The full case caption appears at the
end of this opinion. TALMADGE, J. — We must decide in this case if the City of Tacoma’s(Tacoma) local public utility tax on paging services is consistent with thestate law definition of a taxable telephone business under RCW82.04.065(4), and whether Tacoma’s tax constitutes an excessive increase ina tax rate pursuant to RCW 35.21.710. Insofar as paging services involvethe transmission of data by microwave systems, we conclude Tacoma’s localpublic utility tax on paging services is consistent with RCW 82.04.065. Wealso hold Tacoma’s taxation of paging services under its public utilitiestax does not violate RCW 35.21.710, even though Tacoma formerly taxed suchactivities under the services classifications of its local business andoccupation (B & O) tax. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. ISSUES 1. Does the definition of ‘telephone business’ under RCW 82.04.065include paging services? 2. Does a municipality violate the restriction of RCW 35.21.710 ifit properly classifies and taxes an activity under its local tax ordinancesthereby changing the rate of taxation on the activity? FACTS Western Telepage, Inc., d/b/a AT & T Wireless Services (Telepage), hasprovided paging services in Tacoma and elsewhere in Washington since 1984.It also leases paging devices to some of its customers. Telepage’s pagingservice transmits numeric and alpha-numeric messages to customers. Anumeric message is usually transmitted in response to a telephone call madeto a customer’s pager access number; a telephone company then transmits thecall to Telepage’s paging terminal. Alternatively, an alpha-numericmessage may be prompted by a message sent to the paging terminal by one ofseveral ways, including direct access by modem, dictation to a liveoperator, and Internet e-mail. For either the numeric or alpha-numericmessage, Telepage’s paging terminal sends a microwave (radio) transmissionto the pager device advising the caller to return a call to the specifiedtelephone number or transmitting the brief alpha-numeric message.
[FOOTNOTE 1]Generally, the pager itself does not permit the customer to respond tocallers or to initiate messages, nor does it have any of the capacitiessometimes associated with more recent innovations in two-way paging –message acknowledgment, embedded responses, or message initiation. Until 1981, the Legislature imposed a public utility tax ontraditional telephone services. Former RCW 82.16.010 (1965), amended byLaws of 1981, ch. 144, sec. 2. Recognizing the impending revolution intelecommunications services and wishing to ‘level the playing field’between regulated telephone businesses and emerging, nonregulatedtelecommunications companies,
[FOOTNOTE 2] the Legislature broadened the definition ofcompanies susceptible to the state public utilities tax by amending formerRCW 82.16.010. Former RCW 82.16.010(6), the 1981 predecessor to RCW82.04.065, stated:
[FOOTNOTE 3] ‘Telephone business’ means the business of providing access to a localtelephone network, local telephone network switching service, toll service,or coin telephone services, or providing telephonic, video, data, orsimilar communication or transmission for hire, via a local telephonenetwork, toll line or channel, or similar communication or transmissionsystem. It includes cooperative or farmer line telephone companies orassociations operating an exchange. ‘Telephone business’ does not includethe providing of competitive telephone service, or the providing of cabletelevision service. Laws of 1981, ch. 144, sec. 2(6). As predicted, the telecommunications industry underwent unprecedentedchange in the 1980′s. The breakup of the AT & T telephone system monopolyinvolving the local Bell operating companies, United States v. AmericanTel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C 1982), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001, 103S. Ct. 1240, 75 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1983), the onset of new, competitive longdistance telephone services, and the development of new telecommunicationsservices such as cable television, cellular telephones, and Internet-basedservices were major mileposts in that industry-wide change. Several ofthese new service industries sought and obtained exemptions from the publicutilities tax, which are reflected in the present language of RCW82.04.065, which states: (1) ‘Competitive telephone service’ means the providing by any personof telecommunications equipment or apparatus, or service related to thatequipment or apparatus such as repair or maintenance service, if theequipment or apparatus is of a type which can be provided by persons thatare not subject to regulation as telephone companies under Title 80 RCW andfor which a separate charge is made. (2) ‘Network telephone service’ means the providing by