Perhaps there has always been an uneasy relationship between science and the law. Though Daubert ostensibly governs the use of scientific evidence in litigation in most, if not all, jurisdictions, use of the Daubert procedures has not lead to uniform results nor consistent fairness. Astonishing developments in genomic research now stretch the ability of the law to put new scientific evidence into use and of both the regulated communities and private citizens to understand and respond to it. This article is a very brief survey of some of the many areas where genomic information may change the way evidence is presented and understood and also the way the use of this information may apply to a few of the varied and disparate parts of our lives.

Toxic Torts

Perhaps the most obvious use of genomic evidence is in the area of toxic torts, where plaintiffs must prove that a substance has caused them injury. Traditional causation evidence usually employs differential diagnosis—nothing else appears to have caused this injury, so the cause must be the substance under inquiry—or statistical analysis, both of them blunt instruments so far as proof is concerned. Genomic evidence gives much more precise proof of exposure and can also reveal whether the injured person has a predisposition to the condition complained of. That can cut two ways, of course, but may be more helpful to defendants than to plaintiffs. In Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, 358 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Tex. 2005), the defense proved that thimerosal in a vaccine did not cause autism in a child because he lacked a genetic susceptibility to mercury poisoning; in Cavallo v Star Enterprise, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996), a plaintiff was unable to prevail on her claim of being highly sensitive to vapors from an oil spill when the court found that the standard for such proof had to be the normal general population, not a person highly susceptible to the contamination in question.