Argued November 10, 1999
Isaac Burgess and James Waddell were indicted for first degree premeditated murder while armed, see D.C. Code �� 22-2401, -3202 (1996 Repl.), assault with intent to kill (AWIK) while armed, see D.C. Code �� 22-501, -3202 (1996 Repl.), possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV), see D.C. Code � 22-3204 (b) (1996 Repl.), and carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL), see D.C. Code � 22-3204 (a) (1996 Repl.). Albert Quiovers was also named a defendant; he entered a plea to a lesser-included conspiracy charge and testified for the government at appellants’ trial. A jury acquitted both appellants of first degree murder and AWIK, but convicted them of the lesser included offenses of second degree murder while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW), and the weapons offenses. Appellants were sentenced to fifteen years to life for second degree murder while armed, forty to hundred-twenty months for ADW, five to fifteen years for PFCV, and one year for CPWL, to run consecutively.
On appeal, Burgess claims that the court plainly erred when it permitted evidence of an uncharged crime, i.e, that he and a group of friends had initially agreed to mislead the police about their involvement in the murder, and when it failed to intervene sua sponte in the prosecutor’s closing argument. He also claims the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a hearsay statement made by Quiovers presented during the testimony of Eric Cloyd, another government witness. Waddell appeals the trial court’s denial of his collateral challenge that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, which is based on Burgess’ claims on direct appeal. We see no merit to Burgess’s claims (and, thus, to Waddell’s collateral challenge).