Beach Exploration, Inc. challenges a summary judgment that it take and recover nothing on its action for damages against Bradford L. Moore and McGowan & McGowan, P.C. Presenting two issues, Beach contends the trial court erred in granting Moore and McGowan’s motion for summary judgment (1) on the ground of limitations because Beach’s claim did not accrue within two years of the filing of its lawsuit and the discovery rule applies to toll the accrual of Beach’s claim, and (2) on the ground of proximate causation because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or not the negligent act of Moore proximately caused damages incurred by Beach. Because the summary judgment is interlocutory and not subject to appeal, we must dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
This Court is obligated to determine, sua sponte, its jurisdiction to hear and consider an appeal. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1994, writ denied); see also New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. 1990). The jurisdiction of this Court is established by various constitutional and statutory provisions. See, e.g., Tex. Const. art. 5, � 6; Tex. Gov’t Code Annotated � 22.220 (Vernon 1988). As a general rule, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). As a result, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order absent an express grant of authority. Steeple Oil and Gas Corporation v. Amend, 394 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. 1965); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. � 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Therefore, before we consider Beach’s issues, we must first determine if the order granting summary judgment signed February 6, 2001, is a final judgment.
After being engaged by Beach to examine the title to a 160-acre tract in Terry County and to render their written title opinion, Moore and McGowan, attorneys, submitted their original title opinion dated December 10, 1986, by which they expressed their opinion as to the ownership of the oil, gas, and minerals and existing oil, gas, and mineral leases. Among other things, the attorneys concluded in the title opinion that Amerada Hess Corporation owned an undivided one-fourth of the oil, gas, and minerals, and that Beach held oil, gas, and mineral leases covering the remainder of the oil, gas, and minerals under the tract. After making arrangements with Amerada Hess Corporation under a “farm out” agreement, Beach drilled and completed four oil wells on the property which continued to produce oil, gas, or minerals until 1996, when a third party filed a suit asserting a claim to part of the oil, gas, and minerals under the tract which interest was not reflected in the December 10, 1986 title opinion.
