The Supreme Court of Georgia issued the following opinions regarding three attorneys on Tuesday and two on Jan. 7.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 22, 2019

S19Y0266. IN THE MATTER OF HEATHER E. JORDAN.

PER CURIAM.

Heather E. Jordan (State Bar No. 587470) has been a member of the Bar since 2011. In a September 4, 2018 report and recommendation, special master Chong Joo Kim recommended that this Court impose a public reprimand for Jordan's misconduct in representing a single client in a custody matter. Neither the State Bar nor Jordan filed exceptions to the special master's report, and we agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate level of discipline in this matter.

The facts alleged and the violations charged in the formal complaint are deemed admitted as follows. In December 2011, a client hired Jordan to represent him in a divorce matter. Jordan agreed and finalized the client's divorce. Subsequently, Jordan agreed to represent the client in a custody matter. From January to May 2016, the client attempted to contact Jordan numerous times via email, text message, and telephone calls to obtain a status update on his custody case. However, Jordan failed to respond promptly to the client's requests for information and updates in the case, she failed to perform the necessary work on the case, she provided incorrect information to opposing counsel in the client's discovery responses, and she ultimately stopped responding to the client and stopped working on the case. The client retained new counsel, emailed Jordan, and requested his file. Jordan did not respond to the client and did not return his file. The client's new counsel also attempted on several occasions to request the file, and while Jordan did not respond to these requests, she did eventually send the client his file.

The special master concluded that Jordan violated Rule 1.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to communicate or consult with the client on the scope and objectives of the representation. In addition, the special master concluded that Jordan violated Rule 1.3 by failing to perform work on the client's custody case and Rule 1.4 when she failed to keep the client informed about the status of his case and failed to respond to his numerous requests for information in the case. Finally, the special master concluded that Jordan violated Rule 1.16 when she failed to timely surrender his file to him or his new counsel. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.2 and 1.3 is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.4 and 1.16 is a public reprimand.

The special master recognized that this Court relies on the American Bar Associations Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for general guidance in determining the appropriate level of discipline, see In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52) (1995), and that ABA Standard 4.43 provides that a reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

The special master found in mitigation the absence of a prior disciplinary record, see ABA Standard 9.32 (a), as well as Jordan's inexperience in the practice of law, see ABA Standard 9.32 (f). The special master recommended that, based on the violations Jordan is deemed to have admitted, she should receive a public reprimand.

Having reviewed the record, we agree that the admitted facts are sufficient to support a finding that Jordan violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. In light of those facts and the mitigating circumstances, we agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate level of discipline. See In the Matter of Gantt, 302 Ga. 3 (804 SE2d 336) (2017); In the Matter of Stewart, 301 Ga. 227 (800 SE2d 279) (2017). Accordingly, we order that Heather E. Jordan receive a public reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public Reprimand. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 22, 2019

S19Y0455. IN THE MATTER OF NATHAN E. HARDWICK, IV.

PER CURIAM.

In February 2016, Nathan E. Hardwick, IV (Bar No. 325686), who has been a member of the State Bar since 1991, was indicted by a federal grand jury for numerous felonies related to his law practice. As a condition of his pretrial bond, he was ordered to stop practicing law, and this Court granted the State Bar's unopposed “Request for Suspension Consistent with Conditions of Bond.” See In the Matter of Hardwick, 299 Ga. 661, 661 (791 SE2d 5) (2016) (Hardwick I). Hardwick was tried and found guilty of 21 felonies, and on November 27, 2018, he filed a “Petition for Voluntary Suspension of License Pending Termination of Appeal,” asking this Court to continue his suspension pending an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The State Bar filed a response asking this Court to accept Hardwick's petition.

Our precedents say that continuing the suspension is appropriate. See, e.g., In the Matter of Ellis, 297 Ga. 791, 791 (778 SE2d 227) (2015). Accordingly, we hereby continue the suspension of Nathan E. Hardwick, IV from the practice of law in this State pending termination of an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit and until further order of this Court.

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Suspension continued pending termination of appeal and until further order of this Court. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 22, 2019

S19Y0466. IN THE MATTER OF SHANNON DEWAYNE PATTERSON.

PER CURIAM.

