In Cerame v. Lamont, answering a question of law certified by the District of Connecticut, the Connecticut Supreme Court construed Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53‑37—colloquially called the “racial ridicule” law—to apply exclusively to commercial advertisements and not to other noncommercial speech. This case both offers a lesson in using the state’s certification procedure (as outlined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51‑199b(d)) to streamline federal litigation and underscores the wisdom of advocating textually plausible statutory interpretations, even if they contravene settled practice or informal understanding. And while likely ending the particular matter before it, the Supreme Court’s decision leaves open the ultimate constitutionality of the narrowed statute—now solely and explicitly a form of trade regulation.

Section 53‑37 makes a misdemeanant out of anyone “who, by his advertisement, ridicules or holds up to contempt any person or class of persons, on account of the creed, religion, color, denomination, nationality or race of such person or class of persons.” The Cerame plaintiff brought a pre‑enforcement federal lawsuit against state officials to invalidate the state statute, claiming that it violated his First Amendment rights. To have Article III standing to bring such a lawsuit, a plaintiff must demonstrate a credible fear that the law will be enforced against him, which entails showing, among other things, that the statute at least arguably proscribes his intended activity.