The full case caption appears at the
end of this opinion. This is an appeal by the Borough of Swarthmore from the Commonwealth Court’sorder reversing the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which deniedbenefits to James Davis, a former police officer for the Borough. We granted the Borough’spetition for allowance of appeal to address the issue of the standard to be applied to claimsfor workers’ compensation benefits when the claimant asserts that a psychic injury ismanifested through both psychic and physical symptoms. We hold that where a psychicinjury is claimed, regardless of whether it is manifested through psychic symptoms aloneor physical symptoms as well, the claimant must establish that the injury arose fromabnormal working conditions in order to recover benefits. We reverse the CommonwealthCourt’s order in this case and reinstate the Board’s order denying benefits.On April 21, 1992, James Davis filed a claim petition under the Workers’Compensation Act alleging that he had sustained a psychic injury as a result of hisemployment as a police officer. Davis asserted that he suffered from post-traumatic stressdisorder and specific work inhibition as a result of repeated stressful and life-threateningexperiences during the course of his duties as a police officer. At the hearing before the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ), Davis testified thathe had been hired as a police officer by the Borough in July of 1960. The population of theBorough of Swarthmore was approximately 5,900, including 1,300 college students, whilethe size of the Borough was one plus square miles. The Borough’s police force consistedof eight officers, including the chief of police, a sergeant, a corporal and five patrol officers. In May of 1971, Davis was promoted to the position of sergeant. As the sergeant, Daviswas the second in command after the chief of police. His responsibilities included patrolfunctions, supervisory functions and investigative functions. The Borough did not have aseparate detective division, and the responsibility for criminal investigations was given tothe sergeant. The responsibility for supervising the police officers during the three eight-hour shifts was divided among the chief of police who worked the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift, the sergeant who worked the 4 p.m. to midnight shift, and the corporal who worked themidnight to 8 a.m. shift. For twenty years, Davis performed the functions assigned to him as the sergeant.On June 16, 1991, the Borough’s chief of police died unexpectedly of a heart attack. MayorG. Guy Smith issued an order four days later naming Davis, the ranking officer, as theofficer in command of the police force. Davis remained in the position for a period of onlyfour months. Donald Lee was designated as the chief of police on October 15, 1991. Lee, thena 28-year veteran of the Swarthmore Police Department, had been Davis’s close friend andpartner on the police force. Lee testified on behalf of Davis that the functions performed byDavis were normal things that would be required of a detective sergeant in a town the sizeof Swarthmore. He further testified that he had not noticed any specific incident during theiryears together that triggered any change in Davis’s conduct, but felt that Davis’s positionas second in command caused Davis to feel that his loyalty was torn between the patrolofficers and the chief of police. He discussed the fact that Davis had married and divorcedtwice, stating that Davis’s marital difficulties did not affect his ability to carry out policefunctions. It was not until Davis assumed the responsibilities of the chief of police that Leeobserved a change in Davis. Lee testified that Davis demonstrated that he was incapableof being the police chief or acting chief. He described Davis as an acting chief who haddifficulty making decisions that affected the police department. Davis also had difficultydealing with officers under his command and with issuing orders to the patrolmen. Leebecame so concerned about Davis’s inability to command that he spoke to Mayor Smithon several occasions. Mayor Smith asked Lee to check on Davis because he wasconcerned about Davis’s health and well being. Mayor Smith, who also testified on behalf of Davis, felt that Davis had becomeparalyzed by his role as police chief. He stated that “it wasn’t like he was making baddecisions; he simply wasn’t making any decisions.” Mayor Smith indicated that he wouldhave discussions with Davis about getting certain tasks done, minor or major, without anyresults. In October 1991, Mayor Smith recommended that Davis take vacation leave, whichDavis did. Shortly thereafter, Lee informed Mayor Smith that he did not think Davis wouldbe able to perform his functions as police chief. Mayor Smith concurred in this assessmentand recommended to the Public Safety Committee of the Borough Council that Davis beallowed to go out on disability retirement. The recommendation was accepted, and Davisbegan receiving a disability pension as of May 1, 1992. Davis testified that between June and October 