In November 2017, Shannon DeWayne Patterson (State Bar No. 173418) pled guilty in federal district court to one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation and presentation of a false tax return, in violation of 26 USC § 7206 (2). See United States v. Patterson, No. 1:17-CR-00413-WO (M.D.N.C. Nov. 13, 2017). On May 21, 2018, this Court granted Patterson's petition requesting an interim suspension of his license to practice law pending his sentencing and ordered that he be suspended until further order of this Court. See In the Matter of Patterson, 303 Ga. 750 (814 SE2d 729) (2018). On September 27, 2018, the federal district court sentenced Patterson, who has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 2006, to 13 months of incarceration, followed by one year of supervised release. The court further ordered him to pay restitution in the sum of $60,800. Patterson subsequently filed the underlying petition for voluntary surrender of license, admitting that he has violated Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which makes it a disciplinary violation “for a lawyer to … be convicted of a felony.” See Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The State Bar has responded, requesting that the Court accept the petition and indicating that a surrender of license, which is tantamount to disbarment, is appropriate and in the best interests of the public and the Bar.

Based on our review of the petition, we agree that acceptance of Patterson's petition is in the best interests of the Bar and the public. Accordingly, the name of Shannon Dewayne Patterson is hereby removed from the rolls of persons entitled to practice law in the State of Georgia.

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 7, 2019

S19Y0028. IN THE MATTER OF SAMUEL WILLIAMS, JR.

PER CURIAM.

This is the second appearance of this matter before this Court. In our first opinion, In the Matter of Williams, 300 Ga. 781 (798 SE2d 215) (2017), we rejected a petition for voluntary discipline filed by Samuel Williams, Jr. (State Bar No. 764123) because the discipline proposed—a suspension coextensive with the probation imposed in connection with Williams's guilty-plea conviction in Alabama for selling unregistered securities—was insufficient, given that his probation was scheduled to end only one month after the issuance of our opinion. See 300 Ga. at 783-784. Shortly after the issuance of our opinion, Williams filed another petition for voluntary discipline, his third,¹ before filing a fourth petition on June 15, 2018; it is this fourth petition that is currently before us.

In his current petition, Williams suggests the imposition of a suspension no shorter than 20 months, nunc pro tunc to the November 1, 2017, date on which he voluntarily ceased the practice of law. The State Bar responded and recommended to the Special Master that a recommendation be made to this Court to accept the petition and impose a suspension of between 20 and 36 months, nunc pro tunc to November 1, 2017. The Special Master then issued a report, recommending that we accept Williams's petition and impose a suspension of 20 months, nunc pro tunc to November 1, 2017.

The facts underlying this petition remain largely unchanged since our prior review of this matter. Williams's petition arises from his guilty-plea conviction for selling unregistered securities in Alabama,² which, Williams concedes, constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Although a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) often results in an attorney being disbarred, our prior opinion recognized the presence of “significant mitigating factors” in this case that could justify the imposition of a suspension instead of disbarment. 300 Ga. at 783-84. Specifically, we noted that Williams

was under considerable mental and emotional stress because of the near-concurrent bankruptcy of his law firm and diagnosis of his wife with metastatic breast cancer in the fall of 2009; that he has no prior disciplinary history or criminal record; that he served honorably in the military for 20 years; that he self-reported his conviction to the disciplinary authorities and has been cooperative; that his failure to register the securities was negligent and unintentional; that his failure to reject or secure the $380,000 was negligent and without a selfish motive; that he is sincerely remorseful; that he has attempted to improve his own understanding of the law and to help others avoid the mistakes he made; and that he has complied with all of the terms of his probation. Williams also asserts that the nearly four-year delay between his self-reporting of the violation and the petition for appointment of a special master should be considered in mitigation. Additionally, the Alabama prosecutor sent a letter to the Bar saying that Williams was inexperienced, distressed because of his wife's illness, and extremely remorseful, and that the trial judge concluded that Williams's involvement in the criminal scheme was minimal.

300 Ga. at 782.

Since the issuance of our prior opinion, Williams's probation ended in April 2017. Williams continues to pay restitution, however, and is timely on his payments. The Special Master considered the effect of Williams's continuing restitution obligation on the question of whether his probation had truly concluded, noting that the restitution payments—$250 per month against an obligation of $380,000—did not appear to be calculated to ensure full repayment; that, pursuant to a June 8, 2017, Alabama court order, the “[c]ase is nolle prossed upon payment of restitution and court costs”; that, given the ongoing restitution obligation, the case is not truly dismissed, but remains on the “administrative docket” of the Alabama court; and that Williams has consented to the continuing jurisdiction of the Alabama court for the purpose of collecting the restitution payments. Given these facts and the application of Ala. Code § 15-78-78 (a),³ the Special Master concluded that, were Williams to default on the restitution obligation, he would not be subject to additional criminal sanctions, such that the criminal portion of his sentence had apparently concluded.

