The full case caption appears at the
end of this opinion. McGregor, Justice �1 The issue presented is whether Arizona should adopt thepositive misconduct rule, which permits a client whose attorney hasabandoned him or her to obtain relief from a judgment by invokingRule 60(c)(6) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. We declineto adopt the rule because doing so would require us to abandon ourlong-standing interpretation of Rule 60(c) and to overturnestablished principles of law. I. �2 On January 18, 1993, a car driven by Denise Karlin struckLaura Panzino as she walked in a street to avoid rainwater pondingin her path. Panzino, seriously injured, retained attorney DavidAppleton to represent her. Appleton eventually filed two identicalpersonal injury actions against the same defendants, neither ofwhich he timely pursued. On the motion of defendants, the trialcourt dismissed both actions. �3 Panzino then retained new counsel, who moved for reliefunder Rule 60(c)(6), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The trialcourt, relying upon the positive misconduct rule, granted relief inone action and denied relief in the other. The court of appeals,also adopting the positive misconduct rule, held that Rule 60(c)(6)provided Panzino relief in both actions. The court concluded thatAppleton’s omissions and actions in representing Panzinodemonstrated “longstanding and pervasive neglect” and constitutedcomplete and total abandonment of his client. See Panzino v. Cityof Phoenix, 195 Ariz. 453, 459, 990 P.2d 654, 660 (App. 1999).Although Appleton disputes that characterization, we assume forpurposes of this opinion that Appleton’s actions comprisedlongstanding and pervasive neglect, that he completely abandonedhis client, and that Panzino was relatively free from negligence.�4 We granted review to decide whether Arizona should adoptthe positive misconduct rule. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant toarticle VI, section 5.3 of the Arizona Constitution, Rule 23 of theArizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, and Arizona RevisedStatutes Annotated (A.R.S.) section 12-120.24. II. �5 Rule 60(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure allowsa trial court to grant relief from judgment for the followingreasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligencecould not have been discovered in time to move for a newtrial under Rule 59(d); (3) fraud (whether heretoforedenominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation orother misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment isvoid; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, ordischarged, or a prior judgment on which it is based hasbeen reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longerequitable that the judgment should have prospectiveapplication; or (6) any other reason justifying relieffrom the operation of the judgment. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 60(c).
[FOOTNOTE 1] This rule “‘is primarily intended to allowrelief from judgments that, although perhaps legally faultless, areunjust because of extraordinary circumstances that cannot beremedied by legal review.’” Hyman v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 150Ariz. 444, 447, 724 P.2d 63, 66 (App. 1986) (quoting Tippit v.Lahr, 132 Ariz. 406, 408-09, 646 P.2d 291, 293-94 (App. 1982)).Thus, “[t]he purpose of the rule is to provide relief for thosemistakes and errors which inevitably occur despite diligent effortsto comply with the rules.” City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz.323, 332, 697 P.2d 1073, 1082 (1985). �6 To obtain relief under Rule 60(c)(6), the subsection onwhich Panzino relies, a party must make two showings. “‘First, the reason for setting aside the [judgment or order] must not be one ofthe reasons set forth in the five preceding clauses. . . . Second,the “other reason” advanced must be one that justifies relief.’”Bickerstaff v. Denny’s Restaurant, Inc., 141 Ariz. 629, 632, 688P.2d 637, 640 (1984) (quoting Webb v. Erickson, 134 Ariz. 182, 186,655 P.2d 6, 10 (1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).Furthermore, the subsection applies only when our systemiccommitment to finality of judgments is outweighed by”‘extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice.’” Id.(quoting Webb, 134 Ariz. at 187, 655 P.2d at 11).
