The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines an anachronism as “a chronological misplacing of persons, events, objects or customs in regard to each other.” Connecticut's General Statutes have a number of provisions at Conn. Gen. Stat. §51-80 through §51-94 that meet this definition.

It is commonly known among judges and attorneys that the judiciary is empowered to promulgate rules governing the regulation of the legal profession, including the admission and discipline of attorneys. The Rules Committee of the Superior Court annually proposes to the Superior Court judges at their annual meeting in June amendments to and/or additions to the Practice Book that deal with the admission and discipline of attorneys.

Per Article Fifth of the 1818 Connecticut Constitution, all three branches of government are called “Departments.” Decades ago and consistent with the wording of the state constitution, the judiciary called itself the “Judicial Department.” One court administrator believed that that name suggested that the judiciary was not a co-equal branch of government (it actually is not under a proper understanding of the constitutional jurisprudence concerning the state's separation-of-powers doctrine). Before the judiciary called itself the “judicial branch” rather than the “judicial department,” the Legislature, at the behest of the judiciary, would regularly update the general statutes to mirror the changes to the Practice Book that had been made by the Superior Court judges at their annual meeting.

When the judicial department called itself the “judicial branch” in an effort to appear as a co-equal branch of government, that kind of updating no longer took place on a consistent basis because the judiciary no longer thought the Legislature should be enacting any statutes dealing with the admission and discipline of attorneys. Therefore, what presently exist in the general statutes are outdated provisions concerning the admission and discipline of attorneys, which are not consistent with the provisions in the Practice Book dealing with those subjects.

For instance, the general statute provides only two and a half pages pertaining to the admission to the bar, consisting of three rules. In contrast, the Practice Book devotes 11 pages consisting of 28 rules. The provisions in the general statutes dealing with attorney discipline are completely different from the Practice Book provisions dealing with attorney discipline in the way local panels interact with the Statewide Grievance Committee. The Practice Book provisions set forth what appellate rights a respondent may have if there is a finding of probable cause, or a finding of discipline.

The general statutes are silent about any appellate rights. The Practice Book provisions dealing with attorney discipline have been amended in more than a dozen instances to reflect the role of the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. The general statutes have no provision or provisions that create the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. Finally, the deadlines for filings and reports differ in each set of rules.

One may argue that this anachronism is harmless because attorneys and judges know full well under the doctrine of separation of powers that the judiciary has primary—and in some cases, exclusive—jurisdiction in making rules regulating the legal profession. The problem is the general public is unaware of this fact. Hence, citizens sometimes rely on the general statutes. That reliance creates chaos in the world of attorney discipline, where resources are in short supply and funding has been curtailed.

We call on the Judiciary Committee of the General Assembly to propose to the Legislature either the elimination of the above-cited statutes dealing with attorney admission and discipline or update the provisions so they mirror what is currently provided for in the Practice Book.