RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Joseph Conleybrought this action pursuant to theVocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973(the “Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C.sec. 701 et seq., and the Americans withDisabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”), 42U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq. He claimed thathis employer, the Village of Bedford Park(the “Village”), had discriminatedagainst him on the basis of hisdisability; Mr. Conley is a recoveringalcoholic. The district court grantedsummary judgment for the Village. For thereasons set forth in the followingopinion, we affirm the judgment of thedistrict court. I BACKGROUND A. Facts
[FOOTNOTE 1] Mr. Conley worked as a MaintenanceWorker for the Village of Bedford Park.He was assigned to the Water Departmentfrom October 1989, until his transfer tothe Department of Public Works in October1997. For the first four and one-halfyears of his employment, Mr. Conley waschronically tardy and absent from workwithout permission. In response, theWater Department imposed various forms ofprogressive discipline, including verbalwarnings, written warnings, and, finally,suspension. Believing that alcoholism wasthe root of Mr. Conley’s work problems,Water Department management requestedthat Mr. Conley submit to a substanceabuse evaluation. As a result of thatevaluation, Mr. Conley was required toattend an alcohol rehabilitation programin late February and early March of 1994. As the completion of his program drewnear, Mr. Conley contacted hissupervisor, James Gifford. The exactnature of the conversations between Mr.Conley and Gifford are disputed. According to Mr. Conley, however, hecontacted Gifford on March 1, 1994, andtold Gifford that he (Mr. Conley) wouldbe released from the program on March 3;Gifford responded: “Mike, I don’t havetime for this s_ _ t now. Call me whenyou get your paperwork,” and hung up.R.7, Ex.3 at 63. On March 3, the day Mr.Conley was released, he called the WaterDepartment at 4:15 p.m. and again askedfor Gifford. Mr. Conley was told thatGifford had left for the day; Mr. Conleyleft a message. At 9:00 a.m. the following day, Mr.Conley again called Gifford to obtaininstructions for his return to work.Gifford told him that he should havecalled earlier or, at least, havereported for work at the usual starttime; Gifford then told Mr. Conley thathe would have to call Mr. Conley back.After speaking with the Village’sattorney and others, Gifford returned Mr.Conley’s call and told Mr. Conley that heshould come to the Water Department laterthat day. When Mr. Conley arrived, he wasinformed by Gifford that he was beingsuspended for nine days without paybecause he had failed to come directly towork after his treatment and because hehad missed four days of his treatment.During the course of the meeting, Giffordalso told Mr. Conley that he “would berelentless” toward Mr. Conley and thatMr. Conley “should probably find anotherjob.” Id. at 70. Mr. Conley returned to work after hisnine-day suspension. Although hisabsenteeism and punctuality improvedmarkedly, Mr. Conley’s work performancedeclined in Gifford’s eyes. Specifically,Mr. Conley failed to report pump problemsto the central office on severaloccasions. According to Mr. Conley, his diagnosisand treatment for alcoholism marked thebeginning of various types ofdiscrimination by the Village. Forinstance, after his return fromtreatment, Mr. Conley was assigned topaint the pump house for several monthsby himself. During this time, he was notallowed to drive department vehicles.These actions, according to Mr. Conley,made him feel isolated from otheremployees. Mr. Conley also points to other examplesof allegedly discriminatory actions thatoccurred after his treatment. Mr. Conleybelieves that the Village unjustifiablydenied him opportunities to work overtimeand, in August 1996, promoted a lesssenior maintenance worker instead of him. The injustice Mr. Conley perceived as anemployee in the Water Department led himto file a charge of discrimination withthe Illinois Department of Human Rightson March 20, 1997, three years after hissuspension. In his charge, Mr. Conleyalleged that he had been subjected to”different terms and conditions” ofemployment since March of 1994. R.7,Ex.14. Specifically, he complained ofthree actions by the Water Department.First, Mr. Conley stated he had beengiven the “worst job assignments (mainlypainting)” and that this made him feel”isolated from the other employees.” Id.Second, Mr. Conley cited the WaterDepartment’s failure to offer himovertime “as recent as March 7, 1997,” asfurther evidence of discrimination. Id.Finally, Mr. Conley charged that theWater