Williams, Circuit Judge. Kauthar Sdn Bhd and three of its former attorneys, Daniel Voelker,William Howard, and William Factor, seek reviewof a bankruptcy court order sanctioning them forimproper conduct during a bankruptcy proceeding.For various reasons, the appellants contend thatthe sanctions order must be reversed. Because thebankruptcy court committed no reversible error insanctioning the appellants, however, we affirm. I Kauthar Sdn Bhd is a Malaysian entity thatinvested a substantial sum of money in Rimsat,Ltd., a firm that planned to provide satelliteservice to the Pacific Rim using satellite rightsallotted to the island nation of Tonga andcontrolled by Tongasat, a Tongan company.However, Rimsat ran into financial trouble andfiled for bankruptcy. Tongasat and Rimsatattempted to settle their claims against eachother on two occasions, but Kauthar objected toboth of the proposed compromises contending thatTongasat was being let off too easy, to thedetriment of Kauthar’s investment in Rimsat. In contesting the Tongasat/Rimsat compromises,Kauthar’s attorneys pursued an aggressivelitigation strategy to force a more favorablesettlement plan. Their strategy earned them atleast one warning from the bankruptcy judge aboutunnecessary and purely strategic litigiousnessbefore the events leading up to the bankruptcyjudge’s ultimate decision to sanction them. In challenging the second proposedTongasat/Rimsat compromise, Kauthar sought todepose a number of individuals associated withTongasat, including the Princess of Tonga, whochaired Tongasat’s Board of Directors, and EdwardLau, Tongasat’s outside general counsel and itsdeposition designee. Tongasat filed a motion fora protective order and the bankruptcy court helda hearing on the matter. At the hearing, thebankruptcy judge expressed concern that Kauthar’sdiscovery requests had gone beyond the limitedscope relevant to the compromise and ruled thatKauthar could only depose one person fromTongasat. William Factor, who represented Kautharat the hearing, informed the court that Kautharwould choose to depose the Princess. Tongasatobjected on the ground that the Princess lackedpersonal knowledge regarding the disputed issues. With the understanding that the Princess wouldsubmit an affidavit attesting to her lack ofpersonal knowledge, the bankruptcy judge ruledthat Kauthar would have to depose someone else,and on Kauthar’s behalf, Factor selected EdwardLau. Kauthar’s attorneys then filed a motion tocompel the deposition of the Princess assertingthat the Princess had personal knowledge ofdisputed issues. Meanwhile, Daniel Voelker and William Howardrepresented Kauthar at Lau’s deposition. Voelker,who conducted the deposition, focused hisinquires on whether Lau believed he coulddisclose information he had acquired from thePrincess. Dissatisfied with Lau’s refusal toanswer yes or no in general to these inquires,Voelker began to argue with and ask harassingquestions of Lau. For instance, at one point, heasked Lau, “In the conversation you had in Augustof 1995, what did the Princess say to you, andwhat did you say to her? I want to knoweverything she said to you, Mr. Lau, every singleword she uttered?” Voelker then began to bickerwith Lau and Lau’s counsel, implying that Lauintended to be dishonest in answering andintended to improperly invoke attorney-clientprivilege when he asked, “Are you going to answer[my question] fully and completely and honestly,or are you going to selectively answer thequestion and assert in your own mind, Mr. Lau,the attorney-client privilege?” Unable to get theanswers he wanted regarding Lau’s ability todisclose information acquired from the Princessand claiming that Lau was not a proper depositiondesignee, Voelker terminated the depositionwithout asking a single question regarding theproposed Tongasat/Rimsat compromise. Afterwards, Tongasat filed a motion forsanctions based on the deposition. The motionalleged that Kauthar’s attorneys never had anyintention to depose Lau and intentionallysabotaged the Lau deposition. The motion soughtattorneys’ fees and other costs associated withthe deposition. When the parties next came before thebankruptcy judge, the judge informed “Kauthar’scounsel” that he was disturbed by the depositionand, in light of their previous conduct in thelitigation, he was seriously considering not onlyimposing a monetary sanction but also revokingtheir pro hac vice status.
