The Supreme Court of Georgia on Monday issued the following attorney discipline decisions:

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 16, 2017

S17Y1536. IN THE MATTER OF BRENDEN E. MILLER.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Notice of Discipline seeking the disbarment of Brenden E. Miller (State Bar No. 506214). The State Bar attempted to serve Miller at the address listed with the Bar, but he did not acknowledge service of the disciplinary pleadings within 20 days of mailing and the sheriff filed a return of service non est inventus when personal service was attempted. The State Bar then properly served Miller by publication, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Miller failed to file a Notice of Rejection as to this disciplinary matter. He is therefore in default, has waived his rights to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of his default, show that Miller, who has been a member of the Bar since 2000, filed on behalf of a client a petition for relief in federal bankruptcy proceedings, butthe client was thereafter unable to reach Miller. The client then contacted the bankruptcy trustee, who wrote to Miller, requesting that he contact his client regarding matters as to which the client needed assistance, but the client, who was hospitalized at the time and continued to be unable to reach Miller, was allowed to file a motion pro se. The bankruptcy court entered an order directing Miller to confer with his client and, if necessary,file an amended motion, and the trustee again sought to contact Miller about the status of the matter, but he failed to respond. The court then entered a show cause order as to why Miller should not be sanctioned for his conduct, but he again failed to respond to this order or to appear at a hearing on the matter. The court then entered an order sanctioning Miller and suspending him from filing cases until he appears and shows cause, but he has failed to respond to the order, contact his client, or seek to be removed from the case.

Based on these facts, the Investigative Panel found probable cause to believe that Miller's conduct violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 (c), and 3.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2 and 1.3 is disbarment, and the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 3.2 is a public reprimand. In aggravation of discipline, the Bar notes that Miller received a prior 12-month suspension from this Court for his neglect of another client's bankruptcy matter, see In the Matter of Miller, 291 Ga. 30 (727 SE2d 124) (2012); that he failed to respond to the Notice of Investigation, for which failure he is currently under suspension, see In the Matter of Miller, S17Y0713 (Dec. 8, 2016); and that he possesses considerable experience in the practice of law.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Brenden E. Miller be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Miller is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 16, 2017

S17Y1831. IN THE MATTER OF JAMES EDWARD RAMBEAU, JR.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Notice of Discipline seeking the disbarment of Respondent James Edward Rambeau, Jr. (State Bar No. 592845) based on three underlying grievances. After Rambeau failed to acknowledge service of the Notice of Discipline mailed to the post office address on file with the State Bar's membership department, the Bar served him by publication, see Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). However, Rambeau failed to file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, he is in default, has waived his rights to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b). Rambeau, who was admitted to the State Bar in 1995, is currently under an interim suspension for his failure to respond to the State Bar's investigation with regard to one of the grievances addressed in this matter, and he has since failed to pay his Bar dues such that he is not currently in good standing with the State Bar. We agree that disbarment is appropriate.

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of Rambeau's default, show with regard to State Disciplinary Board (“SDB”) Docket No. 7020 that, in April 2015, a client hired Rambeau to represent her in a civil suit filed in Fayette County Superior Court. Rambeau entered an appearance on the client's behalf but thereafter failed to take any action or appear at any hearing in the case. The client attempted to contact him about his efforts and the status of her case, but Rambeau never responded and the client was forced to take action on her own to protect her interests. Rambeau never sought permission to withdraw from the representation and effectively abandoned the client's case. The client filed a grievance with the State Bar and, although properly served with the Notice of Investigation based on that grievance, Rambeau failed to timely respond.

With regard to SDB Docket No. 7021, the record shows that, in April 2015, a client hired Rambeau to represent her in an employment discrimination case. Although Rambeau filed suit on the client's behalf against her employer, he never served the employer with the summons and complaint and therefore the magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the action be dismissed. After prodding from the client, who learned of the recommendation on her own, Rambeau filed an objection to the report and was granted additional time in which to serve the client's employer. Despite the fact that the client had furnished Rambeau with the funds to pay for the expenses of service, Rambeau failed to serve the employer and the case was dismissed in September 2016. Rambeau never told the client about the dismissal order, nor did he refund the money she gave him for service expenses or otherwise account to her for those funds. The client filed a grievance and once again, although properly served with the resulting Notice of Investigation, Rambeau failed to timely respond thereto.

With regard to SDB Docket No. 7022, the record shows that Rambeau maintained an IOLTA account at BB&T Bank. In 2016, the Bank twice notified the Bar that checks written by Rambeau were not paid because his account had insufficient funds to pay the checks. Thereafter, Rambeau failed to respond to the Bar's Trust Account Overdraft Coordinator's request for a explanation, leading the Investigative Panel to initiate a grievance, to which Rambeau failed to respond. Thereafter, Rambeau was properly served with the Notice of Investigation based on the grievance, but he did not properly respond thereto.