[FOOTNOTE 2] �7 In general, a party can obtain Rule 60(c)(6) relief froma judgment entered due to his or her attorney’s failure to act onlyif that failure is legally excusable. See id. at 633, 688 P.2d at641; see also ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). In contrasting cases ofinexcusable neglect, the client cannot obtain relief because “theclient is charged with the actions and omissions of its attorney.”Mission Ins. Co. v. Cash, Sullivan & Cross, 170 Ariz. 105, 108, 822P.2d 1, 4 (App. 1991); see also Carroll v. Abbott Lab. Inc., 654P.2d 775, 775 (Cal. 1982) (“[A]s a general rule an attorney’sinexcusable neglect is chargeable to the client.”). �8 To permit relief from judgment when an attorney’s conduct is so egregious as to constitute abandonment of a client, a smallnumber of courts adopted the “positive misconduct rule.” The rule,which apparently had its genesis in Daley v. County of Butte, 38Cal. Rptr. 693, 700 (Ct. App. 1964), describes an exception to therule that an attorney’s actions bind his client:”[E]xcepted from the rule are those instances where theattorney’s neglect is of that extreme degree amounting topositive misconduct, and the person seeking relief isrelatively free from negligence. . . . The exception ispremised upon the concept [that] the attorney’s conduct,in effect, obliterates the existence of theattorney-client relationship, and for this reason hisnegligence should not be imputed to the client.” Carroll, 654 P.2d at 778 (citations omitted) (quoting Buckert v.Briggs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (Ct. App. 1971)); see also Thomas N.Thrasher and Gary T. Blate, Positive Misconduct: Excusing anAttorney’s Inexcusable Neglect, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 667 (1988).
[FOOTNOTE 3] A few federal courts also have sparingly applied the exception.See, e.g., Boughner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 572F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978) (granting relief because theattorney’s “egregious conduct amounted to nothing short of leavinghis clients unrepresented”); United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 34 (2d Cir. 1977) (granting relief because the attorney’s failureto act was caused by “a mental disorder which induced him to bothneglect his duties and to assure his client that he was attendingto them”). By and large, however, this exception has found littlefavor outside California. �9 Even those jurisdictions that recognize the rule haveconstrued it narrowly. For instance, the California Supreme Courtconcluded that the positive misconduct rule “should be narrowlyapplied, lest negligent attorneys find that the simplest way togain the twin goals of rescuing clients from defaults andthemselves from malpractice liability, is to rise to ever greaterheights of incompetence and professional irresponsibility while,nonetheless, maintaining a beatific attorney-client relationship.”Carroll, 654 P.2d at 779.�10 With this background, we turn to the reasons we rejectPanzino’s arguments urging us to adopt the positive misconduct rulein Arizona. III. A. �11 Adopting the positive misconduct rule would require thatwe abandon our traditional understanding of the relationshipbetween subsections one through five and subsection six of Rule60(c). We cannot consistently hold that although Rule 60(c)(1) allows relief for judgment only for excusable neglect, Rule 60(c)(6) allows relief from inexcusable neglect in the form ofabandonment. �12 Rule 60(c)(6) provides an equitable catch-all thatauthorizes a trial court to set aside a final judgment for “anyother reason justifying relief” beyond the specific reasons listedin clauses one through five. See also Gorman v. City of Phoenix,152 Ariz. 179, 181-82, 731 P.2d 74, 76-77 (1987); Bickerstaff, 141Ariz. at 632, 688 P.2d at 640. We have long held, however, that”the reason for setting aside the [judgment or order] must not beone of the reasons set forth in the five preceding clauses.” Webb,134 Ariz. at 186, 655 P.2d at 10. Because Panzino cannot attributeexcusable neglect to her former lawyer, we could grant the reliefshe seeks only by overturning those decisions that hold subsectionsone through five are mutually exclusive from subsection six. �13 Moreover, adopting the positive misconduct rule wouldresult in the irrational holding that Rule 60(c) applies to actionsin which attorneys engaged in excusable neglect or to actions inwhich attorneys completely abandoned their clients, but not toactions involving attorney activities that