any person ofaccess to a local telephone network, local telephone network switchingservice, toll service, or coin telephone services, or the providing oftelephonic, video, data, or similar communication or transmission for hire,via a local telephone network, toll line or channel, cable, microwave, orsimilar communication or transmission system. ‘Network telephone service’includes interstate service, including toll service, originating from orreceived on telecommunications equipment or apparatus in this state if thecharge for the service is billed to a person in this state. ‘Networktelephone service’ includes the provision of transmission to and from thesite of an internet provider via a local telephone network, toll line orchannel, cable, microwave, or similar communication or transmission system.’Network telephone service’ does not include the providing of competitivetelephone service, the providing of cable television service, the providingof broadcast services by radio or television stations, nor the provision ofinternet service as defined in RCW 82.04.297, including the reception ofdial-in connection, provided at the site of the internet service provider. (3) ‘Telephone service’ means competitive telephone service ornetwork telephone service, or both, as defined in subsections (1) and (2)of this section. (4) ‘Telephone business’ means the business of providing networktelephone service, as defined in subsection (2) of this section. Itincludes cooperative or farmer line telephone companies or associationsoperating an exchange. In the early 1990′s, representatives of the cellular telephoneindustry prevailed upon the Legislature to direct the Department of Revenue(DOR) to review state and local taxes on cellular telephone companies. DORcreated an advisory committee on cellular telephone services; in turn, thatcommittee recommended a model local ordinance on the taxation of suchservices. Prompted by the dissemination of this model ordinance, Tacomainitiated a review of its tax treatment of cellular telephone and pagingservices. Until 1995, Telepage had reported and paid its B & O taxes locally underthe ‘Services and Other’ classification of Tacoma Municipal Code (TMC)6.68.220.
[FOOTNOTE 4]Under that classification, Telepage paid a B & O tax of forty-eight one-hundredths of one percent (.0048%) of its gross income, the rate applicableto those ‘engaged in the business of rendering any type of service{.}’ TMC6.68.220(I). Prior to 1995, Tacoma did not apply its local public utilitytax to paging services. In March 1995, Tacoma adopted Ordinance 25680, which amended Title 6of the Tacoma Municipal Code, and defined pager service for purposes ofTacoma’s local public utilities tax as follows: ‘Pager service’ means service provided by means of an electronic devicewhich has the ability to send or receive voice or digital messagestransmitted through the local telephone network, via satellite or any otherform of voice or data transmission. TMC 6.67.020. TMC 6.67.030 subjects both cellular telephone services andpaging services to the local public utility tax of six percent of thetaxpayer’s total gross income. This is the same rate applicable to’telephone businesses’ generally. TMC 6.66.030. The tax became effectiveon July 1, 1995. After the adoption of the ordinance, Tacoma sent a letter to Telepagestating: Effective July 1, 1995, a city tax of 6% will be imposed on pagingservices, which is defined as a communication service. Prior to July 1,1995, all gross sales received from customers inside the city limits shouldbe reported under the Service and Other classification. Ex. 4. When Tacoma discovered pager companies had not been reporting underthe proper tax classification, it decided to prospectively collect theproper rate under the proper classification. This decision allowed thecompanies to continue reporting as they had been doing, but provided a datecertain as to when they would be required to begin reporting under theproper classification and paying at the proper rate. Tacoma also believedthis decision would limit the financial hardship for the companies’previous underreporting, as it did not seek retroactive adjustment. Under protest, Telepage paid the tax as required and requested arefund at the end of the year. Tacoma denied the request, and Telepageadministratively appealed to the Tacoma Office of the Hearing Examiner. Ahearing examiner considered only the issue of whether Telepage’s servicesfit the definition of ‘pager service’ set forth in TMC 6.67.020. Thehearing examiner denied Telepage’s refund request and affirmed theapplication of TMC 6.67 to Telepage. Telepage appealed the hearing examiner’s ruling to the Pierce CountySuperior Court. In its appeal, Telepage alleged it was due a tax refundbecause its business of providing one-way paging services was not coveredby the tax