1991, he noticed that he was notsleeping well, that “it seemed like his strength was being zapped,” and that his bloodpressure was up. Davis did not attribute the changes to his appointment as the actingpolice chief. Instead, Davis recounted several stressful incidents that had occurred duringthe course of his 31-year career. The first incident happened approximately 27 yearsearlier, in 1964 or 1965. Another officer had gone into a house and was confronted in thebasement by a young man who was armed. Davis, who was the back up officer, begannegotiations with the man and was able to convince him to put his weapon down. WhenDavis went to pick up the weapon, the man pulled out another weapon, pointed it at hisface and started to pull the trigger. Davis caught the hammer of the weapon before it felland wrestled the gun away from him. The disarmed man was then arrested. Davis testifiedthat he continually dreamed about the incident, but that it was not until he underwentpsychiatric treatment that he remembered the incident itself. Davis testified regarding another incident which occurred in 1965 or 1966 when hebecame involved in a high speed pursuit of robbery suspects. During the course of thepursuit, Davis fired his weapon at a suspect for the first time in his career. Davis alsorelated two other incidents in his career when he fired his weapon at suspects. Davisfurther testified about the 1974 arrest of a member of the Pagan motorcycle gang forattempted murder. Davis testified that the police chief informed him that unknown sourceshad threatened to shoot him and his family to prevent him from testifying at trial. Other thanthe reported threat, no incident occurred. The only incident that was not remote in time occurred in January 1991. Davisresponded to a call from Swarthmore College security officers for assistance in handlinga group of 25 people he described as “a bunch of neo nazis.” Davis called for assistanceand confronted the group, along with four unarmed college security officers. No weaponswere visible, but Davis ordered them to lay down whatever weapons they had within fiveminutes. The group lined up, refusing to comply. Faced with a standoff, Davis did not knowwhat to do next. He was not attacked by any member of the group. When four other policeofficers responded to his call for assistance, 22 members of the group were arrested. Thepolice officers recovered baseball bats, chains, knives, and tear gas–none of which wasused or displayed during the incident. Davis also testified that as a police officer he was required to undergo annualfirearms training. He described himself as an expert shooter and well-versed in handguns.During his last qualification on the shooting range, Davis had to go through three roundsbefore he was qualified. Davis testified as follows: Q. Explain what the qualification involves and why you had to go through it three times. A. Well, we go through a practice shoot just before we can qualify. Then we take the weapon itself, target area, and type rounds were fired. Then we fired for qualification the next round, and it took me three times to go through to qualify. Q. What happened that it took you three times to qualify? Had it ever taken you three times to qualify before? A. Never. I shook so bad, I couldn’t shoot any more. I still don’t today. R.103a. Davis did not describe any other situation in which he had a similar experience.Nor did Davis describe his experience as the acting police chief. He did notacknowledge any problems with assuming command of the officers. Davis testified only thatwhen he took leave time in October of 1991, he experienced difficulties with sleeping. Davisconsulted his family physician, who eventually referred him to a psychiatrist, Dr. Sol Kadish.Dr. Kadish testified that he first saw Davis on January 30, 1992. Dr. Kadishdiagnosed Davis as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and specific workinhibition. Post-traumatic stress disorder was defined to include when a person hasexperienced, witnessed or been confronted with an event that is life threatening orthreatening to the person’s or another’s personal or physical integrity, and the event evokesfear, horror or helplessness. Dr. Kadish explained specific work inhibition as Davis’sinability to return to work and fear of returning to work because of his stress symptoms. Dr.Kadish was of the opinion that the accumulation of events experienced by Davis from 1965until 1991 was the cause of Davis’s psychic injury. Dr. Kadish also described physical manifestations of Davis’s psychic injury:He has a variety of related physical symptoms. He gets short of breath. Hegets pressure on his chest. He becomes nervous. He has generalizedmuscle twitching with aches and pains. He has flashbacks and relivingexperiences of these various stressors that occurred during his duty as apolice officer and most significantly, his right-hand shakes. When he writesa check or holds a glass of water, his right hand feels tremulous and he feelsvery unsteady and, in fact, since he was sent out of work on October 23 rd ,1991, he has not touched his revolver. R.192a.
