The full case caption appears at the
end of this opinion. Flaum, Circuit Judge. Georgeen Stevens broughtsuit alleging that her employer, the IllinoisDepartment of Transportation (“IDOT”), dischargedher for reasons related to her disability inviolation of the Americans with Disabilities Act(“ADA” or “Act”), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq.After a jury returned a verdict in favor ofStevens, the district court granted judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict in favor of IDOT. Forthe reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgmentfor IDOT and dismiss this case for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction. I. BACKGROUND Georgeen Stevens worked as a highway maintainerat IDOT’s District 7 Traffic Operations Divisionin Effingham, Illinois for approximately fiveyears, from 1991 to 1996. Maintainers in thatdivision are responsible for repairing andreplacing road signs, striping lines oninterstate highways, installing and maintaininghighway lights and removing snow. On September20, 1993, a mechanical hand lever pump she wasoperating on the job broke and struck Stevens inthe right chest area injuring her. As a result ofthis injury, Stevens began to suffer from apainful neurological condition known as reflexsympathetic dystrophy. Because of this condition,Stevens was unable to lift more than ten poundswith her right arm or stay outside intemperatures lower than fifty degrees for longerthan fifteen minutes without extreme pain. Stevens’s doctor wrote various letters to IDOTstating that she should be provided withaccommodations for her disability but that herability to work depended on her ability towithstand pain. The doctor stated that she shouldbe allowed to determine her own work limitationsand that her condition would not worsen orimprove even if she worked without therecommended accommodations. Stevens requestedaccommodation from IDOT but informed hersupervisors that she was willing to work withoutaccommodation if it could not be provided. Stevens filed a worker’s compensation claim andit was determined that she suffered a 30 percentpermanent partial disability as a result of theaccident. After the worker’s compensationdecision, IDOT fired Stevens because it concludedthat she was not able to perform the functions ofher job. Stevens then filed claims in federaldistrict court under Title VII for sexdiscrimination and under the ADA for disabilitydiscrimination. Her Title VII claim was dismissedon summary judgment and was not appealed. The ADAclaim went to a jury trial where a verdict wasreturned in favor of Stevens. After trial, IDOT filed a motion to vacate theverdict, claiming that the district court did nothave jurisdiction to hear the claim because IDOTwas immune from suit under the EleventhAmendment. The trial court denied this motion.The trial court then overturned the verdict,entering a judgment as a matter of law in favorof IDOT because it found that there was notsubstantial evidence to support the jury’sconclusion that Stevens could perform theessential functions of her job, a criticalelement of her ADA claim. Stevens now appeals. II. DISCUSSION In our recent decision Erickson v. Board ofGovernors, No. 98-3614, 2000 WL 307121 (7th Cir.Mar. 27, 2000), we reexamined our decision inCrawford v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 115F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997), in light of thesubsequent Supreme Court decisions in FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999), andKimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631(2000), in which the Court more precisely definedthe limits of Congress’s Section 5 power toenforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In Erickson, weconcluded that the ADA was not enacted pursuantto a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 powerso that Congress had not effectively abrogatedthe States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity forclaims brought under that Act. We follow themajority’s conclusion in Erickson and we findthat IDOT, a department of the State of Illinois,is immune from suit brought by an individual infederal court under the ADA.
[FOOTNOTE 1] We write furtherto more fully explain the reasoning by which wehave reached this conclusion.
