Mark Dubois

Some day, law students learning about the common law may study the Litchfield elephants case for what it shows about how new concepts, values and sensibilities can redefine and reshape what is at its core the flexible and adaptable system of common law. If I teach ethics again, I might include the case on the final exam because of what it teaches us about Rule 3.1 and the mandate that lawyers only bring nonfrivolous matters to courts.

As reported in the Tribune a few weeks ago, Judge James Bentivegna dismissed a habeas corpus petition brought by an animal legal rights group challenging the continued detention in Litchfield of three elephants at the Comerford zoo and farm. Initially, I joked about the case as probably many did—“wow, I bet they won't forget that!” I viewed the whole thing as a farce and a waste of time. I was wrong.

I was intrigued enough to look further into the case because one of the grounds of dismissal was that the matter was “wholly frivolous.” For ethics nerds like me, hearing a judge call an argument or position frivolous is kind of like blood in the water. There's a schadenfreude that draws us to the troubles of others. I figured the case might add something to the law of frivolity, especially if there were repercussions for bringing such a claim. After a lot of reading and thinking (OK, I really do have to get out more…), I think the case has a point.