[FOOTNOTE 1] Davis’s counsel asked Dr. Kadish for his expert opinion as to whether the right handtremors were related to Davis’s psychic injury. The Borough’s counsel objected to Dr.Kadish rendering an expert opinion as to the cause of Davis’s right hand tremors becauseDr. Kadish had not been qualified as an orthopedic expert or qualified as an expert withregard to the physical components of Davis’s claim, as compared to the psychiccomponents. The Borough’s counsel further asserted that no foundation had been laid thatDr. Kadish had ever performed a physical examination of Davis. Because Dr. Kadish was testifying in a deposition, the Borough’s objection wasplaced on the record and Dr. Kadish was permitted to respond for purposes of thedeposition. Dr. Kadish testified that there was a direct temporal connection between theonset of Davis’s hand tremors and an event that occurred while at work as a police officer. Dr. Kadish based his opinion on two events related to him by Davis, i.e. that Davis’s handshook sometime in 1986 after the arrest of an individual for murder and in 1993 whenDavis’s “right hand shook so badly that he uncharacteristically had to try three times beforehe could just barely qualify to continue his duties.” (Emphasis added.)On cross-examination, Dr. Kadish testified that he had not conducted a physicalexamination, neurological examination, or orthopedic examination of Davis. Dr. Kadish alsostated that he had not requested any diagnostic studies to determine whether there wasany pathological condition responsible for the right hand tremors. The Borough introduced the deposition testimony of Dr. Wolfram Rieger, whoexamined Davis on July 6, 1993. Dr. Rieger did not conduct any psychological orpsychiatric tests. He diagnosed Davis as suffering from an adjustment disorder withanxious mood. Dr. Rieger concluded that Davis was a man who simply suffered from jobburn-out. The WCJ awarded benefits to Davis, finding that “[a]s of October 23, 1991, Claimantsuffered and continues to suffer, from a bona-fide psychiatric illness, which was caused bythe abnormal objective working conditions imposed upon Claimant by Defendant in June,1991.” The WCJ found that in June, 1991, Davis’s usual police duties had changedbecause he was instructed to perform the duties of the police chief in addition to his regularpolice duties, and that between June 1991 and October 1991, Davis had to fill in vacantpatrol shifts himself because of manpower shortages. The WCJ did not specifically rule onthe Borough’s objection to the competency of Dr. Kadish to testify regarding the cause ofDavis’s right hand tremors, but relied upon his expert opinion in concluding that Davis “haddeveloped physical impairments as a result of his job-related stress, including a right-handtremor which directly affected his ability to continue to perform his employment duties.”
[FOOTNOTE 2] The WCJ also found that during Davis’s 31 year employment as a police officer, Davis hadexperienced numerous stressful and life-threatening incidents. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed the WCJ’s decision. The Boarddiscussed three categories of claims involving a psychological component: (1)psychological stimulus causing physical injury (mental/physical); (2) physical stimuluscausing psychic injury (physical/mental); and (3) psychological stimulus causing psychicinjury (mental/mental). Davis’s claim was categorized by the Board as a psychologicalstimulus causing a psychic injury. The Board determined that Davis had failed to establishthat abnormal working conditions had caused his psychic injury as required to recoverbenefits. The Board found that Davis’s working conditions were not unusually stressful forpolice work, stating, [n]othing presented in the case would lead anyone to conclude thatClaimant’s experience differed from that of any other police officer. While hisjob did contain stress, that stress was normal for a police officer. Slip opinion at 4. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, Davis raised two issues for review: (1)whether Davis’s physical symptoms were a result of work-related stress justifying a findingthat Davis suffered a compensable injury; and (2) whether Davis’s work-related stressresulting from normal working conditions was sufficient to constitute a compensable injury.The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision, concluding that Davis did nothave to establish that his injury was caused by abnormal working conditions. The courtreasoned that because Davis had introduced evidence that he was exposed to a psychological stress that caused him to suffer a distinct physical injury, i.e. right handtremor, Davis was not required to prove abnormal working conditions. The court held thatDavis was required to prove only that the psychological stress of normal working conditionscaused a physical injury, stating that “he is not saddled with the heightened burden ofproving an abnormal working condition.” (Slip opinion at 6.) We granted the Borough’s petition for allowance of appeal to address the confusionengendered by the Commonwealth Court’s application of a different burden of proof incases where a claimant seeks benefits for psychic injury, asserting that the psychic injuryis manifested