[FOOTNOTE 2] The ADA was enacted “to provide a clear andcomprehensive national mandate for theelimination of discrimination against individualswith disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101(b)(1).The ADA specifically targets discrimination intwo broad areas: employment (Title I) and publicaccommodations (Title II). This case onlyinvolves allegations of employment discriminationthat fall under Title I. Under Title I, a coveredentity may discriminate in two ways: disparatetreatment of or failure to accommodate a disabledemployee. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112; see Foster v.Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7thCir. 1999); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d461, 464 (7th Cir. 1997). To make out a claimunder the ADA, an individual must show: 1) thatshe is disabled; 2) that she is otherwisequalified to perform the essential functions ofthe job with or without reasonable accommodation;and 3) that the employer took an adverse jobaction against her because of her disability orfailed to make a reasonable accommodation. 42U.S.C. sec.sec. 12111-12; see Gile v. UnitedAirlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1996).It is a defense to an ADA claim that anemployment criterion that adversely impactsdisabled persons is “job-related and consistentwith business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. sec. 12113;see EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55F.3d 1276, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Amendment renders a State immunefrom any suit brought by an individual in federalcourt unless the State has consented to beingsued in that forum. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 640(“[T]he Constitution does not provide for federaljurisdiction over suits against nonconsentingStates.”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
[FOOTNOTE 3] Congress may abrogate theStates’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and providefor federal jurisdiction over individual suitsagainst States. However, Congress only has thispower to abrogate when it is acting pursuant toits enforcement power under Section 5 of theFourteenth Amendment. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at644; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58. Congress maynot nullify States’ Eleventh Amendment immunitywhen it is operating under its Article I powers.Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 643-44; Florida Prepaid, 119S.Ct. at 2205; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. Congress has abrogated Illinois’s EleventhAmendment immunity, if it 1) unequivocallyexpressed its intent to abrogate the States’Eleventh Amendment immunity through the ADA, and2) acted pursuant to a valid exercise of itspower under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 640; FloridaPrepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2205; Seminole Tribe, 517U.S. at 55. The text of the ADA makes clearCongress’s explicit intent to abrogate theStates’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for suitsbrought by individuals under that statute. See 42U.S.C. sec. 12202 (“A State shall not be immuneunder the eleventh amendment to the Constitutionof the United States from an action in Federal orState court of competent jurisdiction forviolation of this chapter.”); 42 U.S.C. sec.12101(b)(4) (“It is the purpose of this chapter. . . to invoke the sweep of congressionalauthority, including the power to enforce thefourteenth amendment . . . .”). Therefore, it isonly necessary to discuss the scope of theauthority granted to Congress under Section 5 toenact the ADA. Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 isnot unlimited. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997). Section 5 onlyauthorizes Congress to enact legislation thatremedies or prevents Fourteenth Amendmentviolations.
[FOOTNOTE 4] See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 644. Inorder for a legislative enactment to be a validexercise of this power, Congress must “identifyconduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’ssubstantive provisions, and must tailor itslegislative scheme to remedying or preventingsuch conduct.” Florida Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at2207. This does not mean that Congress may onlyprohibit through federal legislation conduct thatis itself unconstitutional under the FourteenthAmendment. Federal legislation may prohibit “asomewhat broader swath” than that which isdirectly forbidden by the Amendment, providedthat the target of the legislation is to remedyor prevent unconstitutional conduct. Kimel, 120S.Ct. at 644; see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at518. The ultimate test is that “[t]here must bea congruence and proportionality between theinjury to be prevented or remedied and the meansadopted to that end.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at520. The analysis begins with identifying the conducttargeted by Congress through the legislation inquestion. The ADA purports to have the broad goalof “the elimination of discrimination againstindividuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. sec.12101(b)(1). The types of discrimination at whichthe statute is aimed are recited in the “Findingsand purpose” section of the Act. 42 U.S.C. sec.12101(a). Some of the “various forms ofdiscrimination” outlined by Congress as targetedby the Act include: outright intentional exclusion, thediscriminatory effects of architectural,transportation, and communication barriers,overprotective rules and policies, failure tomake modifications to existing facilities andpractices, exclusionary qualification standardsand criteria, segregation, and relegation tolesser services, programs, activities, benefits,jobs, or other opportunities. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101(a)(5). The ADA is tailoredto achieving its goal in part by forbiddingemployment discrimination against the disabledand imposing an affirmative duty to providereasonable accommodation on public and privateemployers. See 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112. Having identified the remedial and preventativegoal of the statute, we next proceed to examinewhether the conduct targeted by the ADAconstitutes a violation of the FourteenthAmendment. We start with the fundamentalprinciple that it is the judiciary, not thelegislature, that determines what conductviolates the provisions of the FourteenthAmendment. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 644 (“Theultimate interpretation and determination of theFourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaningremains the province of the Judicial Branch.”);City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. Therefore, welook to judicial rulings, not congressionalpronouncements, in our consideration of whetherthe conduct targeted by the ADA isunconstitutional. Disabled individuals, like any class, areprotected by the Equal Protection Clause of theFourteenth Amendment. See City of Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985);United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870, 876 (7thCir. 1999). We have previously held that thelevel of protection afforded to this class isthat of rational basis review. See Harris, 197F.3d at 876. Under traditional equal protectionanalysis, it is a violation of the FourteenthAmendment for the State to discriminate againstdisabled persons in an irrational manner or foran illegitimate reason. However, the FourteenthAmendment allows the State to single out thedisabled for different treatment so long as ithas a rational or legitimate purpose. SeeCleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47. As with othercharacteristics that receive rational basisprotection, a State may rely on disability “as aproxy for other qualities, abilities, orcharacteristics that are relevant to the State’slegitimate interests.” Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 646.”That [disability] proves to be an inaccurateproxy in any individual case is irrelevant.” Id.Furthermore, it is presumed that distinctionsmade by the State that are based on disabilityare rational and legitimate. See id.; Cleburne,473 U.S. at 441. The burden rests on theindividual to demonstrate that the government’sclaimed purpose is illegitimate or that the meansused to achieve that purpose are irrational. SeeKimel, 120 S.Ct. at 646. Under the ADA, disabled individuals receivesubstantially more protection than provided bythe Fourteenth Amendment. State practicesaffecting the disabled do not receive the samepresumption of legitimacy that they do underrational basis scrutiny. In many cases, once aqualified individual with a disability hasdemonstrated that the State took an adverseemployment action against her because of herdisability, the burden shifts to the State toshow that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatoryreason for the practice. See DeLuca v. WinerIndus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995)(applying a burden-shifting approach to an ADAclaim); but see Pond v. Michelin N. Am., Inc.,183 F.3d 592, 597 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999) (notingthat the burden-shifting approach only applies toclaims for disparate treatment under the ADA anddoes not apply to claims for failure toreasonably accommodate). Furthermore, under theADA it is no longer the case that any rationalreason will support the State’s action. The ADAimposes on the state a duty to accommodatedisabled individuals and prohibits the State fromdenying any accommodation that is determined tobe “reasonable” under the Act. See Vande Zande v.State of Wisc. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541-542 (7th Cir. 1995). As long as the disabledindividual is able to perform the essentialfunctions of the position in question, the Statecannot choose for a legitimate policy reason totreat disabled employees differently from non-disabled employees. Moreover, while theFourteenth Amendment allows the State to makebroad generalizations about the disabled, the ADA”starts with a presumption in favor of requiringthe employer to make an individualizeddetermination.” Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 647; seeWeigel, 122 F.3d at 466 (noting that “the ADA’s'qualified individual’ inquiry . . . necessarilyinvolves an individualized assessment of theindividual and the relevant position”). As with the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct (“ADEA”) discussed in Kimel, the ADA shiftsthe burden in a disability discrimination casefrom the individual to the State, raises thelevel of judicial scrutiny from rationalityreview to a heightened level of scrutiny, anddisallows the approximations and generalizationsthat are permitted for classes that otherwisereceive only rational basis protection. In sum,the ADA replaces the Fourteenth Amendment’sconstitutional protections with a higher set oflegislative standards, thereby making illegalunder the ADA conduct that is constitutionalunder the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that Congress prohibits some conductthat is constitutional under the FourteenthAmendment does not end our discussion. We alsoexamine the proportionality between the measurestaken by Congress pursuant to its Section 5powers and the unconstitutional conduct that isproperly the target of that enforcement effort.See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 644; City of Boerne, 521U.S. at 520. By proportionality we mean that”[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures mustbe considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harmmay be an unwarranted response to another, lesserone.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (internalcitations omitted). It is in this respect thatthis case differs from other cases recentlydecided by the Supreme Court in this area. Unlikewith respect to its enactment of the ADEA, thePatent and Plant Variety Protection RemedyClarification Act, or the Religious FreedomRestoration Act, Congress made extensive findingsof discrimination against the disabled to supportits passage of the ADA. Compare 42 U.S.C. sec.12101, and Coolbaugh v. State of Louisiana, 136F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting the broadrange of evidence upon which Congress madeextensive findings of discrimination against thedisabled in support of the passage of the ADA),with Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 649 (“Congress neveridentified any pattern of age discrimination bythe States”), Florida Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2207(“Congress identified no pattern of patentinfringement by the States”), and City of Boerne,521 U.S. at 530 (“RFRA’s legislative record lacksexamples of modern instances of generallyapplicable laws passed because of religiousbigotry.”). With the enactment of the ADA,Congress was not acting to remedy or preventunsubstantiated harm but was attempting toaddress the documented injury of pervasivedisability discrimination. However, not all discrimination against aparticular class is discrimination that isunconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.As noted above, discrimination against groupsthat receive rational basis protection is onlyunconstitutional where that discrimination isarbitrary and unrelated to a legitimategovernment purpose. In this case, thediscrimination targeted by the ADA may wellinclude such arbitrary and illegitimatedistinctions concerning disabled persons.However, the ADA also undoubtedly prohibits muchconduct that is permissible under the FourteenthAmendment. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 541(notingthat the discrimination prohibited by the ADA isnot only that which is arbitrary or irrelevant tolegitimate considerations). The fact that the ADAtargets some discrimination that is not aviolation of the Fourteenth Amendment isreflected in the Congressional finding that”unlike individuals who have experienceddiscrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,national origin, religion, or age, individualswho have experienced discrimination on the basisof disability have often had no legal recourse toredress such discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. sec.12101(a)(4). Thus, while the ADA may remedy andprevent arbitrary and illegitimate discriminationagainst the disabled that is unconstitutional, italso sweeps in a wide area of conduct singlingout the disabled that is not prohibited by theFourteenth Amendment. It is apparent that the broad sweep of the ADAis not “‘adapted to the mischief and wrong whichthe [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended toprovide against.’” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at532 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13(1883)) (brackets in the original). As theSupreme Court has repeatedly noted, theFourteenth Amendment is aimed at preventingdiscrimination by the States, as opposed todiscrimination by private actors that may beaddressed through Congress’s Article I powers.See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 649; Florida Prepaid, 119S.Ct. at 2207; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.In its passage of the ADA, Congress appears tohave relied on significant findings ofdiscrimination against the disabled throughoutsociety. However, these findings do not revealthat the States themselves are discriminatingagainst the disabled in an arbitrary orillegitimate fashion such that it is appropriatefor the federal government to step in withfederal legislation aimed at compellingcompliance with the dictates of theConstitution.