ordinance as properly construed and, if the ordinance applied,the tax exceeded Tacoma’s authority under RCW 35.21.710. Telepage movedfor partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the Tacoma ordinanceunlawfully increased Telepage’s tax rate in excess of two percent andconflicted with the statutory definition of telephone business. The trialcourt, the Honorable Bryan Chushcoff, denied Telepage’s motion andsubsequently granted Tacoma’s motion for summary judgment, finding thestatutory definition was plain on its face and included paging services;thus, Tacoma’s ordinance was not in violation of state law. Telepage appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division Two, whichaffirmed in a published decision, holding paging services as defined in theTacoma ordinance are not inconsistent with the state definition oftelephone business. Western Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 95 Wn. App.140, 974 P.2d 1270 (1999). We granted Telepage’s petition for review. ANALYSIS We review an order of summary judgment de novo. Enterprise Leasing,Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 139 Wn.2d 546, 988 P.2d 961, 964 (1999); Wilson v.Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment isappropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissionson file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, andthe moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). Weconstrue the facts and the inferences from the facts in a light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195,201, 961 P.2d 333 (1998); Wilson, 98 Wn.2d at 437. Additionally, statutory interpretation is a question of law, which wereview de novo. Enterprise Leasing, 139 Wn.2d at 551; Monroe v. Soliz, 132Wn.2d 414, 418, 939 P.2d 205 (1997); Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology,128 Wn.2d 508, 515, 910 P.2d 462 (1996). A. Telephone Business The basic question in this case is whether the definition of ‘pagerservices’ in TMC 6.67.020 is consistent with the statutory definition oftelephone services in RCW 82.04.065. Telepage asserts the lower courtsincorrectly concluded the statute is unambiguous and includes pagingservices. Rather, Telepage contends the Legislature did not intend toinclude paging services in the statute because the statutory definition,when properly construed, is limited to ‘two-way’ communications and pagingservices do not meet that definition. Tacoma, in turn, argues thestatutory definition of telephone services subject to the public utilitytax plainly encompasses paging services. Tacoma suggests there is noambiguity in the language of the statute because paging services involvethe transmission of data or information. Under state law, ‘ ‘{t}elephone business’ means the business ofproviding network telephone service, as defined in subsection (2) of thissection.’ RCW 82.04.065(4). Network telephone service means: the providing by any person of access to a local telephone network, localtelephone network switching service, toll service, or coin telephoneservices, or the providing of telephonic, video, data, or similarcommunication or transmission for hire, via a local telephone network, tollline or channel, cable, microwave, or similar communication or transmissionsystem. . . . RCW 82.04.065(2) (emphasis added). A statute is ambiguous if it can be reasonably interpreted in morethan one way. Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov’t v. Washington StateBoundary Review Bd., 127 Wn.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953 (1995) (emphasisadded). While a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or morereasonable interpretations, we are not obliged to discern an ambiguity byimagining a variety of alternative interpretations. State v. Tili, 139Wn.2d 107, 115, 985 P.2d 365 (1999). Moreover, we do not construe unambiguous statutes. Whatcom County v.City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). ‘In judicialinterpretation of statutes, the first rule is ‘the court should assume thatthe legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not requireconstruction’.’ State v. McCraw, 127 Wn.2d 281, 288, 898 P.2d 838 (1995)(quoting Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 325, 329, 815 P.2d 781(1991)); State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 271, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) (‘Wordsare given the meaning provided by the statute or, in the absence ofspecific definition, their ordinary meaning.’) (quoting State v. Standifer,110 Wn.2d 90, 92, 750 P.2d 258 (1988)). Thus, when construing anunambiguous statute we look to the wording of the statute, not to outsidesources such as legislative intent. Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Department ofSoc. & Health Servs., 114 Wn.2d 572, 582, 790 P.2d 124 (1990).
