� 1 Shawn Lockridge appeals from the October 11, 2000, ninety (90) day judgment of sentence imposed after he was found guilty, following a de novo hearing, of the summary offense of driving while his license was suspended.
*fn1 The facts, which provide the basis of this appeal, follow.
� 2 On May 10, 2000, Mindy Davis Musser, the Juniata County probation officer assigned to appellant following an unrelated conviction, observed appellant operating a motor vehicle, in violation of the terms of his probation (N.T., 9/8/00, at 5). Musser reported this violation to Chief Deputy Shane Corwell of the Juniata County Sheriff’s Department, and Deputy Corwell issued a traffic citation charging appellant with driving while his license was suspended, DUI-related. Judgment of sentence was initially entered on July 11, 2000, an appeal was taken, and following a September 8, 2000, summary appeal hearing, the court granted counsel ten (10) days within which to submit briefs. On October 11, 2000, the court entered judgment of sentence, re-imposing the aforementioned 90-day term of incarceration and assessing a one thousand dollar ($1,000.00) fine. This appeal followed.
� 3 Appellant argues Deputy Corwell was unauthorized to issue the Motor Vehicle Code citation because the deputy did not observe him driving his vehicle, and the traffic violation in question was not a “breach of the peace,” as contemplated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Leet, 537 Pa. 89, 641 A.2d 299 (1994). Appellant interprets Leet as follows: for a deputy sheriff to make a valid arrest in connection with the Motor Vehicle Code, the “deputy sheriff must (1) complete the same type of training that is required of police officers throughout the Commonwealth, (2) make an arrest under the Motor Vehicle Code only for violations committed in his presence, and (3) those violations must be breaches of the peace.” (Appellant’s brief at 8.) Appellant concedes Deputy Corwell was a trained officer, but argues the latter two prongs of the tri-part test were not satisfied. We find appellant’s arguments unconvincing and his interpretation of the Leet decision faulty.