[FOOTNOTE 5] The lack of evidence that theStates are pervasively discriminating against thedisabled is compounded by the fact that virtuallyevery State in the Union has promulgated statestatutes prohibiting discrimination against thedisabled in employment.
[FOOTNOTE 6] Moreover, severalStates have explicit policies encouraging theemployment of the disabled in state governmentpositions.
[FOOTNOTE 7] There is no evidence in thelegislative record that the States are actingcontrary to these policies or that those Stateswhich do not have them are engaged in widespreaddiscrimination against the disabled. It is onlywhen the States themselves are engaged in conductthat violates the Fourteenth Amendment thatCongress is authorized to step in under Section5 to remedy and prevent those violations. SeeKimel, 120 S.Ct. at 645; Florida Prepaid, 119S.Ct. at 2211. We do not doubt that occasionallyStates falter in their efforts to eliminatediscrimination in state employment. However, thebroad sweeping federal legislative remedy that isthe ADA is out of proportion to correcting thetransgressions that do occur. Without moredetailed findings concerning a nationwide patternof arbitrary and illegitimate discriminationagainst the disabled by the States, the ADAcannot be viewed as a proportional and congruousresponse to the problem of state-perpetrateddiscrimination against the disabled. While theADA’s goal of eliminating discrimination againstthe disabled throughout society may be a laudableaim for federal legislation, it is not one whichserves the purpose of enforcing the protectionsprovided by the Fourteenth Amendment. See City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (“Congress does notenforce a constitutional right by changing whatthe right is. It has been given the power ‘toenforce,’ not the power to determine whatconstitutes a constitutional violation.”). In conclusion, we wish to emphasize the limitednature of our decision in this case as well asour decision in Erickson. We have only concludedthat States are entitled to Eleventh Amendmentimmunity for suits brought by individuals underthe ADA. The limitations on that immunity applywith equal force in this context. See, e.g.,United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-141 (1965); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651(1974); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).Furthermore, our decisions do not address thevalidity of the ADA as an exercise of Congress’sCommerce Clause power. Therefore, in all contextsother than that of an individual suing a State infederal court, the ADA retains its full force asa means of enforcing nationwide standards fornon-discriminatory treatment of the disabled. III. CONCLUSION Passage of the ADA was not a proper exercise ofCongress’s authority under Section 5 of theFourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the ADA does notabrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity,and IDOT, as a department of the State ofIllinois, cannot be sued without its consent infederal court for a violation of the ADA. Weconclude that the district court did not havesubject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. WeVacate the district court’s entry of judgment infavor of the defendant and Dismiss this case forlack of subject matter jurisdiction. :::FOOTNOTES:::
FN1 Suits against departments of state government areequivalent to suits against a State for purposesof Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis. SeePennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465U.S. 89, 100-101 (1983).
FN2Because we find that Illinois is immune fromsuit, we limit our discussion to that issue anddo not discuss the merits of Stevens’s claim. Inaddition, Congress’s power to enact the ADApursuant to the Commerce Clause is not an issuein this appeal and is not addressed by thisopinion.
FN3 We find no evidence in the record that IDOTconsented to suit in federal court. The mere factthat the Illinois Attorney General appeared infederal court to represent the State’s interestsis not sufficient to constitute consent by theState to be sued in a federal forum. See Estateof Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir.1994) (finding that the Attorney General ofIllinois is not authorized to waive the State’sEleventh Amendment immunity).