[FOOTNOTE 5] Here, Telepage’s interpretation cannot be harmonized with the plainlanguage of the statute. On its face, the statute is not ambiguous. Itdefines precisely the range of activity that falls within its purview –the transmission of telephonic, video, data, or similar communication bytelephone line or microwave. Although Telepage concedes its pagingservices involve a transmission of signals by microwave, Br. of Appellantat 28, it denies its services involve ‘the providing of telephonic, video,data, or similar communication or transmission{.}’ RCW 82.04.065(2).Thus, the real issue before us narrowly focuses on whether Telepagetransmits telephone, video, data, or similar communication by microwave.Because those terms are not defined in the statute, we turn to theirordinary dictionary meaning. C.J.C. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop, 138Wn.2d 699, 709, 985 P.2d 262 (1999) (citing American Legion Post No. 32 v.City of Walla Walla, 116 Wn.2d 1, 8, 802 P.2d 784 (1991)). Webster’s dictionary defines ‘telephonic’ as ‘conveying sound to adistance . . . of or relating to the telephone . . . carried or conveyed bytelephone.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2350 (1971). Itdefines ‘video’ as ‘relating to or used in the transmission or reception ofthe television image.’ Id. at 2551. These definitions do not accuratelydescribe Telepage’s paging services. Thus, the only category left underwhich paging services would constitute a telephone business is if suchservices involved data communication or transmission. Webster’s defines’data’ (the plural of ‘datum’) as ‘material serving as a basis fordiscussion, inference, or determination of policy . . . detailedinformation of any kind.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 577(1971) (emphasis added). Likewise, Webster’s New Riverside UniversityDictionary 348 (1984) defines ‘data’ as ‘{i}nformation, esp. informationorganized for analysis or used as the basis for decision-making . . .{n}umerical information suitable for computer processing . . . data can nowfunction as a singular form in English.’ As previously stated, paging services involve the transmission orcommunication of data because the service transmits numeric and alpha-numeric information to customers by microwave. Simply put, paging servicesinvolve the transmission of information. As such, paging services plainlyfall within the purview of RCW 82.04.065. Nowhere does the statute sayonly two-way communications are subject to RCW 82.04.065. Furthermore, ofthe three enumerated types of communication included in the statute, onlyone, ‘telephonic,’ is traditionally a two-way communication. WesternTelepage, 95 Wn. App. at 146 n.8. Even were we to discern an ambiguity in the statute requiring ourconstruction of RCW 82.04.065, we do not believe Telepage’s argumentssupport its own interpretation of the statute. First, by its terms, RCW82.04.065 applies to the transmission of data by microwave. Second, theLegislature expressly excluded from RCW 82.04.065(4) various types of’network telephone service,’ such as competitive telephone services, cabletelevision, radio, broadcast television, and the Internet. It did notexpressly exclude paging services. As we have noted, the mention of onething implies the exclusion of others, under the maxim ‘expressio unius estexclusio alterius.’ State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Department of PublicServ., 1 Wn.2d 102, 95 P.2d 1007 (1939). Thus, where the Legislature didnot expressly exclude paging services from the broad definition of networktelephone services in RCW 82.04.064(4), it must be assumed the Legislaturedid so intentionally. Telepage argues we should be persuaded only ‘two-way’ transmissionsare covered by RCW 82.04.065, but it undercuts its own position byacknowledging that ‘large-scale,’ one-way data dissemination is subject tothe statute. Moreover, Telepage’s view on two-way communication as theessence of the definition in RCW 82.04.065 is based on the declaration of aformer telephone company lobbyist. Given our reluctance to discernlegislative intent from the testimony of a single legislator, City ofYakima v. International Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 469, 117Wn.2d 655, 677, 818 P.2d 1076 (1991), we find the view of a lobbyist to beof even less utility in discerning the Legislature ‘s intent in enacting abill.
[FOOTNOTE 6] Moreover, the declaration submitted was written 17 years after theevents of 1981. A noncontemporaneous understanding of legislative intentis not reflective of the Legislature’s rationale for enacting a 1981statute. Telepage’s best argument is the fact DOR apparently does not treatpaging as a ‘telephone business’ for tax purposes. Telepage repeatedlyrefers to an article in a DOR newsletter, Tax Topics, which states: ‘Apager does not provide an ability to establish two-way contact orcommunication. Consequently, paging services are not classified astelephone services.’ Clerk’s Papers at 261. While we may defer to a long-standing agency interpretation of a statute, Davis v. Employment SecurityDep’t, 108 Wn.2d 272, 279, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987), we do so only when thestatutory language is ambiguous. Waste Management, Inc. v. Utilities &Transp. Comm’n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 627-28, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994); see alsoCowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 813-14, 828 P.2d 549(1992). Additionally, the agency interpretation must be clear anddefinitive. DOR did not adopt a rule on the issue in this case,
[FOOTNOTE 7] nor didit adopt an interpretive guideline or a policy statement.