fall between those twoextremes. In United States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue, 15 F.3d 632,634 (7th Cir. 1994), the court rejected the same argument madehere, explaining: We know how to treat both ends of the continuum:negligence and willful misconduct alike are attributed to the litigant. When the polar cases are treatedidentically, intermediate cases do not call fordifferentiation. Holding that negligence and wilfulmisconduct, but not gross negligence, may be the basis ofa default judgment would make hay for standup comics. Nolawyer would dream of arguing on behalf of a hospitalthat, although the hospital is liable in tort for staffphysicians’ negligence and intentional misconduct, it isnot liable for their “gross negligence.” The argumentmakes no more sense when presented on behalf of a lawyeror litigant. �14 Commentators also have criticized the positive misconductrule as illogical:Courts are sensitive to the fact that justice is notalways served when clients are required to bear theconsequences of attorney misconduct. As a result, thereis an older line of cases that holds that when anattorney is guilty of gross negligence, and the client isinnocent of wrongdoing, relief from a judgment may be hadunder Rule 60(b)(6) even though this “neglect” is not”excusable” under Rule 60(b)(1) . . . . This line ofcases goes against the general rule that conduct arguablywithin some other subsection of Rule 60(b) should not begrounds for relief under the catch-all provision of Rule60(b)(6) . . . . This line of cases also is illogical,in that the opponent is made to bear the brunt ofunacceptable conduct by an attorney while the party thathired the attorney obtains relief. 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, � 60.48[4][b] (3d ed.1997) (internal citations omitted).�15 Adopting the positive misconduct rule would thereforerequire not only that we abandon our previous interpretation ofRule 60(c), but also that we abandon it to adopt an illogicalreplacement. B. �16 The positive misconduct rule also ignores established principles of third-party agency law. Under general rules ofagency, which apply to the attorney-client relationship, “[t]heneglect of the attorney is equivalent to the neglect of the clienthimself when the attorney is acting within the scope of hisauthority.” Balmer v. Gagnon, 19 Ariz. App. 55, 57, 504 P.2d 1278,1280 (1973); see also 7108 West Grand Ave., 15 F.3d at 634 (“Theclients are principals, the attorney is an agent, and under the lawof agency the principal is bound by his chosen agent’s deeds.”).To avoid that effect, courts adopting the positive misconduct rulereason that an attorney’s positive misconduct “obliterates theexistence of the attorney-client relationship,” Buckert, 93 Cal.Rptr. at 64, and that the client, therefore, should not be heldresponsible for the attorney’s actions. �17 But the abandonment of a principal by an agent does not,absent notice to a third party,
[FOOTNOTE 4] affect the agent’s authority tobind the principal as to third parties. Because the attorney-clientrelationship is governed by principles of agency law, thetermination of the lawyer’s authority does not terminate hisapparent authority as to third parties, i.e., adverse litigants.See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY � 124A (1958).
[FOOTNOTE 5] Thus, under traditional agency rules, even if an agent abandons a principal,the agent retains apparent authority as to third parties. Althoughabandonment by a lawyer may afford his client-the injuredprincipal-the right to bring an action against the lawyer, it doesnot affect the client’s responsibility for the actions of hislawyer. Without addressing the merits of her actions, we note onlythat under agency principles, Panzino’s right of action now liesagainst her former attorney,
[FOOTNOTE 6] not against the original defendants. C. �18 The positive misconduct rule also produces another significant negative impact in that it undermines the finality ofjudgments. “As a matter of public policy, a judgment must at sometime become final, for if it were not so, there could never be anycertainty as to the rights acquired thereunder.” Vazquez v.Dreyfus, 34 Ariz. 184, 188, 269 P. 80, 81 (1928). Our courts haveoften recognized the importance of according finality to judgments,particularly in the area of civil judgments. For example, inTippit, 132 Ariz. at 409, 646 P.2d at 294, the court held that”[t]he public policy against the assignment of personal injuryclaims does not outweigh the compelling societal interest in thefinality of judgments.” And, in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 133 Ariz.88, 89, 649 P.2d 291, 292 (App. 1982), the court said, “‘[p]ublicpolicy requires an end to litigation and even erroneous finaljudgments must be honored in order to continue the “well-orderedfunctioning of the judicial process.”