Department failed to promote him toa higher class of maintenance workeraround August 20, 1996. Mr. Conleyattributed his poor treatment to hisdisability; he stated: “I believe I havebeen discriminated against because of mydisability, in violation of the AmericansWith Disabilities Act of 1990, asamended, in that I was not treated badlyuntil after I was diagnosed [with my]disability.” Id. While his charge waspending, Mr. Conley requested, and wasgranted, a transfer to the Department ofPublic Works. B. District Court Proceedings After receiving his right-to-sue letterfrom the EEOC, Mr. Conley brought thisaction in the district court forviolations of both the ADA andRehabilitation Act. In his complaint, Mr.Conley averred that, after the disclosureof his alcoholism in March 1994, hissupervisors no longer considered him “acompetent or valued member of the agency,unjustifiably criticized his work, andpursued adverse personnel actions against[him], all because of his alcoholismcondition.” R.1, para.14. He also stated,as in his EEOC charge, that he “wasdenied promotion, given menialassignments below his former level, andotherwise mistreated.” Id., para.15.Finally, Mr. Conley alleged that theVillage, “through [its] management team,intentionally created a hostile workenvironment for [him] after hisdisclosure of his handicap, on account ofhis handicap.” Id., para.17. The Village denied the materialallegations of the complaint. It also setforth an affirmative defense that Mr.Conley’s complaint was outside the scopeof the charge of discrimination becausethe charge did not name alcoholismspecifically as Mr. Conley’s disability. Shortly thereafter, the Village movedfor summary judgment on the ground thatMr. Conley was not disabled within themeaning of the statutes. According to theVillage, he was not disabled because hewas, at all times, able “to sit, stand,lift, reach, hear, speak, breathe, learn,walk, work, [and] care for himself.” R.5at 11. Furthermore, it did not perceiveMr. Conley as disabled because hepossessed all of the abilities listedabove. The Village also took issue withMr. Conley’s claims that he had sufferedadverse employment actions as a result ofhis alcoholism. The Village claimed thatthere was “no evidence that the Villageof Bedford Park discriminated against Mr.Conley because he was an alcoholic.” Id.at 12. Any failure to promote Mr. Conley,the Village argued, was based on jobperformance. As well, his assignments andopportunities for overtime had notchanged since his treatment. Finally, theVillage reiterated its affirmativedefense that the EEOC charge wasdeficient because it lacked specificsconcerning Mr. Conley’s disability. TheVillage maintained that this deficiencyresulted in an absolute bar to Mr.Conley’s claims because the date forfiling a new charge had passed.
[FOOTNOTE 2] Mr. Conley filed a response to themotion for summary judgment. In hisresponse, Mr. Conley set forth examplesof the ways that the Village haddiscriminated against him, namely, hissuspension, his supervisor’s statementthat he would be “relentless” toward Mr.Conley, the lack of opportunities for himto work overtime, his job assignments,and the fact that he was not promoted.R.13 at 6-7. Mr. Conley also refuted theVillage’s argument that his claims weretime-barred; he said the Village becameaware of the nature of the allegeddisability discrimination early in theEEOC’s investigation. The district court was persuaded by theVillage’s arguments and entered summaryjudgment on its behalf. In its opinion,the court first reiterated the elementsof Mr. Conley’s cause of action: “(1) heis a disabled person under the statute;(2) he is qualified to perform theessential functions of his job with orwithout reasonable accommodation and (3)he has suffered an adverse employmentaction because of his disability.” R.18at 4 (citations omitted). Because Mr.Conley had produced evidence that”Bedford Park viewed his alcoholism asimpairing his job performance,” the courtconcluded that his alcoholism qualifiedas a disability. Id. at 5. The court thendetermined that “Conley has failed tocarry his burden of proving that hisalcoholism did not affect his job andthat he was performing at the samestandard as other employees.” Id. at 6.In support of its statement, the districtcourt pointed to Mr. Conley’sacknowledgment of his less than stellarattendance record and of his admissionthat “his lack of promotion was theresult of not performing on a par withother maintenance workers.” Id. The courtthen addressed Mr. Conley’s otherallegations of discrimination, that hewas not allowed to drive a Villagevehicle and that he was assigned to paintthe pump room for an extended period oftime. It stated: Refusing Conley a city-owned