We agree with the Special Master that a suspension is appropriate. Although the status of Williams's probation is an important consideration in assessing the propriety of a suspension,⁴ the Special Master's adjudication of the matter was appropriate under the circumstances present here—especially in light of the parties' apparent expectation that Williams's restitution obligation would not ever be totally fulfilled, and given that a contrary reading could result in the imposition of what would effectively be an endless suspension.

Accordingly, two issues remain: the appropriate length of a suspension and whether that suspension should be imposed nunc pro tunc. Our precedents suggest that the 20-month suspension recommended by the Special Master is within the range of punishments appropriate in this matter and should be accepted. See, e.g., In the Matter of Suttle, 288 Ga. 14, 16 (701 SE2d 154) (2010) (two-year suspension for conviction on one felony count of residential mortgage fraud); In the Matter of Paine, 280 Ga. 208, 210 (625 SE2d 768) (2006) (suspension for at least 20 months until termination of federal probation for felony conviction of obstruction of a federal audit). See also, e.g., In the Matter of Youn, 300 Ga. 134, 135 (793 SE2d 379) (2016) (18-month suspension for misdemeanor conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028 for having counseled, commanded, and induced a client, who was not a Georgia resident, to possess a Georgia driver's license). Furthermore, in light of the Special Master's finding that Williams voluntarily ceased his practice of law as of November 1, 2017, we agree with the Special Master's recommendation to impose the 20-month suspension nunc pro tunc to that date.

Having reviewed the record as a whole, we agree with the Special Master's recommendation and conclude that imposition of a 20-month suspension is the appropriate sanction in this matter, and we therefore accept Williams's petition for voluntary discipline. Accordingly, we hereby order that Williams be suspended from the practice of law in this State for 20 months. Because there are no conditions on Williams's reinstatement other than the passage of time, there is no need for him to take any action either through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate his return to the practice of law. Instead, the suspension outlined in this opinion will take effect, nunc pro tunc, as of the November 1, 2017, date on which Williams voluntarily ceased the practice of law and will expire by its own terms 20 months later. Williams is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. 20-month suspension. All the Justices concur.

¹ Williams's second petition was the petition at issue in our first opinion; his first was rejected by the Special Master. See 300 Ga. at 782. Williams's third petition was superseded by his fourth.

² As we recounted in our first opinion, Williams “was the escrow officer for a client who offered a high-yield investment program and … although Williams did not promote the sale of securities and was not otherwise involved in the underlying fraud scheme, he was responsible for holding and disbursing the funds associated with the program using his trust account. Williams asserts that he filed a notice to withdraw upon learning of a criminal investigation of the program, but admits that he nonetheless subsequently accepted $380,000 from an investor and then disbursed those funds in February 2010, instead of reporting the matter to the authorities and holding the money in his trust account as he should have done.” 300 Ga. at 781-782.

³ “A restitution order in a criminal case shall be a final judgment and have all the force and effect of a final judgment in a civil action under the laws of the State of Alabama. The victim on whose behalf restitution is ordered, the executor or administrator of the victim's estate, or anyone else acting on behalf of the victim, shall be entitled to all the rights and remedies to which a plaintiff would be entitled in a civil action under the laws of this state as well as any other right or remedy pertaining to such restitution order as may be provided by law.”

⁴ See In the Matter of Paine, 280 Ga. 208, 210 (625 SE2d 768) (2006) (noting that “the public is likely to lose respect for the legal system if any lawyer is allowed to practice law while on probation for a criminal conviction”).

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 7, 2019

S19Y0122. IN THE MATTER OF MELODY YVONNE CHERRY.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Melody Yvonne Cherry (State Bar No. 123395) filed the underlying petition for voluntary discipline pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) to resolve two pending disciplinary matters. See Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2). In the petition, Cherry admits violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (b), 4.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Although the maximum penalty for a violation of any of these Rules of Professional Conduct is disbarment, Cherry seeks imposition of a public reprimand, and the Bar agrees that the requested discipline is appropriate.

