In five issues, appellants Linda and John W. Williams, individually and as representatives of the estate of John Wesley Williams, challenge a judgment against them in their suit for medical malpractice against appellee Balluswamy Viswanathan, M.D. Appellants were the parents of John Wesley Williams (John), a 14-year-old special education student, who suffered near drowning in a swimming pool on May 22, 1995, and was treated by appellee at Methodist Hospital in Lubbock. John died approximately 24 hours after being taken to the hospital.
Initially, appellants challenge this court’s overruling of their motion for disqualification and recusal of one of the justices of this court. They also contend that reversible error exists because (1) the trial court submitted two unsupported and cumulative jury instructions, (2) the jury’s failure to find that appellee’s negligence was a proximate cause of John’s death was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in overruling their motion for new trial based on admitted juror misconduct, and (4) a new trial is required to investigate the discovery of a new death certificate. Disagreeing that reversal is required, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In their first issue, appellants except to this court’s overruling of their motion for the disqualification and recusal of Justice Quinn. Although they presented several bases for disqualification or recusal in their motion, in this appeal they apparently only attempt to re-assert one basis, i.e., that Justice Quinn has a financial interest in the outcome of this case because he offices at Texas Tech University and serves as an Adjunct Professor there, and appellants have another lawsuit pending against that university. In our opinion overruling appellants’ motion, we found that Texas Tech University was not a party to this lawsuit and therefore the issue was not relevant here. In the opinion, we also noted that the type of interest required for disqualification must be of a pecuniary nature so that the judge would gain or lose by the judgment rendered in the case. That interest must not only be capable of valuation, it must be direct, real, certain, and in the subject matter of the case in question. We did not believe that Justice Quinn had a sufficient pecuniary interest to warrant his disqualification. Williams v. Viswanathan, No. 07-00-0414-CV, 2001 WL 23151, at 4 (Tex.App.–Amarillo January 8, 2001).