[FOOTNOTE 8] We decline togive deference to a short article in an agency bulletin that lacks anofficial, definitive analysis of the issue in question. In the absence ofa DOR rule, interpretive guideline, or policy statement on the issue ofpaging services being subject to RCW 82.04.065, we believe the language ofRCW 82.04.065 compels the conclusion paging services meet the definition ofnetwork telephone services in RCW 82.04.065. In summary, we believe RCW 82.04.065 plainly contemplates taxation ofpaging services because such services involve data transmitted bymicrowave. Consequently, the definition of ‘pager service’ in TMC 6.67.020is not inconsistent with the definition of telephone services contained inRCW 82.04.065. B. Limitation on the Tax Rate Telepage also contends TMC 6.67 violates the terms of RCW 35.21.710,which limits the rate of increase in local taxes. We disagree. RCW 35.21.710 states: Any city which imposes a license fee or tax upon business activitiesconsisting of the making of retail sales of tangible personal propertywhich are measured by gross receipts or gross income from such sales, shallimpose such tax at a single uniform rate upon all such business activities.The taxing authority granted to cities for taxes upon business activitiesmeasured by gross receipts or gross income from sales shall not exceed arate of .0020; except that any city with an adopted ordinance at a higherrate, as of January 1, 1982 shall be limited to a maximum increase of tenpercent of the January 1982 rate, not to exceed an annual incrementalincrease of two percent of current rate: Provided, That any adoptedordinance which classifies according to different types of business orservices shall be subject to both the ten percent and the two percentannual incremental increase limitation on each tax rate: Provided further,That all surtaxes on business and occupational classifications in effect asof January 1, 1982, shall expire no later than December 31, 1982, or byexpiration date established by local ordinance. Cities which impose alicense fee or tax upon business activities consisting of the making ofretail sales of tangible personal property which are measured by grossreceipts or gross income from such sales shall be required to submit anannual report to the state auditor identifying the rate established and therevenues received from each fee or tax. This section shall not apply toany business activities subject to the tax imposed by chapter 82.16 RCW.For purposes of this section, the providing to consumers of competitivetelephone service, as defined in RCW 82.04.065, shall be deemed to be theretail sale of tangible personal property. Prior to 1995, Tacoma treated paging services as services for purposesof its local B & O tax, but changed the basis for the tax on such services tothe local option public utilities tax authorized by state law. We do notbelieve RCW 35.21.710 was designed to freeze local tax codes at their 1982status; the statute was, however, designed to severely restrict the taxrates local governments could assess. Local governments can change the taxtreatment of certain activities to make that taxation consistent with statedefinitions, so long as the effort is not a mere subterfuge, meant tocircumvent the express restrictions on local taxing authority set forth inRCW 35.21.710. Telepage fails to show Tacoma’s action here was pretextualor prompted by a bad faith effort to circumvent the provisions of RCW35.21.710. Rather, it was the result of an analysis by DOR’s advisorycommittee of the tax treatment of cellular telecommunications and pagingservices, as well as the promulgation of a model ordinance. Tacoma madeits taxation of paging services consistent with a public utilities taxexpressly authoritized by state law. RCW 35.21.714. As such, Tacoma didnot raise the B & O tax rate on such services, and RCW 35.21.710 does notapply. See, Enterprise Leasing, 139 Wn.2d at 554. CONCLUSION RCW 82.04.065 is clear on its face. The definition of ‘telephonebusiness’ includes paging services because those services involve thetransmission or communication of data by microwave. Tacoma’s ordinance isconsistent with the statute. Moreover, the Tacoma ordinance does notviolate RCW 35.21.710 as it represents Tacoma’s good faith effort toproperly classify and tax paging services, and does not represent anincrease in the local B & O tax rate. We affirm the judgment in favor of Tacoma. WE CONCUR :::FOOTNOTES:::
FN1 Telepage has argued throughout this case that its paging servicesinvolve ‘one-way’ communication — its terminal transmits only by microwaveto the pager. However, to be fair, it could be argued two-waycommunications are actually involved. Someone must also telephone, e-mail,or otherwise communicate a message to Telepage’s terminal before the pagingservice has any practical utility.