Based on those facts, the Investigative Panel found, in connection with SDB Docket No. 7020, that Rambeau violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) (4), 1.16 (c), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bar Rule 4-102 (d). In connection with SDB Docket No. 7021, the Investigative Panel found violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) (4), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.16 (d), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Finally, in connection with SDB Docket No. 7022, the Investigative Panel found violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.15 (I), and 1.15 (II) (a) and (b) is disbarment, while the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 9.3 is a public reprimand.

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the State Bar that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, the name of James Edward Rambeau, Jr., is hereby removed from the rolls of attorneys authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. He is reminded of his duties under Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 16, 2017

S17Y1980. IN THE MATTER OF DAVID WESLER FRY.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before theCourt pursuant to the new report and recommendation of special master Joseph A. Boone following this Court's opinion rejecting an earlier request by Respondent David Wesler Fry (State Bar No. 278690) that he be allowed to resign his membership in the Georgia Bar, pursuant to Rule 1-208 of the State Bar's Governance Rules. See In the Matter of Fry, 300 Ga. 862 (800 SE2d 514) (2017). The special master now recommends that Fry be suspended for one year with conditions on his reinstatement, and represents that all parties have consented to this resolution. We, however, find this resolution to be too lenient under the circumstances of this matter, and we order that Fry be disbarred.

As set out in the earlier opinion, in March 2012, in the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, Fry entered a guilty plea under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970), and the First Offender Act, see OCGA § 42-8-60, to two felony counts of bribery of county commissioners. He was sentenced to five years probation on each count to be served concurrently. Fry's probation was terminated in October 2016, and he was discharged without an adjudication of guilt, as is allowed by the First Offender Act, see OCGA § 42-8-60 (e). Although the State Bar received a certified copy of Fry's convictions in 2012, the Bar failed to act on those convictions until 2016 when it initiated this disciplinary matter.

Initially, Fry agreed that if the disciplinary matter was dismissed, he would then “resign” his Bar membership and would not seek reinstatement to the State Bar of Georgia. Although the State Bar had no objection to that unusual resolution, this Court rejected it, noting that Georgia's Bar Rules do not allow for dismissal/resignation in the face of an unresolved disciplinary matter; that the accepted method in Georgia for the cessation of a law practice in exchange for the resolution of a pending disciplinary matter would be through the voluntary surrender of one's license; and that Fry had not presented this Court with sufficient evidence or policy support for creating an alternative to that standard practice. See Fry, 300 Ga. at 865-866. The Court remanded the matter for further proceedings.

After remand, the special master held a hearing at which Fry testified and presented evidence. The special master then issued his report and recommendation in which he found that, by virtue of his plea, Fry had violated Rule 8.4 (a) (2), see Bar Rule 4-102 (d), the maximum penalty for which is disbarment. The special master found, in aggravation of punishment, that Fry was a long-term, experienced member of the Bar and, in mitigation, that Fry lacked a prior disciplinary history; that he suffered personal and emotional problems; and that there was delay in the disciplinary process. See Standard 9.32 of the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The special master also acknowledged an affidavit from the judge who accepted Fry's guilty plea attesting to Fry's good character and to Fry's successful participation in the mental health court program following his plea. Noting that this case involved no potential or actual injury to a client in the traditional sense, the special master nevertheless recognized that there had been a violation of the ethical standards of the legal profession and recommended that Fry be suspended from the practice of law for a minimum term of one year, with his reinstatement conditioned on his providing the State Bar with an acceptable written certification from a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist stating that Fry is mentally competent to return to the practice of law. Both Fry and the State Bar agreed with his recommendation, and neither side has filed exceptions.

After consideration of the record in this case, the Court finds that the discipline recommended by the special master is an unacceptable sanction in this matter. It is true that the “primary purpose of a disciplinary action is to protect the public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to incompetence or unprofessional conduct.” In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865, 866 (621 SE2d 750) (2005) (“disbarment is the typical discipline imposed in cases … where a lawyer engages in criminal conduct involving interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, or fraud”). Another important purpose, however, involves the protection of the public's confidence in the legal system. In the Matter of Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (706 SE2d 461) (2011). In this case, Fry committed more than one felony by bribing public officials. Moreover, Fry has shown no remorse for his crimes. His acts not only indicate that he is unqualified to practice law due to unprofessional conduct, but they also gravely denigrate public confidence in the legal system. Despite the Bar's slow prosecution of this case, Fry's conduct must be met with strong discipline, not merely a one-year suspension. See, e.g., In the Matter of Csehy, 296 Ga. 492 (769 SE2d 93) (2015) (lawyer disbarred for felonies involving drug and gun possession); In the Matter of Hutto, 292 Ga. 556 (739 SE2d 385) (2013) (lawyer disbarred for withholding information of crime); In the Matter of Vickers, 291 Ga. 354 (729 SE2d 355) (2012) (lawyer disbarred for felony charges of fraud). Accordingly, we hereby order that David Wesler Fry be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in this State. Fry is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4–219(c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 16, 2017

