We have in the past suggested that Connecticut General Statutes § 1-2z, the plain language statute, impinges on the power of the judiciary to decide what the law is, and therefore is potentially unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. Briefly, in a statutory construction case, that statute requires the court first to determine whether, after review of the text and other statutes, the language is plain. If so, the court can look nowhere else unless that meaning would yield absurd or unworkable results.

We now have another complaint about § 1-2z, and that is that it appears to be encouraging the justices to find statutes plain when in fact they are not. In Seramonte Association, LLC v. Hamden, the statute in question required the taxpayer to "submit" a form to the town by a particular date. The plaintiff sent it by mail a day before the deadline but the town received it a day after the deadline.

The majority said "submit" plainly meant the document had to be received by the town by the deadline, and so the filing was late. Two justices said the meaning was not plain, and thus they were permitted by § 1-2z to search further for the correct answer. In the end, they agreed that the filing was late, but that is not the point. The point is that the further search might have yielded the most persuasive evidence that the filing was timely if it were sent to the town by the deadline.