vehicle inwhich to drive to work hardly constitutesdiscrimination when Conley had previouslyappeared for work with alcohol on hisbreath. See Gifford Dep. at 154-56.Conley’s assignment to paint the pumproom was a normal aspect of his job;other maintenance workers had beenrequired to paint parts of the pumpstation. See Orlos Dep. at 12-13. Id. at 6-7. Because Mr. Conley had failedto show that the Village discriminatedagainst him on the basis of hisalcoholism, the court entered judgment onbehalf of the Village. II DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’sgrant of summary judgment to thedefendants. See Silk v. City of Chicago,194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 1999). Inevaluating the district court’s decision,we “must construe all facts in the lightmost favorable to the non-moving partyand draw all reasonable and justifiableinferences in favor of that party.”Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485,491-92 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgmentis proper if the record shows “that thereis no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp.v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).However, the nonmoving party, here Mr.Conley, was required to set forth”specific facts showing that there is agenuine issue for trial,” Fed. R. Civ. P.56(e), and to produce more than ascintilla of evidence in support of hisposition, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In fact,Mr. Conley must have presented evidencefrom “which the jury could reasonablyfind for” him. Id. With these standardsin mind, we turn to Mr. Conley’s firstclaim.
[FOOTNOTE 3] B. Suspension Mr. Conley first argues that the Villagediscriminated against him by suspendinghim for his failure to report for work ontime immediately following his treatment.In order to state a claim fordiscriminatory suspension, Mr. Conleymust establish that he is disabled asdefined under the ADA and that hesuffered an adverse employment action asa result of his disability. See Silk, 194F.3d at 798 n.6. The district courtconcluded, and the Village does notcontest on appeal, that alcoholism is adisability as defined by the ADA.Furthermore, there is no dispute that asuspension constitutes an adverseemployment action. See, e.g., id. at 800;Biolchini v. General Elec. Co., 167 F.3d1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1999) (“It isundisputed that Biolchini . . . sufferedan adverse employment action in the formof a one week suspension . . . .”). Weturn, therefore, to whether Mr. Conleyhas proffered some evidence of an illicitmotive for the adverse action, that is,some causal link between his alcoholismand his suspension. We have stated previously that aplaintiff may show a causal link in twoways: either by (1) putting forward”direct evidence of illegal motive linkedto the challenged employment decision,”or (2) establishing illegal motiveindirectly through the three-step modelof McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411U.S. 792 (1973). Chambers v. AmericanTrans Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1003 (7thCir. 1994). Different kinds andcombinations of evidence can demonstratea discriminatory intent such as”suspicious timing, ambiguous statements,oral or written, behavior toward orcomments directed at other employees inthe protected group, and other bits andpieces from which an inference ofdiscriminatory intent might be drawn.”Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994). Here, if we accept Mr. Conley’s versionof events as true, there is evidence fromwhich an inference of discriminatoryintent might be drawn with respect to thesuspension. Both during and after hisrelease from treatment, Mr. Conley tooksteps to determine exactly what he mustdo to return to work. However, Giffordnever responded to Mr. Conley’s requests.When Mr. Conley finally reached Giffordon March 4, Gifford immediately chastisedMr. Conley for failing to show up forwork at the usual hour and did not giveMr. Conley further instructions at thattime. Instead, Gifford summoned Mr.Conley for a meeting later that afternoonand informed him that he was suspendedfor nine days without pay because he hadfailed to report to work on time. Giffordalso told Mr. Conley that he “would berelentless” toward Mr. Conley and thatMr. Conley “should probably find anotherjob.” R.7, Ex.3 at 70. The combination ofGifford’s reluctance to give Mr. Conleyinstructions for his return to work, ofthe timing of the suspension–occurringthe day Mr. Conley returned to work afterhis treatment–and of Gifford’sstatements during the suspension meeting,is sufficient evidence from which a jurycould find that Mr. Conley’s alcoholismresulted in his suspension.