State Disciplinary Board Docket No. 7135

With regard to State Disciplinary Board (“SDB”) Docket No. 7135, Cherry, who joined the State Bar in 1992, admits that in 2015 she was retained by a client to represent him in a personal injury claim arising from an incident occurring on May 24, 2015. Because several people were injured in the accident, the limits of insurance coverage under the policy were insufficient to settle all of the claims, and the client was not able to receive what he believed was full compensation for his injuries and special damages. Cherry filed suit on the client's behalf, and after some discovery the claim was settled in September 2016 for a gross amount of $16,300. Cherry knew at that time that a lien had been asserted against the claim by a hospital and therefore made only a limited disbursement to her client. In February 2017, however, after the hospital notified Cherry that its lien had been released, Cherry prepared a settlement statement reflecting the client's wishes that the remaining funds, after reduction for attorney fees, costs, and repayment of a litigation loan, be paid directly to him to the exclusion of certain healthcare providers, including a doctor who Cherry knew had provided chiropractic care to her client. By signing the settlement statement, the client agreed that he would be “responsible for all outstanding medical expenses and [that he would] pay the same.” Thereafter, Cherry paid the balance of the net proceeds of the settlement to her client.

Cherry admits, however, that in June 2015, she had sent a letter to the doctor who provided chiropractic care to the client advising him that “any medical expenses incurred on behalf of [her client]shall be protected at the time of settlement of this case” and that “[s]aid funds shall be forwarded to your office upon conclusion of this matter.” The recitation of facts by the Bar indicates that the doctor provided medical treatment to the client in reliance on Cherry's written assurance that medical expenses incurred by the client would be protected at the time of the settlement of the case and that funds would be forwarded to the doctor upon conclusion of the case. The Bar's response indicates the doctor submitted a bill in the amount of $2,444 for services to the client. The Bar's response also refers to a grievance filed by the doctor, but the record does not contain a copy of that grievance. Cherry admits that by following her client's directive at the time of the disbursement in disregard of the interests of the doctor and his practice, she violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b)¹ of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

State Disciplinary Board Docket No. 7136

With regard to SDB Docket No. 7136, Cherry admits that on April 19, 2017, a woman contacted her by phone concerning an April 18, 2017 automobile accident, providing the woman's address, the name of the at-fault driver, the at-fault driver's insurance company, and the assigned claim number. That same day, Cherry sent a letter of representation to the insurance company, referring to the woman who had called her as “my client” and requesting information about potentially applicable liability insurance coverage. The letter purported to include the woman's signature, notarized by Cherry's employee, but the woman did not actually sign the letter and Cherry's employee notarized the signature at Cherry's direction. Cherry admits she is responsible for the false signature and that she intended for the insurance company to rely on the notarized signature in providing the requested information, which Cherry intended to use to help the woman promptly resolve any personal injury claim. An early email from the woman may have given Cherry a basis for believing that the woman would soon be officially hiring her, but Cherry heard nothing more until mid-May when an attorney called, on the woman's behalf, advising Cherry that the woman had never hired Cherry or authorized her to communicate with the liability insurer. Cherry immediately notified the insurance company that she no longer represented the woman, but she admits that by preparing and sending the April 19 letter, she violated Rules 4.1² and 8.4 (a) (4)³ of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

Discussion

Cherry admits no factors in aggravation of discipline, but offers some in mitigation—most of which go to SDB Docket No. 7136. Specifically, Cherry asserts that she has no prior disciplinary history; that she harbored no selfish or dishonest motive in that she mistakenly believed that the woman was going to formally retain her and expedited the process in an effort to provide prompt assistance to the woman; that she made a timely and good-faith effort to rectify the consequences of her misconduct by promptly withdrawing upon learning that the woman disputed the existence of an attorney-client relationship; that she has exhibited a cooperative attitude toward these disciplinary proceedings; and that she possesses good character and a positive reputation in the community, as evidenced by a character letter from a practicing attorney.

The Bar has responded to Cherry's petition for voluntary discipline, agreeing generally with Cherry's version of events and the various factors she sets out in mitigation of discipline. The Bar notes in aggravation, however, that Cherry has substantial experience in the practice of law, and that this case involves multiple offenses in that Cherry is admitting violations of three different Rules in the two incidents.

