The Supreme Court of Georgia on Monday issued the following attorney discipline opinions:

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 1, 2019

S19Y0608. IN THE MATTER OF EDWARD NEAL DAVIS.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the court for a second time. See In the Matter of Davis, 303 Ga. 564 (814 SE2d 383) (2018) (“Davis I”). In Davis I, this Court rejected Edward Neal Davis's petition for voluntary discipline that sought a Review Panel reprimand. Upon remand, special master Michael E. Sumner was appointed. Following a hearing, the special master issued a report recommending a 90-day suspension for Davis's misconduct in notarizing a signature that he did not witness and for a technical violation of rules governing trust accounts. But given the mitigating factors present, we conclude that a public reprimand—a less severe punishment than a suspension—is the appropriate sanction.

The facts, as found by the special master and supported by the record, show that the improper notarization arose out of Davis's representation of a client in its 2009 purchase of real estate jointly owned by a husband and wife. Davis knew the couple and previously had represented them in real estate transactions. For the 2009 transaction, Davis prepared the Warranty Deed and Owners' Affidavit in the couple's names as grantors. At closing, Davis notarized the signatures of both the husband and wife on the Warranty Deed and Owners' Affidavit; the wife was not present, but the husband was. It later became apparent (in the couple's 2012 divorce proceedings) that the wife had not signed either document. Davis admitted that he failed to take any independent steps to verify that the wife had signed the documents and that he relied on the husband's representations. Although it is not known who signed the wife's name, there is no evidence in the record that Davis forged her signature. When the wife learned of the sale for the first time in divorce proceedings, she retained counsel, and filed a quiet title action against Davis's client that had purchased the property. She ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with Davis's client in which she ratified the sale and dismissed all claims to the property, but did not receive any compensation.

As the special master correctly concluded, these facts support a finding of violations of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) and Rule 4.1 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). See, e.g., In the Matter of Cherry, ___ Ga. ____ (S19Y0671, 2019 WL 1590643) (Apr. 15, 2019) (preparing and sending letter with false signature and notarization violated Rules 4.1 and 8.4 (a) (4)); In the Matter of Dock Davis, 291 Ga. 169 (728 SE2d 548) (2012) (violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) established by attorney's action of falsifying client's signature on court documents and having those signatures notarized).

The trust account violation arose out of a $15,000 loan Davis obtained from a former client in 2011. In 2012, Davis obtained a loan from a third party to repay the loan from the former client with interest. Davis deposited the proceeds from the third party into his trust account, thus mingling personal and trust funds. Davis then repaid the former client with a check drawn on the trust account for the amount he had just deposited, thus using the trust account for personal use.

The special master found that the improper use of the trust account was negligent, but unintentional, noting that Davis maintained his trust account at the same bank as his personal account. These facts support the conclusion that Davis's conduct constitutes a violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b). See In the Matter of Howard, 292 Ga. 413, 414 (738 SE2d 89) (2013) (technical violation of Rule 1.15 occurred when attorney mistakenly deposited check into operating account rather than in trust account and mistake led to check drawn on trust account being returned for insufficient funds).

With regard to the appropriate mitigating and aggravating factors to consider, we look, as is our custom, to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992). See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996). In this matter, we find pertinent that Davis has no prior disciplinary history; that he lacked an intent to cause harm; that there was no dishonest or selfish motive; that he has accepted responsibility for his actions; that he has expressed remorse; and that he has cooperated in the disciplinary process. See ABA Standards 9.32 (a), (b), (e), and (l); see also In the Matter of Swain, 290 Ga. 678, 679 (725 SE2d 244) (2012) (recognizing lack of intent to cause harm as mitigating factor for Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation). The special master's report does not identify any aggravating factors, but we note that Davis has substantial experience in the practice of law, as he has been a member of the Bar since 1990. See ABA Standard 9.2.

Considering the facts and the mitigating and aggravating factors, we conclude that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this case and is consistent with discipline imposed in prior, similar cases. See In the Matter of West, 301 Ga. 901 (804 SE2d 340) (2017) (imposing Review Panel reprimand for violations arising out of attorney having signed his client's name to an application for asylum without any intent to deceive or falsify); In the Matter of Ellis, 296 Ga. 83 (764 SE2d 856) (2014) (imposing Review Panel reprimand for attorney's conduct in failing to supervise an employee who signed client's name, without authorization, to loan agreement needed for obtaining medical treatment); Howard, 292 Ga. at 414 (imposing public reprimand for a lawyer for technical violations of Rule 1.15 (II), where no harm was done to clients); Dock Davis, 291 Ga. at 170 (imposing Review Panel reprimand for 8.4 (a) (4) violation where attorney twice falsified and notarized client's signature on two documents filed in court but where out-of-state client had signed identical documents before notary, attorney informally advised opposing counsel, and attorney filed client's true originals three months later); In the Matter of Swain, 290 Ga. 678 (725 SE2d 244) (2012) (imposing public reprimand for 8.4 (a) (4) violation where attorney notarized document signed outside of attorney's presence).

