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Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal removed a Broward judge from a case, even though it noted his "understandable frustration" with a case in which he had already allotted three hours to what is typically an hourlong proceeding.

But in the end, the panel agreed with the litigant that the trial judge had denied him due process, and "did not allow him to present his case-in-chief."

Broward County Circuit Judge Michael Davis had been presiding over a divorce between Ivan Domnin as the petitioner and his wife Oksana Domnina.

Judge Michael Davis of the Broward County Court. Courtesy photo

In the appeal, the jurists weighed in on the husband's petition for writ of prohibition, and granted the request.

"We can appreciate the circuit court judge's understandable frustration, expressed several times during the hearing, regarding the hearing's length, and what the circuit court judge perceived as the parties' lack of focus on the required factual determinations to be made on the motion," the appellate panel wrote.

At trial, for instance, Davis noted in the court transcript that the court typically gives about an hour for these types of hearings. "We have now had over three. It's a balancing test between the needs for both parties," the lower court judge said.

Judge Jonathan D. Gerber of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Courtesy photo Judge Jonathan D. Gerber of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Courtesy photo

But in the granting the writ, Judge Jonathan D. Gerber wrote, "Our review of the transcript indicates that the hearing's length was attributable to a variety of factors: the husband's trial counsel's arguments at the hearing's outset on whether and how a foreign judgment affected the circuit court's consideration of the wife's motion; detailed witness examinations during the wife's case-in-chief by both the wife's trial counsel and the husband's trial counsel; and the difficulties inherent in conducting a Zoom hearing requiring interpreters."

However, Gerber said, when the hearing's allotted time had expired, Davis requested the parties submit written closing arguments, even though the husband had not been given the opportunity to present his case-in-chief.

Click here to read the full appellate opinion

Like the appellate court, a University of Miami law professor also disagreed with the trial judge.

Tamara Rice Lave is a professor of law at the University of Miami School of Law. Courtesy photo

"Judge Davis' action was outrageous, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal did the right thing in quashing Davis' order and directing that the matter be assigned to a different circuit court judge," said Tamara Rice Lave, who specializes in criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence. "It's important to understand that the Fourth District was not taking a position on the merits of the underlying case. They were simply ensuring that each party enjoys their constitutional right to due process of law."

Another observer agreed.

Jan Jacobowitz, legal expert and professor at the University of Miami, said, "The judge's perhaps understandable frustration resulted in a decision that the Fourth DCA concluded was a violation of due process, therefore, the Fourth DCA 'righted the ship,' so to speak, in providing due process."

The appellate ruling noted that after the parties submitted their written closing arguments, Davis entered a detailed order making findings of fact, and granting the wife's motion for temporary alimony and temporary attorney fees.

Jan Jacobowitz, legal expert and professor at the University of Miami. Courtesy photo

Gerber noted in the ruling that the husband's counsel stated: "I would request that the court hold off on allowing closing arguments for us to present our case-in-chief. It's a due process concern."

Regardless, the circuit court judge entered an order denying the husband's motion for disqualification as legally insufficient, court records show.

Two days later, the husband filed a motion to disqualify the circuit court judge, basing his argument on various authorities, including a decision based on a previous Fourth DCA ruling in 2014 in Castillo v. Castillo, said Gerber, with Judges Alan O. Forst and Ed Artau concurring.

"Again, we can appreciate the circuit court judge's frustration and desire to manage the very busy docket which our trial judges face every day. And from our review of the transcript, this hearing could have—and should have—taken less time," Gerber said. "However, the circuit court's termination of the hearing without the husband having been given an opportunity to present his case-in-chief before the circuit court ruled on the wife's motion was a denial of due process."

In the end, the panel remanded, with instructions to assign the case to another trial judge.

"We are compelled to grant the husband's petition for writ of prohibition, consistent with our holding in Castillo," Gerber concluded.

Attorneys for both parties did not return emails for comment. They were listed as Andre G. Raikhelson of Trayber Raikhelson Law Group in Boca Raton, for the husband as petitioner, and Meaghan K. Marro of Marro Law in Plantation, for the wife as respondent.