[FOOTNOTE 4] Nevertheless, we may affirm a grant ofsummary judgment “‘on a ground other thanthat relied upon by the district courtbelow, so long as the alternative basisfinds adequate support in the record.’”E.E.O.C. v. North Knox Sch. Corp., 154F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 1998) (quotingBombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.,92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996)). Thesuspension was a discrete act resultingin a discrete injury to Mr. Conley. Hewas not permitted to work for nine daysand lost his income for those nine days.However, even given Mr. Conley’s obviousloss, he failed to file a charge with theEEOC, or equivalent state agency, withinthe requisite 300-day time period.Consequently, any claim based on thesuspension alone is untimely. Moreover, even if timeliness were not abar, Mr. Conley failed to raise theallegedly discriminatory suspensioneither in his EEOC charge or in hiscomplaint; the suspension was mentionedfor the first time in Mr. Conley’sresponse to the Village’s motion forsummary judgment. “A plaintiff may pursuea claim not explicitly included in anEEOC complaint only if her allegationsfall within the scope of the chargescontained in the EEOC complaint.” Cheekv. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 202(7th Cir. 1996) (citing Harper v. GodfreyCo., 45 F.3d 143, 147-48 (7th Cir.1995)). To determine whether theallegations in the complaint fall withinthe scope of the earlier EEOC charge, wemust look at whether the allegations are”‘like or reasonably related to’” thosecontained in the charge. Id. (quotingHarper, 45 F.3d at 148). We do not believe that the allegationsof discriminatory suspension contained inthe response to the motion for summaryjudgment are “like or reasonably relatedto” those actions contained in the EEOCcharge. The EEOC charge sets forth otheralleged discriminatory employmentactions–unpleasant job assignments, lackof overtime and failure to promote; itdoes not mention the suspension. Thesuspension is a discrete action, taken ata definite time, in response to Mr.Conley’s alleged failure to report forwork in a timely manner. Although all ofthese actions implicate conduct byGifford, they are not related in anyother way. “Not having raised the claimor even its seeds before the EEOC,[Conley] was not entitled to bring it in[his] action.” Id. at 203. Consequently,we conclude that the district court didnot err in granting summary judgment tothe Village on the suspension claim.
[FOOTNOTE 5] C. Failure to Promote Mr. Conley also maintains that theVillage discriminated against him on thebasis of his disability because itpromoted a less senior maintenanceworker, and passed him over forpromotion. The district court held thatMr. Conley admitted that “his lack ofpromotion was the result of notperforming on par with other maintenanceworkers.” R.18 at 6. We agree. To survive summary judgment, Mr. Conleyhad to come forward with indirect ordirect evidence to link his lack ofpromotion with his disability. Theindirect method requires a plaintiff todemonstrate that (1) he was disabledwithin the meaning of the ADA; (2) heapplied for and was qualified for theposition sought; (3) he was rejected forthe position; and (4) those who werepromoted had similar or lesserqualifications for the job. See Ghosh v.Indiana Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 192 F.3d1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 1999) (setting forthelements for a failure to promote claimunder Title VII). Mr. Conley has failedto come forth with any evidence of hisqualifications for this position. At thesame time, he appears to admit that PaulMiraldi, the maintenance worker who waspromoted, was qualified for the job. SeeR.14 at 3.
