The decision in Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Medical Center marks a significant change from the way the 9th Circuit has analyzed cases involving attendance policies in relation to the Americans With Disabilities Act, according to Ogletree Deakins Shareholder Mark Kisicki.

Kisicki says that to get to the question of whether an accommodation request is reasonable, most courts outside the 9th Circuit have first determined whether the person qualifies for an accommodation by meeting the essential requirements for performing the job. Previously, the 9th Circuit had skipped the step of determining whether regular attendance was an essential requirement.

The 1999 decision in Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is the earliest 9th Circuit case in which the court entirely skipped the analysis of whether attendance was an essential job function and instead focused on whether leave was a reasonable accommodation that might, at some future time, enable the person to perform the job, Kisicki says.

“This [Samper] decision put the order of analysis back to the way it should have been, and the way most courts outside the 9th Circuit have addressed it,” he says.

The decision in Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Medical Center marks a significant change from the way the 9th Circuit has analyzed cases involving attendance policies in relation to the Americans With Disabilities Act, according to Ogletree Deakins Shareholder Mark Kisicki.

Kisicki says that to get to the question of whether an accommodation request is reasonable, most courts outside the 9th Circuit have first determined whether the person qualifies for an accommodation by meeting the essential requirements for performing the job. Previously, the 9th Circuit had skipped the step of determining whether regular attendance was an essential requirement.

The 1999 decision in Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc . is the earliest 9th Circuit case in which the court entirely skipped the analysis of whether attendance was an essential job function and instead focused on whether leave was a reasonable accommodation that might, at some future time, enable the person to perform the job, Kisicki says.

“This [Samper] decision put the order of analysis back to the way it should have been, and the way most courts outside the 9th Circuit have addressed it,” he says.