Accordingly, the Court orders that Edward Neal Davis be administered a public reprimand in open court pursuant to Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c) for his violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (II) (b), 4.1, and 8.4 (a) (4).

Public reprimand. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 1, 2019

S19Y0709. IN THE MATTER OF CLARENCE A. SYDNOR, IV.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Notice of Discipline filed in February 2019 seeking the disbarment of Clarence A. Sydnor, IV (State Bar No. 627173). After efforts to serve Sydnor personally with the Notice of Discipline proved unsuccessful, the State Bar properly served Sydnor by publication pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Sydnor failed to file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, he is in default, has waived his right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b). Sydnor is currently suspended from the practice of law until further order of this Court based on a Special Master's recommendation that this Court accept Sydnor's petition for voluntary suspension, pending the outcome of his disciplinary proceedings.¹ See In the Matter of Sydnor, S18Y1531 (August 15, 2018).

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of Sydnor's default, are as follows. In February 2018, Sydnor was retained by a client to represent her in a claim arising out of an automobile accident. On May 2, 2018, Sydnor settled the client's claim, on May 3, 2018, Geico Indemnity Company issued a settlement check in the amount of $8,300.00 payable to Sydnor and the client, and on May 8, 2018, the client executed a release and settlement agreement. Sydnor received the settlement check, forged the client's signature on the check, and deposited it into his operating account instead of his IOLTA account. Sydnor failed to inform the client that he received the settlement check or that he deposited the check into his operating account, and failed to disburse the settlement funds to the client. The client attempted to contact Sydnor on numerous occasions about the status of her settlement, but Sydnor failed to respond.

The State Disciplinary Board found probable cause to believe that Sydnor violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 8.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand, while the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), and 8.4 in the present case is disbarment. In aggravation of the level of discipline, see Bar Rule 4-208.2 (a) (4), the State Disciplinary Board found that Sydnor acted with a dishonest and selfish motive.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Clarence A. Sydnor, IV be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Sydnor is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4- 219 (b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

¹ Sydnor currently has another matter pending before the same Special Master in an unrelated disciplinary matter. See In the Matter of Sydnor, S18B1257 (May 23, 2018) (appointing special master to hear claims arising out of Sydnor's representation of a client in a personal injury case).

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 1, 2019

S19Y0977. IN THE MATTER OF CHERYL JOYCE BRAZIEL.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from a renewed petition for voluntary discipline filed by Cheryl Joyce Braziel (State Bar No. 275115), after we rejected her earlier petition, which had been filed before the issuance of a formal complaint. See In the Matter of Braziel, 303 Ga. 154 (810 SE2d 476) (2018) (“Braziel I”). In Braziel I, we noted uncertainty regarding the underlying facts and the violations that could be established. Upon remand, the State Bar filed a formal complaint, and we appointed S. Jeffrey Rusbridge as special master. Following discovery, Braziel filed a renewed petition for voluntary discipline, which she amended after an evidentiary hearing. The amended renewed petition sought a Review Panel reprimand or a public reprimand for Braziel's admitted violations of Rule 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2). The State Bar supported the petition. The special master's report recommends that the Court accept the petition and impose a public reprimand. Given the extensive record generated on remand and the special master's factual findings, we agree that acceptance of the petition for voluntary discipline is appropriate.

The special master made the following factual findings. Braziel, who was admitted to the Bar in 2007, settled a client's personal-injury claim with the liability insurer, and the client executed a limited liability release to enable pursuit of a claim against her own uninsured motorist (UM) carrier. The client's UM policy provided reduced-limits coverage, meaning the amount of coverage was reduced by available liability insurance limits, but coverage could be restored to the extent that certain federal liens, such as a Medicaid lien, were satisfied from the liability settlement proceeds. Braziel's client had been treated at Grady Hospital, incurring charges of $24,384.77, and Braziel believed that the client was eligible to receive Medicaid and that the hospital charges should have resulted in the filing of a Medicaid lien, which would have allowed recovery under the UM policy. However, Braziel had been unable to document the existence of a Medicaid lien.