‘” Id. (citations omitted inoriginal) (quoting In re Marriage of Fellers, 178 Cal. Rptr. 35, 37(Ct. App. 1981)). �19 Although our trial courts enjoy broad discretion whendeciding whether to set aside judgments under Rule 60(c), thatdiscretion “is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality ofjudgments and termination of litigation.” Waifersong, Ltd. v.Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992). Partiesto a legal action should thereafter be “entitled to rely upon such adjudication as a final settlement of their controversy.” Hines v.Royal Indem. Co., 253 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1958). Permittingrelief from judgments entered as a result of an attorney’s actionsclearly undermines the “undeniable public policy that recognizesthe finality of judgments and discourages multiplicitouslitigation.” Smith v. Saxon, 186 Ariz. 70, 74 n.3, 918 P.2d 1088,1092 n.3 (App. 1996). D. �20 We reject the positive misconduct rule for yet anotherreason that we regard as significant: the rule can encouragelawyers “who have lapsed into carelessness to deliberately expandtheir neglect to a level of egregiousness as a tactic to save theirclient’s case.” Panzino, 195 Ariz. at 458, 990 P.2d at 659. Thecourt of appeals dismissed this concern by reasoning that the”narrow availability of relief, the uncertainty of achieving it,and the specter of malpractice lawsuits, professional insurancerate increases, state bar disciplinary proceedings, . . .reputational harm, . . . [and] considerations of professionalism”would encourage attorneys not to abandon a client. Id.�21 We cannot agree that it is acceptable for the courts toapprove a rule that encourages, to any degree, abandonment of aclient by an attorney, while relying upon other considerations todiscourage behavior we regard as unacceptable. We agree with theCarroll court that “[w]hen inexcusable neglect is condoned even tacitly by the courts, they themselves unwittingly becomeinstruments undermining the orderly process of the law.” Carroll,654 P.2d at 779. We simply cannot adopt a rule that encourageslawyers, once their misconduct or inattention has made successfulrepresentation of a client unlikely, to abandon the client so thatthe client can later seek relief under Rule 60(c)(6). E. �22 We conclude that adopting the positive misconduct rulewould require us to abandon our long-standing interpretation ofRule 60(c) and replace it with an illogical interpretation; requireus to ignore established principles of the law of agency; underminethe public policy favoring finality of judgments; and encourageneglectful lawyers to expand their improper behavior toabandonment. The relative benefit to weigh against those harms isslight. �23 The experience of California has shown that relief isjustified on the basis of this rule in very few cases. Since 1964,in Daley v. Butte County, 38 Cal. Rptr. 693 (Ct. App. 1964),California appellate courts have addressed the positive misconductrule in written opinions approximately thirty times and, duringthis thirty-six year span, have granted relief only fourteentimes.
[FOOTNOTE 7] Those cases constitute a very small proportion of California’s appellate decisions. Between 1988 and 1998 alone,California’s appellate courts disposed of more than 120,000 casesby written opinion. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ADMINISTRATIVEOFFICE OF THE COURTS, 1999 COURT STATISTICS REPORT 35 (1999). Thus, theissue has affected a very small percentage of the cases heard.�24 Although we do not disregard the plaintiff’s difficultiesin this case, the overall effect of limiting Rule 60(c) relief fora lawyer’s actions to those cases involving legally excusableactivity appears to be de minimis. Balanced against thesubstantial harm adopting the positive misconduct rule could cause,any benefit is outweighed by the negative impact of the rule. Wetherefore decline to adopt the rule as a basis for relief underRule 60(c). IV. �25 For the foregoing reasons we vacate the opinion of the court of appeals; reverse the trial court’s judgment in case numberCV 93-16143 and remand for proceedings consistent with thisopinion; and affirm the trial court’s judgment in case numberCV 