[FOOTNOTE 1] Kauthar’s counselfiled a response to Tongasat’s sanctions motioncontending that their conduct was entirelyreasonable. Tongasat then filed a reply disputingthe contentions of Kauthar’s counsel andrequesting, among other additional sanctions,that the pro hac vice status granted Kauthar’scounsel be revoked. Approximately eleven months after receivingTongasat’s reply, and thirteen months afterapproving the proposed Tongasat/Rimsatcompromise, the bankruptcy court ruled on thesanctions motion. It concluded that in light ofthe conduct of Kauthar’s counsel throughout thelitigation and the behavior of their counsel atthe Lau deposition, there could be no doubt thatKauthar’s counsel never had any intention ofseeking relevant information from Lau, but rathersought only to increase the cost andinconvenience of the litigation and delay thethen-imminent hearing regarding theTongasat/Rimsat compromise. Pursuant to its authority to impose sanctions under 11 U.S.C.sec. 105(a) and the inherent powers doctrine, thebankruptcy court ordered Kauthar and itsattorneys to pay $10,890.81 in costs associatedwith the Lau deposition and revoked Voelker’s,Howard’s, and Factor’s pro hac vice status.Kauthar and its attorneys appealed to thedistrict court, but the district court affirmedthe sanctions order. Now Kauthar and itsattorneys appeal to this court,
[FOOTNOTE 2] contendingthat they were denied due process when thebankruptcy court sanctioned them, that thebankruptcy court abused its discretion insanctioning them, and that the sanctions orderagainst them must be vacated because thebankruptcy court waited too long to issue it.
[FOOTNOTE 3] II Before we consider the appellants’ challenges tothe bankruptcy court’s sanctions order, we mustdetermine whether we have jurisdiction over thepresent appeal. The general rule is that a courtof appeals has jurisdiction over a bankruptcyappeal only if the bankruptcy court’s originalorder and the district court’s order reviewingthe bankruptcy court’s original order are bothfinal. 28 U.S.C. sec. 158(d); In re Devlieg,Inc., 56 F.3d 32, 33 (7th Cir. 1995) (percuriam); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264(7th Cir. 1986); 16 Charles Alan Wright, ArthurR. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practiceand Procedure sec. 3926.2, at 273 (2d ed. 1996). In the bankruptcy context, however, finality doesnot require a final order concluding the entirebankruptcy proceeding; certain orders enteredprior to the conclusion of the bankruptcyproceeding will be deemed final. In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d 1294, 1298-99(7th Cir. 1997); In re Official Committee ofUnsecured Creditors of White Farm Equip. Co., 943F.2d 752, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1991). Where an orderterminates a discrete dispute that, but for thebankruptcy, would be a stand-alone suit by oragainst the trustee, the order will be consideredfinal and appealable. In re Szekely, 936 F.2d897, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1991); Wright, Miller, &Cooper, supra, sec. 3926.2, at 272-73. Dicta in In re Wade, 991 F.2d 402, 406 (7thCir. 1993), suggests that sanctions orders fallinto this category, but it is unclear whethersuch a position can be maintained in the wake ofCunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 119 S. Ct.1915 (1999), which holds that sanctions ordersare not automatically appealable prior to finaljudgment, at least in the non-bankruptcy context.Even if it was not final at the time it wasissued, we are persuaded that the bankruptcycourt’s sanctions order has since become final.Kauthar’s claims against the bankruptcy estatehave been valued and accepted, and the finaldistribution of the bankruptcy estate’s claimshas been approved. Because Kauthar’s dispute withthe bankruptcy estate has been resolved, ordersrelating to Kauthar’s participation in thebankruptcy proceeding are now final. White Farm Equip., 943 F.2d at 755; Szekely, 936 F.2d at899-900; see also Forty-Eight Insulations, 115F.3d at 1298-99. That this finality arose afterthe present appeals were filed is no barrier tojurisdiction, as the doctrine of cumulativefinality allows an appeal from a non-final orderto be “saved” by subsequent events that establishfinality. See In re Emerson Radio Corp., 52 F.3d50, 52 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Interwest Bus.Equip., Inc., 23 F.3d 311, 314-15 (10th Cir.1994); Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, sec.3926.2, at 