Braziel recalled that she had received a lien letter from an attorney who represented Grady Hospital in another client's matter, and she wanted to contact that lawyer to ask his assistance in determining if a lien had been filed or would be filed with respect to her current client's hospital bill. Braziel testified that, while she was traveling outside of Georgia to obtain medical treatment, she called her assistant to ask her to pull the lien letter from the prior client's file, duplicate it, and place it in the new client's file, so that Braziel could contact Grady's lawyer for assistance. Braziel made the call to her assistant while driving in rural Mississippi, and, due to poor reception for the call, poor instructions, and poor training of the assistant, the assistant misunderstood her instructions. The assistant created a new lien letter patterned after the old one, but with the information for the new client and the expected amount of the lien. The result was a letter purportedly from Grady's lawyer to Braziel about a lien held by Grady in connection with Braziel's representation of her current client. Braziel arrived at her office later that evening and saw the letter that had been created. Braziel admonished her assistant and gave her additional instructions in her duties as a legal assistant.

Rather than destroying the letter, however, Braziel faxed it that evening to Felecia Morris, an administrative service provider who has a law degree but is not a member of the Georgia Bar, and asked her to confirm the existence of the lien. Braziel testified that she explained the nature of the document to Morris and sent her the letter for internal, informational purposes only, as it contained the information Morris would need to track down the lien information. Six days later, Morris emailed the letter to the new client's UM carrier, which then forwarded the letter to Grady's lawyer. When Grady's lawyer contacted Braziel, Braziel promptly admitted what had occurred, took responsibility for the matter, and attempted to explain how the situation occurred. Braziel also severed her ties with Morris.

Morris was deposed and provided a materially different version of her interactions with Braziel. But the special master found Morris not credible and concluded that there was no credible evidence to contradict Braziel's assertion that she did not personally create the lien letter, send it to the UM carrier, or engage in any effort to make it appear that Grady had a lien on the case when it did not. Based on his factual findings, the special master concluded that Braziel violated Rules 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), but that there was insufficient evidence to establish any violation of Rules 4.1 or 8.4 (a) (2). Citing the pertinent American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), the special master also found the following mitigating circumstances: Braziel's lack of prior disciplinary history, her lack of selfish motive or an intent to deceive, the existence of personal health problems that may have led to the misconduct, her efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, her acceptance of responsibility and demonstration of remorse for what occurred, and her demonstration of a cooperative attitude in the disciplinary proceedings. See ABA Standard 9.32 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (l); see also In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (“[W]e look to the American Bar Association's standards for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction to impose.”). The special master further noted that he found Braziel's statements of remorse and acceptance of personal responsibility to be sincere. The only aggravating factor that the special master found was Braziel's substantial experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22 (i). The special master concluded that a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction. See ABA Standard 7.3.

The special master's factual findings are supported by the record, and we are not in a position to second-guess his credibility determinations. See In the Matter of Ballew, 287 Ga. 371, 376 (695 SE2d 573) (2010) (“We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that the Special Master was in the best position to observe the parties' demeanor and credibility.”); In the Matter of Wright, 294 Ga. 289, 293-294 (751 SE2d 817) (2013) (noting that “the special master was in the best position to determine the witnesses' credibility” and determining that his findings “do not appear to be unreasonable, given the testimony in this case”). Based on those findings, we agree with the special master's legal conclusion as to the rules violations supported by the evidence. We also conclude that, consistent with this Court's precedents, a reprimand is the appropriate sanction on the facts presented here. See In the Matter of Heitmann, 297 Ga. 280 (773 SE2d 278) (2015) (public reprimand for violation of Rule 5.3 where independent contractor employed by attorney made unsolicited contact with prospective clients); In the Matter of Ellis, 296 Ga. 83 (764 SE2d 856) (2014) (Review Panel reprimand for violation of Rule 5.3 where staff member signed client's name on medical-financing application without client's knowledge); In the Matter of Mashek, 295 Ga. 179 (758 SE2d 309) (2014) (Review Panel reprimand for violations of Rules 5.3 (a), (b) and 7.3 (d) for staff's client solicitation of which lawyer should have known); In the Matter of Grant, 287 Ga. 131 (694 SE2d 647) (2010) (Review Panel reprimand for misconduct related to mishandling of 8 real estate closing and title insurance policies, and improper supervision of paralegal who stole client funds). And we agree with the special master that a public reprimand is the appropriate type of reprimand in this matter. Accordingly, the Court accepts the petition for voluntary discipline and directs that Cheryl Joyce Braziel be administered a public reprimand in open court pursuant to Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c) for her admitted violations of Rules 5.3 (a), (b), and (c) (2).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public Reprimand. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 1, 2019

S19Y1168. IN THE MATTER OF HAKEEM BERTRAND BROCK.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for voluntary discipline filed in May 2019 by Hakeem Bertrand Brock (State Bar No. 705137) before the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4-227 (b).¹ He seeks a Review Board reprimand for his misconduct related to the handling of his trust account and the failure to properly supervise a nonlawyer employee. The State Bar, after an investigation of the underlying facts and following negotiation with Brock, supports the petition.