through physical symptoms. Appellate review in workers’ compensation proceedings is limited to determiningwhether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law has been committed, orBoard procedures have been violated, and whether necessary findings of fact aresupported by substantial evidence. Waugh v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 737A.2d 733 (Pa. 1999); 2 Pa. C.S. � 704. The Borough asserts that the Commonwealth Courtcommitted an error of law in failing to apply the proper standard in determining whetherDavis was entitled to benefits. We agree. Appellate review of the workers’ compensation judge’s findings of fact is limited toa determination of whether the findings are supported by the evidence as a whole. Whereno additional testimony is taken before the Board, the findings will be overturned only ifarbitrary or capricious. Whether the findings of fact support a conclusion that the claimanthas been exposed to abnormal working conditions is a question of law, however, that isfully reviewable on appeal. Wilson v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (AluminumCompany of America), 669 A.2d 338 (Pa. 1996). To recover workers’ compensation benefits for a psychic injury, a claimant mustprove by objective evidence that he has suffered a psychic injury and that such injury isother than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 568A.2d 159 (Pa. 1990). Even if a claimant shows actual, not merely perceived or imagined,employment events that have precipitated psychic injury, the claimant must still prove theevents to be abnormal in order to recover. Wilson, 669 A.2d at 344 As we observed in Martin, the Workers’ Compensation Act does not provide benefitsto a claimant merely because of the claimant’s status as an employee. Abandoning the distinction between normal and abnormal working conditions, as the Appellant urges us to do, would eliminate the element of causation. It would destroy the fundamental principle underlying the scheme of the Workmen’s Compensation Act — that, in order to be compensable, an injury must be work-related. Under the Appellant’s theory, a claimant would have to establish only that the employee suffered from a mental illness while employed and that the illness was a condition created or aggravated by that employee’s perception of the conditions of his employment. That would reduce workmen’s compensation benefits to nothing more than a disability or death benefit payable only because of the employee status of the claimant– and not because the injury was caused by his employment. 568 A.2d at 165. In Martin, the wife of Charles Martin filed a fatal claim petition alleging that herhusband’s death from a self-inflicted gunshot resulted from job-related stress. Martin hadbeen employed by Ketchum, Inc. as a professional fund raiser for non-profit organizations.After the company underwent several personnel changes, Martin requested that he berelieved of his supervisory responsibilities and assigned to campaign direction. Martinexperienced problems with the campaign project and eventually was replaced at therequest of the client. After reassignment to a less prestigious project, Martin began seeinga psychiatrist. Martin later committed suicide. During the hearing on the fatal claim petition, a psychiatrist testified that Martin’sremoval from the larger campaign project played a substantial contributing role in hissuicide. The referee granted benefits, finding that Martin had sustained a work injury in theform of work-related stress which resulted in suicide. The Commonwealth Court reversedon the basis that the work-related stress that Martin experienced was not so abnormal orunusual as to impose workmen’s compensation liability upon the employer. We affirmed, holding that a claimant who seeks to recover benefits for psychic injurymust prove not only that he has suffered a psychic injury, but also that the injury is otherthan a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. The latter requirement is imposedbecause “evidence of an employee’s subjective reaction to being at work and beingexposed to normal working conditions is not sufficient to establish an injury compensableunder this act….” 568 A.2d 164. It was undisputed that Martin had suffered a psychic injury,but the second requirement, that the claimant prove that the psychic injury was other thansubjective reaction to normal working conditions, was not met. We have consistently rejected the argument that proof that a psychic injury wascaused by normal working conditions establishes a compensable injury under the Act. InWilson v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Aluminum Company of America), theclaimant sought to recover benefits for a psychic injury caused by the elimination of heradministrative assistant position and reassignment to a position which she perceived asdiminishing her status. The existence of a psychic injury was undisputed, as was the factthat the claimant suffered the psychic injury because she was assigned to a differentposition. We concluded, however, that the claimant had failed to sustain her burden ofproving a compensable injury. We determined that the loss of employment, and the offerof a position of less responsibility as an alternative to unemployment, are not abnormalworking conditions. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission et al. v. Workmen’s CompensationAppeal Board, 683 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1996), involved a claimant who was employed as anattorney with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. The claimant had filed aclaim petition seeking benefits, alleging that he had suffered an adjustment reaction withanxiety after he was given a performance evaluation by his employer. The referee awardedbenefits and the Board affirmed. The Commonwealth Court reversed. We affirmed thedenial of benefits, concluding that the attorney’s psychic injury was a subjective reactionto normal working conditions. In Ryan v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 707 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1998), theclaimant sought to recover benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder following herinvolvement in a work-related automobile accident. The claimant, who was employed asa visiting nurse, was injured in a collision with another vehicle. She sustained physicalinjuries as a result, including a fractured right patella, a bruised arm and a chest injury. The claimant received benefits pursuant to a notice of compensation payable. A final receiptwas executed by the claimant upon her return to work. The claimant began to experience depression and sought psychological treatmentwhen she learned that the driver of the other vehicle had filed a lawsuit against her torecover damages for severe head injuries. The claimant subsequently filed a petition forreview to amend her notice of compensation payable to reflect a work-related psychicdisability as a result of the work-related physical injury. A petition for reinstatement ofbenefits also was filed. During the hearing, the claimant introduced expert psychiatric testimony that shesuffered from a post-traumatic stress disorder which was causally related to the automobileaccident. The referee accepted the expert’s testimony and granted her petitions. The Boardreversed, finding that the evidence showed that the claimant’s psychic injury was causedby the psychological stimulus of learning that she was being sued. The Board concludedthat the claimant’s psychic injury was not related to her employment and that there wasonly a tenuous causal relationship between the psychic injury and the accident. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board, finding that the claimant hadsustained her burden of proving that a physical work-related stimulus of the automobileaccident caused the claimant to be disabled with a psychic injury of post-traumatic stressdisorder. We reversed on the basis that the evidence did not support the referee’s finding thatthe claimant’s psychic injury was caused by her work-related accident. We determined thatthe stimulus of the psychic injury was not the physical stimulus of the accident, as foundby the Commonwealth Court. The record established that the stimulus was thepsychological stimulus of the claimant’s learning of being sued which triggered the psychicinjury. We concluded that the claimant had failed to establish either prong of the Martin testfor compensable injuries. In this case, Davis asserts that Martin is inapplicable because he suffered not onlyfrom a psychic reaction to his working conditions, but also a physical reaction. We rejectthis analysis, as we have previously applied the Martin standard in cases where theclaimant suffered a psychic injury that was manifested through both psychic and physicalsymptoms. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 675A.2d 1213 (Pa. 1996), a delivery truck driver for the Philadelphia Daily News filed a claimpetition alleging that he had suffered a severe anxiety reaction and severe depressionbecause of harassment by his supervisors. The claimant also experienced physicalmanifestations of his psychic injury, including dizziness and problems with sleeping andeating, after the incident. The referee awarded benefits; however, the Board reversed onthe basis that a single episode of harassment or mistreatment did not constitute abnormalworking conditions. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision, concludingthat the claimant had sustained his burden of proving that an extraordinary event occurredat work that caused his psychic injury. We found that the Commonwealth Court erred inholding that a single episode of criticism by a supervisor who used vulgar languageconstituted an abnormal working condition under Martin, and reversed. Similarly, in Hershey Chocolate Company v. Workmen’s Compensation AppealBoard, 682 A.2d 1257 (Pa. 1996), the claimant filed a claim petition alleging that shesuffered from a severe emotional disorder due to excess pressure and excessive work loadchanges in her job. The claimant suffered physical manifestations of her psychic injury aswell, which included stomach pains, fatigue and disruptions in her sleeping patterns. Thereferee awarded benefits and was sustained by the Board and Commonwealth Court. Wereversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the claimant’s psychicinjury was other than a subjective reaction to the increase in responsibilities