290. Therefore, and since there is noreason to doubt the finality of the districtcourt’s order simply affirming the bankruptcycourt’s order, our jurisdiction over this appealis secure. We now turn to the challenges theappellants raise to the bankruptcy court’ssanctions order. III A. Due Process The appellants first challenge the bankruptcycourt’s sanctions order on constitutionalgrounds. They contend that the bankruptcy courtfailed to afford them the fair notice andopportunity to be heard that the FifthAmendment’s due process clause requires a courtto provide before imposing sanctions. See In reHancock, 192 F.3d 1083, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999);Larsen v. City of Beloit, 130 F.3d 1278, 1286-87(7th Cir. 1997). As the appellants’ due processchallenge raises issues of law, our review isplenary. Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3dCir. 1995); Kirkland v. National MortgageNetwork, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir.1989). Cf. United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that, ingeneral, due process claims are reviewed denovo). The appellants first complain that they receivedinadequate notice that they were possiblesubjects of sanctions. The bankruptcy court’spractice of referring to them collectively as”Kauthar’s counsel,” they contend, did notsufficiently put them on notice. Fair notice cancome from the court or an opposing litigant,Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1086 (notice from thecourt); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate ofWarhol, 194 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) (noticefrom opposing party); Martin, 63 F.3d at 1263(notice from opposing party), but it must, amongother things, inform the person that he or she isin jeopardy of being sanctioned by the court.Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1086; Larsen, 130 F.3d at1286-87. Voelker and Howard have no grounds forcontending that they did not receive adequatenotice. They are specifically mentioned inKauthar’s motion for sanctions, and they were theones who conducted the Lau deposition. That theirconduct at the Lau deposition might be the basisfor sanctions could hardly have been more plain.Consequently, we conclude that they receivedadequate notice that they might be sanctioned. Factor tries to distinguish himself from Voelkerand Howard by pointing out that he was notpresent at the Lau deposition and the bankruptcycourt’s reference to “Kauthar’s counsel” did notput him on notice that he might be sanctionedbased on the deposition. The problem with thisargument is that Tongasat’s motion for sanctionsspecifically asks the bankruptcy court to imposesanctions against Kauthar’s attorneys based upon”the notice of, argument for, and conduct of thedeposition of Edward Lau.” Since Factor signedthe notice of deposition, Tongasat’s motion puthim on notice that his conduct might be the basisfor sanctions. Moreover, in detailing theevidence of Kauthar’s counsels’ intent to harassindividuals associated with Tongasat, Tongasat’smotion for sanctions specifically refers to anargument Factor made regarding the possibility ofdeposing the Princess. In light of these facts,the practice of the bankruptcy court and Tongasatto refer to Kauthar’s attorneys collectively,rather than individually, should have put Factoron notice that he was in jeopardy of beingsanctioned. Thus, Factor received adequate noticethat he might be sanctioned. The appellants next complain that they receivedinadequate notice of precisely what conduct mightwarrant sanctions. They contend that, althoughthe bankruptcy court based its sanctions decisionon the entire course of Kauthar’s counsels’conduct with respect to the Tongasat/Rimsatcompromise, neither the bankruptcy court norTongasat ever specifically identified particularinstances of misconduct, other than the eventssurrounding the Lau deposition. And, a court maynot, consistent with due process, imposesanctions based on particular conduct unless theparties being sanctioned have received notice(from the court or an opposing party) that thatconduct may be the basis for sanctions. Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at 334; Bonilla v. Volvo CarCorp., 150 F.3d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 1998); Martin,63 F.3d at 1263. In this case, however, we do not read thebankruptcy court’s sanctions order as relying onconduct, other than that related to the Laudeposition, in a manner that gives rise to anobligation to provide the kind of particularizednotice the appellants believe they were due. Thebankruptcy court merely referred to Kauthar’sgeneral litigation strategy as evidence tosupport the court’s finding that the appellantsintentionally sabotaged the Lau deposition in aneffort to further delay the proceedings andinconvenience Tongasat and to explain whymonetary sanctions alone would be insufficient todeter similar future conduct. Moreover, the courtnever referred to particular instances of conductoutside the events surrounding the Laudeposition; it referenced only Kauthar’s generallitigation strategy. As particular conduct, otherthan that related to the Lau deposition, did notactually form the basis for the sanctionsimposed, there is no reason to think thatKauthar’s attorneys were entitled to the sort ofparticularized notice they believe they were due.When a court imposing sanctions simply citesattorney conduct for the limited purpose ofproviding context and background, particularizednotice is not required. In fact, demandingparticularized notice in such situations wouldonly discourage sanctioning courts from writingthe sort of comprehensive sanctions orders,containing all of the relevant backgroundmaterial, that are most helpful to reviewingcourts. To the extent that the appellants were entitledto notice informing them that Kauthar’s generallitigation strategy might provide a backgroundagainst which Tongastat’s motion would beevaluated, statements by the bankruptcy court andin Tongasat’s sanctions motion referencingKauthar’s general litigation strategy withrespect to the Tongasat/Rimsat compromiseprovided adequate notice. For instance, beforetaking Tongasat’s motion for sanctions underadvisement, the bankruptcy judge spoke of thecontext in which Tongasat’s motion would beevaluated, “For a year [Kauthar's counsel has]apparently embarked upon what appears to be aconscious effort to maximize litigation and, indoing so, make certain that the litigation is astime-consuming, difficult, unpleasant, andexpensive as humanly possible.” The bankruptcycourt did not deny the appellants due process byfailing to ensure that they received adequatenotice of what conduct might subject them tosanctions. Finally, the appellants complain that thebankruptcy court deprived them of their dueprocess right to have an adequate opportunity tobe heard by not holding a hearing before imposingsanctions. Providing an opportunity to be heardincludes giving an attorney against whom a courtis considering imposing sanctions the chance topresent his or her case at a meaningful time ina meaningful manner, but a hearing is notinvariably required before sanctions may beimposed. Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1086; Kapco Mfg.Co. v. C & O Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1494-95 (7th Cir. 1989); Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at335; Cook v. American S.S. Co., 134 F.3d 771,774-76 (6th Cir. 1998). Putting to one side thepossibility that the appellants were not entitledto a hearing in the first place, the problem withthe appellants’ argument that the bankruptcycourt should have held a hearing before imposingsanctions is that the appellants never requesteda hearing. Since a court is not invariablyrequired to provide a hearing before imposingsanctions, the appellants’ failure to request ahearing waives any right they might have had toone. See Kapco, 886 F.2d at 1495 (suggesting thatrequest for hearing after sanctions were imposedwas too late). Accordingly, the bankruptcy courtdid not err by imposing sanctions without holdinga hearing.
[FOOTNOTE 4] B. Abuse of Discretion The appellants next challenge the merits of thebankruptcy court’s decision to sanction them. Wereview a decision to impose sanctions for anabuse of discretion. Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1085.Unless the sanctioning court has acted contraryto the law or reached an unreasonable result, wewill affirm the sanctions decision. See generallyHernandez v. Joliet Police Dept., 197 F.3d 256,264 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999). The appellants first argue that the sanctionsimposed against them must be reversed because thebankruptcy court failed to make an explicitfinding of bad faith. The parties agree that thebankruptcy court could only exercise itsauthority under 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) and theinherent powers doctrine to impose sanctions ifthe appellants acted in bad faith.