In his petition, Brock, who was admitted to the Bar in 2007, makes the following admissions unconditionally. He employed a paralegal to assist him with his personal injury cases. In May 2017, he discovered that the paralegal had written checks on his trust account and forged his signature, improperly withdrawing approximately $21,000 in trust account funds, and also discovered that she was purporting to handle legal matters on her own, without his knowledge or participation. Some of the checks were payable to the paralegal's family and friends, but some checks were payable to individuals who were her purported clients. This scheme came to light when she wrote four checks that bounced, and Brock was notified by his bank about the insufficient funds in his trust account. The reason he was unaware of his paralegal's activities was that he did not keep a ledger or other records showing the balance in his trust account belonging to each client or the lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client. As a result of learning of the paralegal's actions, he fired her, implemented new oversight policies, and reinstated all missing client and third-party funds using personal funds; he also notified the Rockdale County sheriff's office about the thefts.

Three instances of Brock's own misuse of the trust account came to light during the State Disciplinary Board's investigation into this matter. Specifically, in March 2017, Brock made one personal student loan payment from his trust account, and in March and April 2017, he made two mortgage payments from this trust account on behalf of a former client. During its investigation, the State Bar confirmed Brock's assertions that the student loan payment was made from earned attorney fees that he had improperly retained in his trust account and that the mortgage payments were made from the client's funds that Brock had failed to promptly deliver to the client.

Brock admits that by this conduct he violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), and 5.3 (a) and (b), of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). And while he did not know of or approve or ratify the paralegal's actions, he admits that because of his failure to supervise her use of the trust account, he remains responsible for conduct that would constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if a lawyer had engaged in such actions. See Bar Rule 5.3 (c) (2).

Although the maximum sanction for a violation of each of these rules is disbarment, under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992),² a reprimand may be appropriate in some circumstances where a lawyer is merely negligent in the handling of client property and in the exercise of his professional duties. See ABA Standards 4.13, 7.3. This is such a circumstance as the record reflects that there are several mitigating factors in this matter, specifically, the lack of a prior disciplinary record; the lack of a dishonest or selfish motive; a timely, good-faith effort to make restitution and to rectify the consequences of the misconduct; a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings; and remorse for his misconduct. See ABA Standards 9.32 (a), (b), (d), (e), and (l). Further, these mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors of Brock's substantial experience in the practice of law and the presence of multiple offenses. See ABA Standards 9.22 (d) and (i). Additionally, the requested discipline is supported by our prior disciplinary cases. See In the Matter of Farnham, 300 Ga. 645 (797 SE2d 84) (2017) (public reprimand for failure to maintain adequate direction and control over activities of nonlawyer staff); In the Matter of Eddings, 300 Ga. 419, 421 (795 SE2d 183) (2016) (public reprimand where attorney was victim of elaborate con perpetuated by his wife, who acted as his firm's financial manager); In the Matter of Ralston, 300 Ga. 416 (794 SE2d 646) (2016) (Review Panel reprimand for using earned but undisbursed fees from trust account to provide no-interest loan to client); In the Matter of Francis, 297 Ga. 282 (773 SE2d 280) (2015) (Review Panel reprimand for misuse of trust account where no clients were harmed); In the Matter of Eddleman, 298 Ga. 469 (782 SE2d 668) (2016) (public reprimand for failure to adequately train and supervise nonlawyer staff and conflict of interest). And finally, as noted above, the discipline requested was a result of negotiations between the State Bar and Brock.

Accordingly, we accept the petition for voluntary discipline and direct that Brock receive a Review Board reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (4) and 4-220 (b) for his admitted violations of Rules 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), and 5.3.

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Review Board Reprimand. All the Justices concur.

¹ This Court issued an order on January 12, 2018, comprehensively amending Part IV of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (“Bar Rules”). The new rules govern this matter because it was commenced after July 1, 2018.

² This Court looks to the ABA Standards for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction to impose. See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996).