occasioned bythe claimant’s promotion. We concluded that the claimant had failed to demonstrate thather responsibilities were unusual for her higher position. As the foregoing survey indicates, Martin and its progeny reflect the view that thereis a degree of uncertainty inherent in any employment situation, as in life itself, such thatan employee’s individual, subjective reaction to these ordinary vicissitudes is not the typeof condition which the legislature intended to require compensation for because it is not,in the common understanding, an injury. Cf. Metropolitan Edison Company v. Workmen’sCompensation Appeal Board, 718 A.2d 759 (Pa. 1998). This understanding is not alteredby the fact that the reaction may be accompanied by various deleterious physicalsymptoms. Although we have previously indicated that the term “injury” is to be interpretedaccording to its common and approved usage, Pawlosky v. Workmen’s CompensationAppeal Board, 525 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Pa. 1987), it is readily apparent that there arecircumstances, such as situations involving the effects of stress unrelated to physicalexertion, that defy easy application of the term. In broad scope it may be suggested thatthe cases have attempted to distinguish between physical maladies that are directly causedby non-physical conditions or events occurring on the job, and those that are indirect, thatis, existing only in relation to or as a result of a mental or emotional disturbance. Inparticular cases the distinction may appear artificial or contrived; indeed, it may have theeffect of encouraging both claimants and employers to “shape” their cases along lines thatdo not always reflect medical science. However, it must be recognized that the constructsdeveloped in Martin and other cases are nothing more than attempts to discern legislativeintent: are workers’ compensation benefits payable under the circumstances presented. Ifwe have misjudged the General Assembly’s intent, the Act can be amended to more clearlyexpress the legislative policy. In the absence of more definitive guidance, we conclude that it is the nature of theinjury asserted, not the presence or absence of physical symptoms, that is controlling.Accordingly, we hold that the standard to be applied to claims for workers’ compensationbenefits when the claimant asserts a psychic injury that has manifested itself throughpsychic and physical symptoms is the same standard that we articulated in Martin: sucha claimant must prove by objective evidence that he has suffered from a psychic injury andthat the psychic injury is other than a subjective reaction to normal working conditions.Applying this standard to Davis’s claim, we find, as did the Board, that the evidencefailed to establish that his post-traumatic stress disorder and related physical complaintswere caused by abnormal working conditions.
[FOOTNOTE 3] “[P]sychic injury cases are highly fact-sensitive and for actual work conditions to be considered abnormal, they must be considered in the context of the specific employment.” Wilson, 669 A.2d at 343 (citation omitted). There was absolutely no evidence that the investigatory and patrol functions performed by Davis or his experiences were unusual for a law enforcement officer. Davis himself testified that it was a usual part of his job to investigate crimes such as burglaries, stolen cars, assaults and murder. This testimony was supported by Davis’s own witnesses, the Borough’s mayor and Davis’s partner, who subsequently served as the Chief of Police. Each of these witnesses testified that the functions performed by Davis were the normalthings that would be required of a Detective Sergeant.
[FOOTNOTE 4] Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed. Mr. Justice Saylor concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Nigro files a Dissenting Opinion. :::FOOTNOTES:::
FN1 The record does not reflect that Davis had any reason to use a revolver upon leaving the police force.
FN2 The issue of the competency of Dr. Kadish’s testimony to establish a causalconnection between the psychic injury suffered by Davis and the right hand tremors thatDavis was found to have experienced is not before this Court, and will not be addressedfor that reason.
FN3 Based upon its erroneous determination that Davis did not have to establishabnormal working conditions, the Commonwealth Court refused to address the issue ofwhether abnormal working conditions caused Davis’s psychic injury.
FN4 We note that during the time that Davis assumed the command of the police force as the acting police chief, he was not required to perform any responsibilities that would not be expected of the highest ranking member of the force. Furthermore, Davis did not offer any evidence that his psychic injury was caused by his promotion.
Davis v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District James H. Davis, v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Swarthmore Borough) No. 118 M.D. Appeal Docket 1997 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court dated December 26, 1996 at No. 1413 C.D. 1996 reversing the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board Argued: February 2, 1998 Decided: May 18, 2000 Before: Mr. Justice Zappala