[FOOTNOTE 5] It is alsoagreed that the bankruptcy court did notexplicitly say that the appellants acted in badfaith. Still, it is impossible to read thebankruptcy court’s opinion without concludingthat the bankruptcy court did in fact determinethat the appellants acted in bad faith. Forexample, the bankruptcy court found thatKauthar’s attorneys, acting in concert, haddecided in advance to sabotage the Lau depositionand that they did so intentionally and for thepurposes of imposing costs on Tongasat anddelaying the upcoming hearing on theTongasat/Rimsat compromise. Such conductcertainly qualifies as bad faith conduct, even ifthe bankruptcy court never said so in so manywords. Nevertheless, the appellants contend thatthe bankruptcy court’s failure to use the words”bad faith” requires that we reverse thebankruptcy court’s sanctions order.
[FOOTNOTE 6] We disagree. Reversing an order imposingsanctions in the face of findings like those madeby the bankruptcy court in this case simplybecause the sanctioning court did not use thewords “bad faith” would needlessly elevate formover substance. Where it is clear that a courthas found that a litigant intentionally abusedthe judicial process in an unreasonable andvexatious manner, we will not reverse an orderimposing sanctions merely because the sanctioningcourt did not make an explicit finding of “badfaith.” Cf. In re Volpert, 110 F.3d 494, 500-01(7th Cir. 1997) (affirming sanctions order under11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) without mentioning anyexplicit finding of bad faith by the sanctioningcourt). In this case, the bankruptcy court’sfailure to make an explicit finding of “badfaith” does not require us to reverse thesanctions it imposed against the appellants. The appellants next argue that their conductdid not warrant sanctions in any event. Withrespect to Voelker and Howard this argument isimpossible to accept. They were the ones whoconducted the Lau deposition in an unproductiveand harassing manner, and such behavior isundoubtedly sanctionable. See generally Carrollv. Jacques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290(5th Cir. 1997) (sanctions imposed based onabusive conduct during deposition); Sassower v.Field, 973 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1992) (sanctionsimposed based on a pattern of vexatious conductincluding “incredibly harassing depositions”);Heinrichs v. Marshall & Stevens Inc., 921 F.2d418 (2d Cir. 1990) (sanctions imposed based onimproper conduct at depositions). Voelker andHoward, nevertheless, attempt to explain theirconduct at the deposition as a reasonableresponse to Lau’s intransigence. But, even iftheir conduct could be given the innocentexplanation they urge, the bankruptcy court didnot abuse its discretion in interpreting theevents differently. With respect to Factor, the question is acloser one, as there is no direct evidence of hisparticipation in the scheme to sabotage the Laudeposition. Still, there is sufficientcircumstantial evidence that Factor acted inconcert with Voelker and Howard and that Factorshares responsibility for the scheme. To beginwith, Factor was the attorney for Kauthar whonoticed the Lau deposition. Likewise, he signedthe motion to compel the Princess’s deposition,a deposition the bankruptcy court considered tobe a part of the plan to delay the proceedingsand otherwise inconvenience Tongasat and thoseassociated with Tongasat. Moreover, he, Voelker,and Howard were all members of the same law firmand jointly represented Kauthar in the bankruptcyproceedings. In fact, it was Factor who arguedagainst Tongasat’s objection to Kauthar’s requestto depose the Princess and who chose to go aheadand depose Lau. Perhaps most significantly,however, the bankruptcy judge, who wasundoubtedly familiar with the roles played by thevarious counsel who appeared before him, foundthat Factor acted in concert with Voelker andHoward to sabotage the Lau deposition. For allthese reasons, it is impossible to conclude thatthe bankruptcy court a bused its discretion insanctioning Factor.The appellants next argue that, even ifsanctions are appropriate, the sanctions thebankruptcy court imposed are excessive andunwarranted. However, the appellants did not makethese arguments to the bankruptcy court in theirresponse to Tongasat’s motion for sanctions. And,such arguments must be made to the sanctioningcourt if they are to be considered by a reviewingcourt, as the failure to make an argumentconstitutes waiver of that argument. In reKroner, 953 F.2d 317, 319 (7th Cir. 1992);Magicsilk Corp. of N.J. v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123,125 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Since theappellants did not argue (at least in a timelyfashion
