The Supreme Court of Georgia on Monday issued the following attorney discipline opinions:

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 3, 2019

S19Y0706. IN THE MATTER OF JOHNNIE MAE GRAHAM.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Notice of Discipline seeking the disbarment of Johnnie Mae Graham (State Bar No. 304625). Graham failed to acknowledge service of the Notice of Discipline mailed to her at the post office box address on file with the State Bar's membership department. The State Bar then properly served Graham by publication pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii), but she failed to file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, she is in default, has waived her right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of Graham's default, are as follows. In 2013, a client retained Graham to represent him in connection with a car accident, and Graham filed a lawsuit on the client's behalf in December 2013. However, after the lawsuit was filed Graham failed to respond to the client who attempted to contact her on numerous occasions regarding the lawsuit. In August 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the client's case. Graham did not file a response to the motion to dismiss, and in October 2015 the court dismissed the client's case due to Graham's failure to appear at a hearing. The State Disciplinary Board found that Graham failed to perform work on the client's behalf, abandoned the legal matter the client entrusted to her to the client's detriment, failed to return the client's file, and failed to provide information requested by the State Bar during the investigation of this disciplinary matter.

Based on these facts, the State Disciplinary Board found probable cause to believe that Graham violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 (d), and 3.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 3 1.3 is disbarment, while the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.3, 1.16, and 3.2 is a public reprimand.

In aggravation of the level of discipline in this case, see Bar Rule 4-208.2 (a) (4), the State Disciplinary Board found that Graham has extensive experience in the practice of law, having been admitted to the Bar in 1981, and that she has previous disciplinary history, having received a Review Panel reprimand in 2013. See In the Matter of Graham, 292 Ga. 901 (742 SE2d 735) (2013). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Johnnie Mae Graham be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Graham is reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 3, 2019

S19Y0959. IN THE MATTER OF PRESTON B. KUNDA.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for voluntary discipline filed by Preston B. Kunda (State Bar No. 430210) prior to the issuance of a formal complaint pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2). Kunda, who has been a member of the Bar since 1996, seeks suspension for a period of not less than 90 days and not more than two years for his admitted violations of Rules 1.7, 1.8 (c), and 1.15 (I) (a) & (c) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found at Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.15 (I) is disbarment; the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (c) is a public reprimand. The State Bar has responded, recommending that the Court accept Kunda's petition and impose a 12- to 24-month suspension. Upon review, this Court concludes that, under the circumstances presented, a 12-month suspension is appropriate and accepts the petition for voluntary discipline.

In his petition, Kunda admits that, in 2014, he was retained to prepare a client's will, in the course of which he agreed to act as the estate's executor without having first obtained the client's written informed consent to the potential conflict of interest. While claiming he did not know so at the time, he now admits that this conduct violated Rule 1.7 (prohibiting lawyer from undertaking representation involving a conflict of interest, absent client's informed consent). Kunda admits further that, in connection with the sale of a gun collection for the same client, he accepted on the client's behalf a cash payment through a firearm broker for the $130,000 balance due, but did not count the cash upon its delivery, and the following morning deposited $117,000 into his trust account, thereby leaving $13,000 unaccounted for. Kunda maintains that this $13,000 was part of the payment ultimately owed for the broker's services and that he thereafter made arrangements to satisfy the debt with $13,000 worth of legal services and payments to the broker. Kunda admits, however, that in failing to safeguard the money while it was in his possession, he violated Rule 1.15 (I) (a) & (c) (requiring lawyer to safeguard and account for client property held in connection with representation). Finally, Kunda admits that, in connection with the firearm sale and on the advice of a federal agency official, Kunda prepared a codicil to the client's will that was to take effect only if the client died prior to consummation of the gun sale. The codicil provided that Kunda was to inherit the gun collection and thereafter sell it, with the proceeds being paid to the will's beneficiary.¹ Kunda admits that, by preparing this codicil, he violated Rule 1.8 (c)'s prohibition on the preparation of instruments “giving the lawyer … any substantial gift.” ²

In mitigation of his conduct, Kunda maintains that he has never previously been the subject of any disciplinary proceeding; that he has cooperated fully and in good faith with the State Bar in this matter; and that he is remorseful and will never again conduct himself in such manner. Accordingly, Kunda requests the imposition of a suspension for a period of not less than 90 days and not more than two years. The State Bar, while noting the serious nature of the violations, agrees that a suspension is proper, due to Kunda's remorse, cooperation, and lack of disciplinary history, and therefore recommends suspension for a period of between 12 and 24 months.

On the record before us, we agree that a suspension is appropriate and consistent with prior disciplinary action. See In the Matter of Harste, 285 Ga. 80 (673 SE2d 235) (2009) (12-month suspension for violations that could have resulted in disbarment, where attorney had no prior disciplinary history and was cooperative and remorseful); In the Matter of Jones, 280 Ga. 302 (627 SE2d 24) (2006) (12-month suspension for violation that could have resulted in disbarment, where attorney had no prior disciplinary history, had made restitution, was cooperative and remorseful, and had used practice for good of community). See also American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Standard 4.12 (suspension appropriate when lawyer knows or should know he is dealing improperly with client property and causes client injury or potential injury); Standard 4.32 (suspension appropriate when lawyer knows of conflict of interest and does not fully disclose it to client, causing injury or potential injury). Accordingly, we find that a 12-month suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case for Kunda's admitted violations of Rules 1.7 and 1.15 (I) (a) & (c). Kunda is reminded of his duties under Rule 4-219 (b).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Twelve-month suspension. All the Justices concur.

¹ According to Kunda, this codicil was designed to avoid the possibility that the gun collection would pass to the will's beneficiary, who disapproved of guns and did not wish to own them himself.

² Notwithstanding Kunda's admission that his preparation of the codicil constituted a Rule 1.8 (c) violation, it may well be that the bequest of the gun collection should be characterized as having effected a constructive trust rather than a “gift” for Rule 1.8 (c) purposes. On the scant record before us, which does not include a copy of the codicil itself, we cannot make this determination. We thus make no finding as to whether Kunda's conduct in this regard constituted a Rules violation.