FN2 The legislature recognizes that there have been significant changes inthe nature of the telephone business in recent years. Once solely thedomain of regulated monopolies, the telephone business has now been openedup to competition with respect to most of its services and equipment. As aresult of this competition, the state and local excise tax structure in theState of Washington has become discriminatory when applied to regulatedtelephone company transactions that are similar in nature to thoseconsumated {sic} by nonregulated competitors. Telephone companies areforced to operate at a significant state and local tax disadvantage whencompared to these nonregulated competitors. To remedy this situation, it is the intent of the legislature to placetelephone companies and nonregulated competitors of telephone companies onan equal excise tax basis with regard to the providing of similar goods andservices. Laws of 1981, ch. 144, sec. 1.
FN3 In 1983, the Legislature amended former RCW 82.16.010(6), deletingthe subsection and placing the definition of ‘telephone business’ in RCW82.04.065. Laws of 1983, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 3, sec.sec. 24, 32.
FN4 Telepage voluntarily reported and paid the B & O tax at thismiscellaneous rate; Tacoma never instructed it to do so. According toDuston Jensen, Manager of the Tax & License Division of Tacoma’s Departmentof Finance, ‘{t}he manner in which a company has reported does not make itcorrect or change the law as to the proper reporting classification.’Clerk’s Papers at 168.
FN5 One canon of construction indicates ambiguous statutes are to beconstrued against the taxing entity; it is not applicable here because thestatute is clear on its face. See Dravo Corp. v. City of Tacoma, 80 Wn.2d590, 595, 496 P.2d 504 (1972).
FN6 While lobbyists refer to themselves as the ‘Third House,’ thisappellation has no grounding in our Constitution. See Wash. Const., art.II, sec. 1.
FN7 Arguably, an agency policy of the nature Telepage contends existedhere had to be adopted as a rule. RCW 34.05.010(16); Hillis v. Departmentof Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 399, 932 P.2d 139 (1997).
FN8 RCW 34.05.230 encourages agency adoption of interpretive or policystatements. RCW 34.05.010(8) defines an ‘interpretive statement’ as a written expression of the opinion of an agency, entitled an interpretivestatement by the agency head or its designee, as to the meaning of astatute or other provision of law, of a court decision, or of an agencyorder. RCW 34.05.010(15) defines a ‘policy statement’ as a written description of the current approach of an agency, entitled apolicy statement by the agency head or its designee, to implementation of astatute or other provision of law, of a court decision, or of an agencyorder, including where appropriate the agency’s current practice,procedure, or method of action based upon that approach.
Western Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma Supreme Court of the State of Washington Opinion Information Sheet Docket Number: 68028-1 Title of Case: Western Telepage, Inc., Dba AT & T Wireless Services v. City of Tacoma File Date: 05/11/2000 Oral Argument Date: 03/01/2000 SOURCE OF APPEAL —————-Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; 97-2-08279-5 Honorable Bryan Chushcoff, Judge. JUSTICES ——–Authored by Philip A. Talmadge Concurring: Richard P. Guy Charles Z. Smith Charles W. Johnson Barbara A. Madsen Gerry L. Alexander Richard B. Sanders Faith E Ireland Bobbe J. Bridge COUNSEL OF RECORD —————–Counsel for Petitioner(s) D. B. Lamka Davis Wright Tremaine 2600 Century Square 1501 4th Ave. Seattle, WA 98101-1688 Dirk J. Giseburt Davis Wright & Jones 2600 Century Square 1501 4th Ave. Seattle, WA 98101-1688 Counsel for Respondent(s) Harding T. Roe Assistant City Attorney City Attorney’s Ofc 747 Market St. Rm 1120 Tacoma, WA 98402-3701 Amicus Curiae on behalf of Association of Washington Business George C. Mastrodonato Lane Powell Spears Lubersky 2120 Caton Way SW Ste B Olympia, WA 98502-1105 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON WESTERN TELEPAGE, INC. d/b/a AT & T WIRELESS SERVICES, Appellant, v. CITY OF TACOMA, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCING, Respondent. No. 68028-1 Filed May 11, 2000