S17Y2000. IN THE MATTER OF MELISSA M. CLYATT.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and recommendation of Special Master Jack J. Helms, who recommends that this Court impose a Review Panel reprimand on Melissa M. Clyatt (State Bar No. 006110) for the misconduct underlying this matter. This matter began when a former client of Clyatt, who has been a member of the Bar since 1988, recorded a videotaped statement conveying her grievance in May 2014. The client died, however, in May 2015, and the formal complaint against Clyatt was not filed until May 2016. Although the parties engaged in extensive discovery, the death of Clyatt's former client greatly impacted the ability of the parties to marshal the relevant evidence and left several issues about the admissibility of certain evidence. As a result, the parties agreed on a set of stipulated facts under which they agreed the matter would be adjudicated. Following presentation of these stipulated facts as the Bar's case, Clyatt moved for dismissal of certain counts of the formal complaint alleging several violations of Bar Rules, but conceded that her conduct had violated Rule 1.8 (a), the maximum sanction for a violation of which is a public reprimand. The Bar did not concede to the dismissal of the various counts, but acknowledged that, based on the stipulated facts, there was not case law with which it could oppose the motion. The Special Master did not rule on the motion at the hearing.

As recounted by the Special Master, the facts underlying this matter began in 2006 with Clyatt's representation of the former client in a catastrophic workers' compensation case, which settled in November 2013. During the course of her representation, Clyatt's relationship with the client evolved into a more personal relationship, with Clyatt and her staff assisting the client with personal matters, in addition to legal matters, including helping the client locate and move to a new residence in a safer area, monitoring the client's medical and home health care, and including the client in family and office socialization. At the client's request, Clyatt assisted the client in setting up accounts for the settlement proceeds and had her name, again at the client's request, placed on the accounts. Clyatt and the client agreed that the client would allow Clyatt to use the settlement money, in return for which the client would receive a set monthly fee for interest payments and Clyatt would return any principal amount borrowed upon request. However, this agreement was never reduced to writing, and the client was not informed that she could and should seek the advice of independent counsel before entering into such an arrangement. In any case, in February and March of 2014, Clyatt wrote several checks for large dollar amounts against the account and paid the client the agreed-upon amounts in interest. In late March, the client suffered a severe health event that necessitated a hospitalization and additional nursing and hospice care from the time she was discharged until her death in May 2015. In May 2014, the client called Clyatt and asked her to return the principal amounts she had withdrawn, which Clyatt did in May and June 2014.

Based on these facts, the Special Master agreed with Clyatt's admission of having violated only Rule 1.8 (a), as the evidence reflects that Clyatt knowingly acquired a pecuniary interest in the client's funds while still representing the client, and without having ensured: that the terms of the arrangement were committed to writing; that the client was advised of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent counsel; or that the client's consent was informed and in writing. In mitigation of discipline, the Special Master noted that Clyatt had no prior disciplinary record, that she did not have a dishonest or selfish motive, that she made a timely good faith effort to make restitution to the client of the principal amounts used to that point and had paid interest per their agreement in the interim, that she displayed a cooperative attitude towards the disciplinary proceedings, and that she has exhibited remorse; in aggravation, the Special Master noted only Clyatt's considerable experience in the practice of law. Because of the greater weight of the collected mitigating factors; because of the rare, personal relationship that developed between Clyatt and the client and which benefitted the client greatly; and because of the absence of evidence of malice, deceit, or bad faith, the Special Master found that a Review Panel reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Neither Clyatt nor the Bar has responded in this Court to the submission of the Special Master's report.

Having reviewed the record, we agree that a Review Panel reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, the Court hereby orders that Clyatt receive a Review Panel reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (4) and 4-220 for her violation of Rule 1.8 (a).

Review Panel reprimand. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 16, 2017

S18Y0141. IN THE MATTER OF VINCENT C. OTUONYE.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition filed by Vincent C. Otuonye (State Bar No. 555470) seeking the voluntary suspension of his license to practice law pending the outcome of an appeal of his criminal conviction, see Bar Rule 4-106 (f). Because we agree that such a suspension is appropriate, we accept Otuonye's petition.

On April 20, 2017, Vincent C. Otuonye was convicted in the Superior Court of Mitchell County, Georgia, on one felony count of Criminal Attempt to Furnish Prohibited Items to Inmates in violation of OCGA § 42-5-18. Otuonye, who has been a member of the Bar since 2000, recognizes that his conviction, which constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d), would make him subject to the provisions of Bar Rule 4-106. Stating that he has initiated an appeal of his conviction, however, Otuonye filed this petition requesting that the Court suspend his license pending the resolution of his appeal. The Bar has indicated that it has no objection to Otuonye's petition, and the special master, Margaret G. Washburn, recommends that we accept it.

Based on our review of the record, we agree that the petition should be accepted. Accordingly, Otuonye hereby is suspended from the practice of law in this State until further order of this Court. He is directed to notify the State Bar of the final disposition of his direct appeal within ten days of that disposition and is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Suspended until further order of this Court. All the Justices concur.