McCarthy v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

�1 In this appeal, we re-examine when a trial court has the authority to sanction counsel based on the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. We conclude that a trial court can sanction counsel by disqualification based on a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct only when the trial court has determined that disqualification is needed to ensure that the parties receive the fair trial that due process requires. We also conclude that even where circumstances are such as to allow a sanction for a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct, the court must have evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the attorney did violate that particular rule.

�2 Jonann McCarthy appeals from the order denying her Motion for Post-Trial Relief. McCarthy asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that her attorney’s (William Keller) ex-parte communication with present and past SEPTA employees was unethical under Rule 4.2 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. McCarthy also asserts that the trial court’s imposition of sanctions deprived her of her choice of counsel and violated her constitutional right to a fair trial. In addition, McCarthy argues that the trial court’s decision to force her to proceed to trial represented by the associate of the disqualified counsel was contrary to law. Finally, McCarthy asserts that the application of Pa.R.P.C. 4.2 to the facts of this case was contrary to the Supremacy Clause because Congress has precluded all interference with employee witnesses in FELA cases. We conclude that although the trial court may sanction attorneys for violations of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct in certain cases, the trial court did not have the authority to sanction Keller on that basis in the instant case. We also conclude that even if the trial court had the authority to sanction Keller, the evidence of record does not support the court’s finding that Keller violated Pa.R.P.C. 4.2. Ultimately, we conclude that the trial court denied McCarthy’s right to choice of counsel, and, therefore, McCarthy was denied a fair trial. Based on the above reasons, we reverse the order denying post-trial relief and remand for a new trial.