As noted, each of the three Rules Cherry admits to violating carries a maximum penalty of disbarment. Cherry contends, and the Bar agrees, that in light of the mitigating circumstances, a public reprimand would be in conformity with prior decisions of this Court. See, e.g., In the Matter of Davis, 291 Ga. 169 (728 SE2d 548) (2012) (Review Panel reprimand for two Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violations where attorney twice signed client's name and had signature notarized on documents filed in the client's civil case); In the Matter of Swain, 290 Ga. 678 (725 SE2d 244) (2012) (public reprimand for violation of Rules 1.2 and 8.4 (a) (4) where the client's signatures on court documents were notarized outside of the client's presence). See also In the Matter of Turner, 289 Ga. 563 (713 SE2d 867) (2011) (Review Panel reprimand for violation of Rules 1.5, l.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 (a) (4), where a respondent with no prior disciplinary history failed to obtain the client's written authorization to make changes to the legal fee, failed to keep detailed accounting of funds paid to her firm, removed funds from her IOLTA account as earned fees without the client's written authorization, and created a contract for legal services after the fact); In the Matter of Mathis, 286 Ga. 728 (691 SE2d 202) (2010) (Review Panel reprimand for admitted violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4 (a) (4), for failing to communicate with client or promptly file her petition to change custody, and then ultimately filing the petition with a signed client verification attached even though the client signed the verification without ever reading or seeing the petition). Compare In the Matter of Edward Davis, 303 Ga. 564 (814 SE2d 383) (2018) (rejecting petition seeking Review Panel reprimand where attorney admitted violations of Rules l.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b), but denied violating Rule 8.4 (a) (4) even though he knowingly notarized a signature on a deed, thereby falsely attesting that the deed had been signed in his presence by the person whose signature appeared thereon).

Aware that this Court looks to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction to impose, see In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52) (1995), the Bar adds that a reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages, as Cherry did in SDB Docket No. 7136, in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law (see ABA Standard 5.13), or when a lawyer's negligence in dealing with client property causes injury or potential injury to a client, as Cherry did in SDB Docket No. 7135 when she deliberately disregarded the doctor's lien at the behest of her client and in apparent ignorance of the rules that prohibit such conduct (see ABA Standard 4.13). Cherry asserts that her conduct did not appear ultimately to harm either her client or her potential client, and that Cherry's proposed resolution of these disciplinary matters is the result of negotiation between the Bar and Cherry. The Bar asserts that a public reprimand is sufficient to act as a penalty for Cherry, a deterrent to others, and an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession. See In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981).

The ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, however, instructs the Bar to consider, among other things, “the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct …”⁴ We have reviewed the record in this case and are troubled by the absence of any information as to the ultimate resolution of the doctor's claim. Both parties to this matter address whether Cherry's conduct in SDB Docket No. 7135 harmed her client, but neither the Bar nor Cherry address whether the third-party doctor who provided care in reliance upon Cherry's representations about payment from settlement proceeds, and who filed a grievance, has been made whole. Cherry admits she violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b), which prohibits a lawyer from disregarding a third person's interest in funds in the lawyer's possession where, as here, the third person's interest is based on a written agreement by the lawyer, on behalf of the client, guaranteeing payment out of these funds. It appears the third person in this case, a doctor, provided medical treatment to Cherry's client in reliance on the written agreement, but it is not possible from the record to determine whether the doctor has been paid. As the Bar noted, this case involves multiple offenses in two different incidents. Without further information regarding the resolution of the doctor's claim to settlement funds received by Cherry in SDB Docket No.7135, we are unable to determine whether the proposed resolution of these two matters is reasonable. See In the Matter of Bozeman, 286 Ga. 510 (689 SE2d 318) (2010) (ordering disbarment where lawyer failed to pay third party medical care providers, comingled settlement funds with lawyer's personal funds, and made false representations to Bar investigators). See also In the Matter of David Thomas Dorer, ___ Ga. ___ (819 SE2d 7) (Case No. S18Y0666, decided Sept. 10, 2018) (not accepting recommended Review Panel reprimand for a putative Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation without a full understanding of the facts). Accordingly, we reject Cherry's petition for voluntary discipline.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

¹ Rule 1.15 (I) relates to the safekeeping of property, and subsection (b) states in pertinent part:

For the purposes of this Rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:

1. the interest is known to the lawyer, and 2. the interest is based upon one of the following:

i. A statutory lien; ii. A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or iii. A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.

² Rule 4.1 states in pertinent part:

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: a. make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or b. fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client …

³ Rule 8.4 (a) (4) states it is a violation of the Rules for a lawyer to “engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation …”

⁴ See ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Para. 3.0.