95-00773. Ruth V. McGregor, Justice CONCURRING: Thomas A. Zlaket, Chief Justice Charles E. Jones, Vice Chief Justice Frederick J. Martone, Justice FELDMAN, Justice, dissenting �26 The issue characterized as “positive misconduct” has beenadverted to and left open in previous cases. See ante � 8 n.3. Indescribing the situation as a case of complete abandonment, thecourt of appeals has finally given the question a proper label. Inmy view, that court reached the correct result. See Panzino v.City of Phoenix, 195 Ariz. 453, 990 P.2d 654 (App. 1999). Agreeingwith its analysis, I need respond to only a few of the points madein this court’s majority opinion. �27 Under the facts of this case, the conduct of Panzino’slawyer cannot be considered neglect, excusable or inexcusable. Heliterally abandoned Panzino, leaving her totally unrepresented.Indeed, she would have been much better off without her lawyer’sso-called help. The court of appeals described the situation quitewell in stating that the lawyerneglected not just one part but the entiretyof his client’s claim. One may fairlysummarize his representation by saying that hefiled Panzino’s claim against the City, parkedit on the inactive calendar, and abandoned it,ignoring the rules, ignoring notices from thecourt, ignoring even the court administrator’sdismissal order, and calendaring nodeadlines. . . . [The lawyer's] neglect ofPanzino’s claim against the City wasegregious; it was “consistent, wide-ranging,and of long duration”; and it “‘amounted tonothing short of leaving his client[]unrepresented.’” 195 Ariz. at 460, 990 P.2d at 661 (quoting Mission Ins. Co. v. Cash, Sullivan & Cross, 170 Ariz. 105, 109, 822 P.2d 1, 5 (App.1991)). This being true, I cannot agree with the majority’s viewthat we should look at this case as one of neglect. See ante at�� 3 and 7. I agree that because Rule 60(c), Ariz.R.Civ.P.,permits relief for excusable neglect, we cannot grant relief froma judgment for inexcusable neglect. But we deal here with completeabandonment, a different matter than handling the case in anegligent or even grossly negligent manner. �28 For the same reason, I cannot agree with the majority’sview that the general rules of agency require or should require thelawyer’s acts or omissions to be charged against his client. Thislawyer ceased representing his client and abandoned his role as heragent. He left Panzino turning in the wind, uninformed,unrepresented, and helpless. As the majority correctly describesit, the lawyer had abandoned Panzino and was no longer acting onher behalf. The majority holds, nevertheless, that Panzino remainsresponsible “for the actions of [her] lawyer.” Ante at � 18. Butthat result is inconsistent with the rule that a client is notbound by his lawyer’s unauthorized actions when those actionsaffect and impair the client’s substantial rights. See Garn v.Garn, 155 Ariz. 156, 160, 745 P.2d 604, 608 (App. 1987) (attorneyhas no implied or apparent authority to stipulate to settlementwithout client’s consent). �29 Finally, I do not agree that adoption of the positivemisconduct rule would have any significant effect on the finalityof judgments, given the existing provisions of Rule 60(c), which, not too infrequently, permit relief from final judgments. As themajority itself notes, the additional cases in which the positivemisconduct rule has been applied are limited to ratherextraordinary facts and are very few and far between. See ante at� 17 n.6 and � 24. �30 Thus, I would agree with the court of appeals that whenthe facts show total abandonment of a client, Rule 60(c)(6) allowsequity to intervene and grant relief. That relief, of course,should not be granted if the client’s actions have contributed tothe situation in any way or if the grant of relief would cause anysignificant prejudice to the opposing party. See Seacall Dev.,Ltd. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 229(Cal.App. 1999). In either of those events, principles of equitywould militate against granting relief. This record establishesneither factor; nor has the city’s response made such claim. Imust therefore respectfully dissent. STANLEY G. FELDMAN, Justice :::FOOTNOTES:::
FN1 The present Rule 60(c) is Arizona’s counterpart to Rule60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and has beeninterpreted similarly by Arizona courts.
FN2 The authority on which the dissent relies, infra at � 28,does not implicate Rule 60(c) and our commitment to the finality ofjudgments and therefore provides little guidance in resolving theissue we face.
