OPINION
The police found crack cocaine in the apartment where Eugene Stroman and his wife, Renee, resided. A jury later convicted Eugene Stroman of possession of cocaine in an amount greater than one gram but less than four grams. Pursuant to the habitual offender statute, see Tex. Pen. Code Ann. � 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002), the jury assessed Stroman’s punishment at sixty years’ confinement. On appeal, Stroman challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence and contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment.
Stroman challenges both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence on the ground that the State failed to affirmatively link him to the cocaine. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we look at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we begin with the presumption that the evidence is legally sufficient, see Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), and we view all of the evidence without the prism of “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d at 647. We determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the verdict, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If we find factual insufficiency, we vacate the conviction and remand the cause for a new trial. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d at 648; Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d at 133-35.