OPINION
Appellee Roger E. Foxall filed suit against appellants Judy Powell, John L. Luther, Bobbe Alexander, Judy Broussard, Gene Ryder, and Ana Bergh, *fn1 individually and in their official capacities, for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified privilege, official immunity in their individual capacity, sovereign immunity in their official capacity, and insufficient evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellants on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but otherwise denied relief. In an interlocutory appeal, appellants assert the trial court erred in denying their claims of immunity. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. � 51.014 (a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2001). In their first issue, appellants query, “does official immunity shield them from individual liability for an error in the newsletter?” Issue two asks, “does sovereign immunity preclude liability against the Defendants in their official capacity?”
The standard of review for denial of a summary judgment is the same as for the granting of a summary judgment. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue precludes summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant is taken as true. Id. at 548-49. Every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant is indulged and any doubts are resolved in its favor. Id. The movant must either disprove at least one element of each of plaintiff’s theories of recovery or conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). If the movant conclusively proves all essential elements of his defense, the burden shifts to the non-movant. See Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989). The non-movant must answer that affirmative defense for summary judgment purposes. See Broussard v. Tyler County Hosp., 831 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1992, no writ).