FN3 In several decisions, Arizona courts have discussed thepositive misconduct rule, but have neither accepted nor rejectedthe rule. See, e.g., Bickerstaff v. Denny’s Restaurant, Inc., 141Ariz. 629, 688 P.2d 637 (1984); McKernan v. Dupont, 192 Ariz. 550,968 P.2d 623 (App. 1998); Mission Ins. Co. v. Cash, Sullivan &Cross, 170 Ariz. 105, 822 P.2d 1 (App. 1991). To the extent thosedecisions can be read as endorsing the positive misconduct rule, wedisapprove them.
FN4 We note that there is neither an assertion by Panzino nora suggestion in the record that would allow the inference thatdefendants knew Appleton’s authority had been terminated.
FN5 “The termination of authority does not thereby terminateapparent authority.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY � 124A (1958). The comments to this section further explain that “[i]f there wasapparent authority previously, its existence is unaffected untilthe knowledge or notice of the termination of authority comes tothe third person . . . .” Id. � 124A cmt. a; see also id. � 125(“Apparent authority, not otherwise terminated, terminates when thethird person has notice of: (a) the termination of the agent’sauthority; (b) a manifestation by the principal that he no longerconsents.”). Thus, the general rule is that the acts of the agent,within the apparent scope of the agent’s authority, are binding onthe principal as against a third party who had formerly dealt withthe principal through the agent and who had no notice of therevocation, because such a third party is justified in assuming thecontinuance of the agency relationship.
FN6 See Florida v. Gautier, 147 So. 240, 247 (Fla. 1933)(The agent “cannot withdraw therefrom wantonly and without causewithout rendering himself responsible to the principal for any lossthat he may sustain therefrom.”); Rudolph v. Andrew Murphy & Son,Inc., 237 N.W. 659, 661 (Neb. 1931) (“[T]he agent who renouncesbefore the expiration of that period, or before the performance ofhis undertaking, will be liable to his principal for the damages hemay sustain thereby.”); see also 2A C.J.S. Agency � 128 (1972)(“[R]enunciation before the time specified for the termination willsubject the agent to the liability for damages sustained by hisprincipal.”).
FN7 Of these fourteen grants of relief, eight occurred beforethe 1988 amendment to section 473, which is California’s counterpart to our Rule 60(c)(6), one occurred between 1989 and1992, and five since 1993. We also note that California has twiceamended section 473 of its Code of Civil Procedure, thus codifyingthe positive misconduct rule. In 1988, the amendment to section473 granted relief from default judgments only, when accompanied byan attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her “mistake,inadvertence, surprise or neglect,” and created “a limitedexception to the court’s discretionary power.” Billings v. HealthPlan of America, 275 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83-84 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasisadded). The 1992 Amendments, which took effect January 1, 1993,expanded this exception to apply to defaults and dismissals causedby attorney “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” CAL.CIV. PROC. � 473(b) (emphasis added); see also Tustin PlazaPartnership v. Wehage, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1994).Arizona, however, has made no such change to our existing rules.
Panzino v. City of Phoenix SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA En Banc LAURA J. PANZINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF PHOENIX, Defendant-Appellant. No. CV-99-0193-PR Court of Appeals Nos. 1 CA-CV 96-0425and 1-CA-CV 96-0609 Maricopa County Nos. CV 93-1614 and CV 95-00773 Appeal from the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County The Honorable Frank T. Galati, Judge JUDGMENT IN CV 93-16143 REVERSED AND REMANDED JUDGMENT IN CV 95-00773 AFFIRMED Opinion of the Court of Appeals Division One 195 Ariz. 453, 990 P.2d 654 (App. 1999) Jones Skelton & Hochuli,by David C. Lewis,Attorneys for the City of Phoenix City of Phoenix, by Stephen J. Craig, Attorneys for the City of Phoenix Jones Skelton & Hochuli, by Ronald W. Collett and Eileen J. Dennis, Attorneys for the Karlins Robert F. Clarke, P.C., by Robert F. Clarke and Sonja M. Yurkiw, Attorneys for Panzino Bury, Moeller, Humphrey & O’Meara, P.C., by Andrew J. Petersen, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association of Defense Counsel Tucson