[FOOTNOTE 6] Furthermore, Mr. Conley has not comeforward with any direct evidence ofdiscrimination with respect to thisclaim. Although Gifford’s allegedstatement that he would be “relentless”toward Mr. Conley may be sufficient toestablish a link between Mr. Conley’ssuspension and his condition as analcoholic, it is not sufficient to linkMr. Conley’s lack of promotion with hisdisability. “To rise to the level ofdirect evidence of discrimination, thisCourt has stated that ‘isolated commentsmust be contemporaneous with the [adverseaction] or causally related tothe[applicable] decision-making process.’”Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman,Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 723 (quoting Geier v.Medtronic Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7thCir. 1996)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 870(1998). However, Gifford’s statementswere made in March 1994, more than twoyears before the allegedly discriminatoryfailure to promote occurred; thesestatements are too distant temporally toprovide support for Mr. Conley’spromotion claim. Here again, Mr. Conley’sadmissions help defeat his claims. Mr.Conley admitted that “Gifford neverdenied [him] a promotion because he wasan alcoholic.” R.6 at 7; R.14 at 3.Consequently, because Gifford’s statementwas not contemporaneous with thepromotion decision, and because Mr.Conley admitted that his alcoholism wasnot a motivating factor in Gifford’sdecision-making process, the districtcourt properly entered summary judgmentfor the Village with respect to thisclaim. D. Lack of Overtime Mr. Conley argues that the districtcourt erred in granting summary judgmentto the Village on his overtime claim. Mr.Conley fails to come forward with anyevidence to substantiate his allegations.He does not set forth any specific timesthat the Village gave others overtimeopportunities, but denied the same tohim. As well, he does not proffer anyevidence to show that, on par, he did notreceive the same number of overtimeopportunities as others. Mr. Conleymerely makes the unsupported allegationthat he was denied overtime on the basisof his alcoholism. Such a statement iswholly inadequate to make out a primafacie case of discrimination. See Jonesv. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 42F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir. 1994) (“‘Self-serving assertions without factualsupport in the record will not defeat amotion for summary judgment.’” (quotingMcDonnell v. Cournia, 990 F.2d 963, 969(7th Cir. 1993))). Consequently, summaryjudgment for the Village was appropriate. E. Painting/Driving the Village Truck Mr. Conley also maintains that theVillage furthered its course ofdiscrimination by requiring him to paintthe pump room for an extended period oftime and by denying him use of a Villagevehicle. We do not believe that theseactions, standing alone, rise to thelevel of an ADA violation. “While adverse employment actions extendbeyond readily quantifiable losses, noteverything that makes an employee unhappyis an actionable adverse action.” Smartv. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441(7th Cir. 1996). “[A] materially adversechange in employment conditions must bemore disruptive than a mere inconvenienceor an alteration of jobresponsibilities[.]” Johnson v. City ofFort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 932 (7th Cir.1996). In this case, Mr. Conley complainsof being assigned to paint the pump roomfor several months and attributes themotivation for this assignment to hisalcoholism because other workers were notassigned to paint for such a long periodof time. However, the record belies Mr.Conley’s assertions. Mr. Orlos, also amaintenance worker, stated that he hadspent “ a whole summer painting firehydrants” and had spent a year paintingone pump room. R.14, Ex.2 at 13.Furthermore, Mr. Conley admitted in hisdeposition that, prior to his treatment,when there was painting to be done, itwas assigned to him. See R.7, Ex.3 at 86. Mr. Conley has not shown that hisassignment to paint the pump room wasmore than “a mere inconvenience or analteration in job responsibilities”;indeed, the assignment seems to be wellwithin the scope of normal activities fora Village maintenance worker.Consequently, Mr. Conley’s paintingassignment did not constitute an adverseaction under the ADA. Mr. Conley also suggests that denyinghim the use of a Village vehicle isolatedhim from his co-workers and, therefore,violated the ADA. We cannot agree.According to the record, Mr. Conley wasdenied the use of a Village vehicle whilepainting the pump room. The Village’sreason for its action was that thevehicles were needed for those who wouldbe answering emergency calls. Mr. Conleydoes not dispute this rationale.Furthermore, Mr. Conley does not explainhow failing to give him a vehicleprevented him from carrying out hisduties or isolated him from his co-employees. Consequently, we cannot saythat denying Mr. Conley use of a vehicle,of itself, violated the ADA.