[FOOTNOTE 7]) that any of the sanctions proposed byor to the bankruptcy court would have beenexcessive or unwarranted if in fact sanctionswere appropriate, we will not consider theirarguments on appeal. Finally, Factor, alone, argues that becauseordinary procedural rules would have beenadequate to address the misconduct on his part,the bankruptcy court abused its discretion byresorting to 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a)
[FOOTNOTE 8] and itsinherent powers. Specifically, Factor suggeststhat Bankruptcy Rules 9011
[FOOTNOTE 9] and 7026
[FOOTNOTE 10](which largely track Rules 11 and 26 of theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure) would have beenadequate to sanction his misconduct. Thebankruptcy court opted instead to rely on itsauthority under 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) and theinherent powers doctrine because Rules 9011 and7026 would only allow the court to sanctionFactor, as he was the only one who signed the Launotice of deposition. A sanctioning court should ordinarily rely onavailable authority conferred by statutes andprocedural rules, rather than its inherent power,if the available sources of authority would beadequate to serve the court’s purposes. Chambersv. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991); Corley v.Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d1041, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1998). But, this ruledoes not require the sanction imposed on Factorto be reversed. To begin with, the bankruptcycourt acted pursuant to its statutory authorityunder 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) as well as itsinherent powers. Thus, it is unlikely that therule to which Factor appeals even applies to hissituation. Moreover, a sanctioning court is notrequired to apply available statutes andprocedural rules in a piecemeal fashion whereonly a broader source of authority is adequate tojustify all the necessary sanctions. Chambers,501 U.S. at 50-51. The bankruptcy court wasjustified in resorting to 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a)and its inherent powers in order to ensure thatall the culpable parties received an appropriatesanction and did not abuse its discretion indeclining to sanction Factor under BankruptcyRule 9011 or 7026. C. Timeliness of Sanctions The appellants contend that the 13-month delaybetween the bankruptcy court’s acceptance of theproposed compromise of the Tongasat claims andthe final issuance of its sanctions orderrequires that the sanctions order be reversed.The appellants cite Prosser v. Prosser, 186 F.3d403 (3d Cir. 1999), in which the Third Circuit,pursuant to a rule announced under itssupervisory power, reversed a sua spontesanctions order that was entered after finaljudgment. In an effort to prevent piecemealappeals and ensure that the deterrent effect ofa sanction is not dissipated through delay, theThird Circuit held that such orders must beentered prior to final judgment if they are basedon conduct occurring prior to that time. Id. at405-06. Even if we were persuaded to adopt the samerule the Third Circuit has, but Cf. Divane v.Krull Elec. Co., 200 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir.1999) (rejecting proposal to require Rule 11motions to be filed before final judgment), thepresent case would not call for the applicationof the rule. To begin with, while theTongasat/Rimsat compromise had been approved, thebankruptcy action itself remained open andKauthar remained an active litigant. Thus, theapproval of the Tongasat/Rimsat compromise (evenif it were considered an appealable finaldecision) does not create the same sort offinality as an ordinary final judgment andtherefore does not justify the same requirementthat sanctions orders be issued before a courtenters a final judgment. Moreover, the ThirdCircuit’s rule appears to apply only to suasponte sanctions orders. Here the sanctions orderwas the product of a sanctions motion filed byTongasat. In sum, while lengthy delays in theimposition of sanctions are not preferable, we donot believe the delay that occurred in this casewarrants reversing the bankruptcy court’ssanctions order. IV In sanctioning the appellants the bankruptcycourt did not deprive the appellants of dueprocess, abuse its discretion to imposesanctions, or otherwise commit reversible error.Accordingly, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s orderimposing sanctions against the appellants. :::FOOTNOTES:::
FN1 Pro hac vice status allows an attorney who hasnot been admitted to practice before a court topractice before that court in a particular case.See Black’s Law Dictionary 1227-28 (7th ed.1999).