FN4 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: Section 1. . . . . No State shall make orenforce any law which shall abridge theprivileges or immunities of citizens of theUnited States; nor shall any State deprive anyperson of life, liberty, or property, without dueprocess of law; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. .. . Section 5. The Congress shall have power toenforce, by appropriate legislation, theprovisions of this article.
FN5 The dissent in Erickson notes that Congress madefindings concerning discrimination against thedisabled in areas such as education, health careand transportation that are traditionallyprovided, at least in part, by state governments.Erickson, No. 98-3614, 2000 WL 307121, at *12.However, there is no indication that anydiscrimination found by Congress was arbitrary orirrational such that it would constitute aviolation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
FN6 See Ala. Code sec.21-7-8; Alaska Stat.sec.18.80.220; Ariz. Rev. Stat. sec. 41-1463;Ark. Code Ann. sec. 11-13-110; Cal. Gov’t Codesec. 12940; Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 24-34-402;Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 46a-60; Del. Code Ann. tit.19, sec. 724; Fla. Stat. ch. 760.10; Ga. CodeAnn. sec. 34-6A-4; Haw. Rev. Stat. sec. 378-2;Idaho Code sec. 67-5909; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat.5/1-102; Ind. Code sec. 22-9-1-2; Iowa Code sec.216.6; Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-1001; Ky. Rev. Stat.Ann. sec. 207.150; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec.23:323; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, sec. 4572;Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, sec. 16; Mass. Gen. Lawsch. 93, sec. 103; Mich. Comp. Laws sec. 37.1202;Minn. Stat. sec. 363.03; Miss. Code Ann. sec. 43-6-15; Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 213.055; Mont. codeAnn. sec. 49-4-101; Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 48-1104; Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 613.310; N.H. Rev. Stat.Ann. sec. 354-A:7; N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 10:5-4.1;N.M. Stat. Ann. sec. 28-7-2; N.Y. Exec. Law sec.296; N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 168A-5; N.D. Cent. Codesec. 14-02.4-03; Ohio Rev. Code sec. 4112.02;Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, sec. 1302; Or. Rev.Stat. sec. 659.436; 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. sec. 955;R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 28-5-7; S.C. Code Ann. sec.1-13-80; S.D. Codified Laws sec. 20-13-10; Tenn.Code Ann. sec. 8-50-103; Tex. Lab. Code sec.21.128; Utah Code Ann. sec. 34A-5-106; Vt. Stat.Ann. tit. 3, sec. 495; Va. Code Ann. sec. 51.5-41; Wash. Rev. Code sec. 49.60.180; W. Va. Codesec. 5-11-9; Wis. Stat. sec. 111.31; Wyo. Stat.Ann. sec. 27-9-105.
FN7 See, e.g., Ala. Code sec.21-7-8; Alaska Stat.sec.39.25.150; Ariz. Rev. Stat. sec. 41-783; Ark.Code Ann. sec. 20-14-301; Colo. Rev. Stat. sec.24-34-801; Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 46a-70; Fla.Stat. ch. 413-08; Ga. Code Ann. sec. 30-1-2; Haw.Rev. Stat. sec. 347-20; Idaho Code sec. 56-707;775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 30/5; Ind. Code sec. 16-32-3-5; Iowa Code sec. 19B.2; Kan. Stat. Ann. 39-1005; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, sec. 1316; Md.Ann. Code art. 30, sec. 33; Minn. Stat. sec.256C.01; Miss. Code Ann. sec. 43-6-15; Mo. Rev.Stat. sec. 209.180; Mont. code Ann. sec. 49-4-202; Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 20-131; Nev. Rev. Stat.sec. 284.012; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 167-C:5;N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 11A:7-3; N.M. Stat. Ann.sec. 28-7-7; N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 128-15.3; N.D.Cent. Code sec. 25-13-05; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.74, sec. 840-2.9; R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 28-5.1-4;S.C. Code Ann. sec. 43-33-60; Tenn. Code Ann.sec. 71-4-202; Tex. Hum. Res. Code sec. 91.017;Utah Code Ann. sec. 26-30-3; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.21, sec. 309a; Va. Code Ann. sec. 51.5-41; Wash.Rev. Code sec. 70.84.080; Wis. Stat. sec. 230.01.
Stevens v. Illinois Dept. of Transp. In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 98-3550 Georgeen Stevens, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Illinois Department of Transportation, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Benton Division. No. 96-4358–James L. Foreman, Judge. Argued December 8, 1999–Decided April 11, 2000 Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Coffey and Flaum, CircuitJudges.