[FOOTNOTE 7] F. Hostile Work Environment Finally, Mr. Conley rather obliquelyargues that, although any one of theseactions might not violate the ADA, thesum total of actions by the Village risesto the level of a statutory violation. Inessence, Mr. Conley claims that theVillage created a hostile workenvironment for him as a result of hisdisability, see R.1, para.17, although henever uses those terms in his appellatebrief. This court has not yet resolved theissue whether the ADA encompasses a causeof action for hostile work environment.”Thus far, we have assumed the existenceof such claims, without expresslydeciding whether they are proper, becauseresolution of that issue has not beennecessary.” Vollmert v. Wisconsin Dep’tof Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir.1999); see also Silk, 194 F.3d at 803-04.We have followed this course because theactions alleged in the cases before ushave not been “significant enough to riseto the level of a hostile environmentwere that type of claim available.”Vollmert, 197 F.3d at 297. This case isno different. In order for harassment to approach thelevel of a hostile work environment, itmust be “so severe or pervasive as toalter the conditions of [the victim's]employment and create an abusive workingenvironment.” Faragher v. City of BocaRaton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)(citations and quotation marks omitted).Here the actions allegedly taken againstMr. Conley are neither severe norpervasive and certainly cannot becharacterized as “abusive.” Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm thejudgment of the district court. AFFIRMED :::FOOTNOTES:::
FN1 Because the district court granted summary judgment to the Village, we take the facts alleged byMr. Conley to be true. See Adusumilli v. City ofChicago, 164 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.742 (1998)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 450 (1999).
FN2 The Village filed its motion for summary judgmenton April 15, 1999, more than 300 days after thelast act of discrimination allegedly took place.
FN3 In Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.2000), and Stevens v. Illinois Department ofTransportation, No. 98-3350, 2000 WL 365947 (7thCir. Apr. 11, 2000), we applied the framework ofKimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631(2000), to an ADA case. In Erickson, the courtheld that the ADA did not “‘enforce’ the Fourteenth Amendment,” and therefore, like the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act, did not validlyabrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 207 F.3d at252. The Eleventh Amendment, however, appliesonly to the states, and not to municipalities.See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (“The bar of theEleventh Amendment to suit in federal courtsextends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances, but does not extend tocounties and similar municipal corporations.”(citations omitted)). It is clear that, under theIllinois Municipal Code, the Village of BedfordPark is considered a municipality, and not an armof the state. See 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-1-2(1) (West 1996) (“‘Municipal’ or ‘municipality’means city, village, or incorporated town in theState of Illinois, . . . .”). Consequently, theVillage may be sued in federal court for allegedviolations of the ADA.
FN4 We note that the Village disputes that Giffordever made these statements. However, summaryjudgment is not the appropriate stage to resolveissues of fact.
FN5 Similarly, Mr. Conley’s Rehabilitation Act claimsare untimely. We previously have held that Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations for personalinjury actions applies to actions brought underthe Rehabilitation Act. See Cheeney v. HighlandCommunity College, 15 F.3d 79, 81-82 (7th Cir.1994). Because Mr. Conley’s complaint was filedon November 10, 1998, more than four years afterthe allegedly discriminatory suspension tookplace, his suspension claim cannot be sustainedunder the Rehabilitation Act either.
FN6 In the Village’s 12M(3) Statement, setting forthfacts to which there was not a genuine issue, theVillage stated: 38. Paul Miraldi was promoted to MaintenanceWorker II based on his job performance eventhough he had less seniority than Mr. Conley.(Transcript of the Deposition of James Gifford,page 148, lines 7-10, Exhibit 2). R.6 at 7. Mr. Conley admitted that this assertionwas true. See R.14 at 3.
FN7 Because we hold that the Village’s denial of theuse of a vehicle was unrelated to Mr. Conley’sdisability, we do not reach the issue whether theVillage might otherwise be justified in denyingthe use of a public vehicle to a recoveringalcoholic without violating the ADA.
Conley v. Village of Bedford Park In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 99-2659 JOSEPH M. CONLEY,Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF BEDFORD PARK, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, EasternDivision. No. 98 C 7183–Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge. ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2000–DECIDED May 31, 2000 Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE,Circuit Judges.