FN2After it appealed, Kauthar reached a settlementwith the other parties to the bankruptcyproceeding, including Tongasat, releasing eachparty from any claim relating to the proceedingthat might be asserted by any of the otherparties. Thus, Kauthar’s challenge to thebankruptcy court’s sanctions order is moot andKauthar is dismissed as a party to this appeal.See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner MallPartnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1993). However, becauseVoelker, Howard, and Factor are not parties tothe settlement agreement and a release would notaddress the revocation of their pro hac vicestatus, their challenges to the bankruptcycourt’s sanctions order are not moot.
FN3 Appellants Kauthar, Voelker, and Howard alsorequest that we expunge certain portions of thebankruptcy court’s order that they contend arewithout factual support. While we certainly mayreverse or vacate the bankruptcy court’s decisionto impose sanctions, we seriously doubt whetherwe can expunge portions of the court’s order. Theauthority we have discovered, although notdirectly on point, suggests that such relief isnot available by way of appeal. See Clark Equip.Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820(7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to vacate opinioncriticizing attorney, but mentioning that theattorney might seek mandamus); Bolte v. Home Ins.Co., 744 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984) (concludingchallenge to opinion criticizing, but notsanctioning, attorney is not appealable). And,the appellants have not cited any authority tothe contrary. Accordingly, we deny the request toexpunge portions of the bankruptcy court’sopinion.
FN4 The appellants also mention in passing anallegation that they had inadequate notice of thesource of the authority the bankruptcy courtwould invoke. Beside the fact that the appellantsnever develop an argument on this ground, such anargument would be a difficult one to make becauseTongasat specifically referred to 11 U.S.C. sec.105(a) in its sanctions motion and a bankruptcycourt’s authority to act under that statutoryprovision is often tied to the inherent powersdoctrine. See In re Volpert, 110 F.3d 494, 501(7th Cir. 1997) (discussing without deciding theissue).
FN5 The parties’ agreement subsumes at least twounresolved issues, whether a bankruptcy court canact pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine, andwhether bad faith is required for a bankruptcycourt to exercise its authority under 11 U.S.C.sec. 105(a). We offer no opinion on these issues.
FN6The appellants cite cases involving sanctionsimposed pursuant to the inherent powers doctrinein which the reviewing court has required aspecific finding of bad faith. See, e.g., RoadwayExpress, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980);Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.1995). However, it is impossible to tell fromthese cases whether a sanctioning court wouldhave to use the words “bad faith” or whetherexplicit findings demonstrating unequivocallythat the sanctioned party had acted in bad faithwould be sufficient. Accordingly, the cases theappellants cite are not particularly helpful inreviewing the sanctions order in this case.
FN7 In a motion to reconsider, Factor did argue thatrevoking his pro hac vice status was an excessivesanction, but arguments raised for the first timein a motion to reconsider are not preserved forappeal. Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d199, 201 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994).
FN8 In relevant part, 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) provides,”The court may issue any order, process, orjudgment that is necessary or appropriate tocarry out the provisions of this title.”
FN9 The version of Rule 9011 in effect when Factor’smisconduct took place allowed a bankruptcy courtto sanction an attorney who signed a pleading orother paper that was frivolous or vexatious.
FN10Rule 7026 simply incorporates by referenceFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which allowsa court to sanction an attorney who signs adiscovery request, response, or objection that isfrivolous or vexatious.
In re Rimsat, Ltd. In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Nos. 99-1625 and 99-1636 In re:Rimsat, Limited, Debtor, Appeals of: Kauthar Sdn Bhd, et al. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. Nos. 1:98cv363 and 1:98cv370–William C. Lee, Chief Judge. Argued February 22, 2000–Decided May 18, 2000 Before Coffey, Easterbrook, and Williams, CircuitJudges.
