The Supreme Court of Georgia on Monday issued the following attorney discipline opinions:

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 19, 2019

S19Y0873. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER J. THOMPSON.

PER CURIAM.

The State Bar of Georgia filed a notice of discipline, seeking the disbarment of attorney Christopher John Thompson (State Bar No. 707559). Thompson has failed to respond,¹ and he is now in default. By virtue of his default, he is deemed to have admitted the facts alleged in the notice of discipline, and he has waived his right to insist upon an evidentiary hearing and is subject to the discipline that this Court determines is appropriate. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b). We conclude that Thompson should be disbarred.

In the notice of discipline, the State Bar alleges that Thompson was retained in 2014 to file a personal injury lawsuit on behalf of a client who had been injured in an automobile accident. Thompson filed the lawsuit in April 2014, but he thereafter abandoned his client. Indeed, other than a certificate acknowledging service of discovery that he filed in October 2014, Thompson filed nothing else in the lawsuit. The trial court eventually dismissed the lawsuit, and the client filed a grievance against Thompson in 2018. The State Bar asserts that Thompson by this course of conduct violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

We agree that the facts alleged in the notice of discipline show violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (d).² Violations of Rules 1.2 (a) and 1.3 are sanctionable by disbarment.³ In prior cases comparable to this one, this Court has concluded that disbarment was an appropriate sanction for the abandonment of clients, especially when coupled with a failure to respond to disciplinary authorities. ⁴ See, e.g., In the Matter of Annis, Case No. S19Y0792, 2019 WL 2414680 (June 10, 2019) (disbarring attorney who abandoned two clients and failed to respond to disciplinary authorities or to reject Notice of Discipline); In the Matter of Graham, Case No. S19Y0706, 2019 WL 2332041 (June 3, 2019) (disbarring attorney who abandoned single client and failed to respond to disciplinary authorities or to reject Notice of Discipline); In the Matter of Larson, 305 Ga. 522 (826 SE2d 99) (2019) (disbarring attorney who abandoned four clients and failed to respond to disciplinary authorities or to reject Notice of Discipline); In the Matter of Brown, 294 Ga. 722 (755 SE2d 742) (2014) (same). We also note the absence of any compelling mitigating circumstances in this case.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is ordered that the name of Christopher J. Thompson be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Thompson is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

All the Justices concur.

¹ The State Bar attempted to serve Thompson personally with the notice of discipline, but he could not be found at the address on file with the State Bar. The State Bar then properly served Thompson by publication. See Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Thompson defaulted when he failed to timely file a notice of rejection. See Bar Rule 4-208.3 (a). We note that Thompson is presently under an interim suspension, which we imposed after he failed to respond to an earlier notice of investigation issued by the State Bar. See In the Matter of Thompson, Case No. S18Y1485 (July 9, 2018).

² We fail to see a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) in the facts alleged by the State Bar. In particular, the State Bar has not alleged that Thompson engaged in any conduct intended or reasonably likely to mislead or deceive another. See In the Matter of West, 301 Ga. 901 (804 SE2d 340) (2017). Put another way, although the State Bar has alleged facts sufficient to show that Thompson abandoned his client, abandonment does not inevitably involve misleading or deceitful conduct (although it certainly could involve such conduct); and the State Bar has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Thompson lied to or otherwise misled his client (or anyone else) about anything. We decline, therefore, to find a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) on the facts alleged in the notice of discipline and admitted by Thompson by virtue of his default.

³ The most severe sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4 and 1.16 is a public reprimand.

⁴ Disbarment for abandonment of a client, especially where the lawyer has completely failed to respond to the disciplinary authorities, is appropriate even in the absence of a Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 19, 2019

S19Y1128. IN THE MATTER OF PHILLIP NORMAN GOLUB.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for voluntary discipline filed by Phillip Norman Golub (State Bar No. 300503). Golub, who has been a member of the Bar since 1980, seeks by this petition to resolve a disciplinary matter involving his failure to complete client work, to adequately communicate with the client, and to refund an unearned fee. Golub admits that his conduct violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 3.2, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, while the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, and 3.2 is a public reprimand.

As to the conduct underlying this matter, Golub acknowledges that he was retained by a client in 2014 in connection with a matter involving a transfer of real property, although he primarily communicated about the matter with the client’s son. Although the client did not sign an engagement agreement with Golub, she paid him $7,500 in legal fees and another $2,500 for his assistance with several personal matters. In 2015, Golub filed two lawsuits on the client’s behalf, in response to which were filed a motion to dismiss and discovery requests, which were a prelude to the taking of the client’s deposition, which Golub was unable to schedule for reasons beyond his control. Golub subsequently received instruction to resolve the cases as quickly as possible, but he instead continued to extend the discovery period and made no effort to place the matter on the trial calendar. Golub acknowledges that he did not always respond to requests for status updates and other communications regarding the client’s matters.

In March 2017, Golub was hospitalized for an extended period of time, after which he stopped communicating with the client and her son. During Golub’s hospitalization, a motion to dismiss his client’s cases was placed on the trial calendar. Viewing the motion to dismiss as likely to succeed, Golub filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the two cases on April 20, 2017, but failed to communicate that information to the client or to her son until the client’s son contacted him in June 2017. Golub filed renewal actions, without consent, in October 2017, but the client had passed away in the intervening time. As to the re-filed lawsuits, Golub states that he failed to serve the defendants, to substitute a party for his deceased client, to perform any more work on the matters, or to update the client’s son on the status of the matters. Finally, Golub notes that he did not have any additional communications with the client’s son, failed to provide any billing records to the client or her son, and failed to refund an unearned fee.

In mitigation, Golub notes that, during the time in question, he was dealing with an illness the severity of which he did not recognize for several months but which eventually required an extensive hospitalization; that he did not have a dishonest or selfish motive; that he is remorseful for his conduct; that he intends to repay the client’s son to the extent that he is able; and that his sole prior discipline, a 1999 Investigative Panel reprimand, is remote in time. Given this admitted conduct, Golub seeks the imposition of a public reprimand. In response, the Bar states that it believes that Golub’s suggested sanction is appropriate in light of the purposes to be served by a disciplinary sanction and under American Bar Association Standard 4.43 for a matter in which an attorney’s negligent failure to represent a client with reasonable diligence causes injury or potential injury to the client.¹ In aggravation of discipline, the Bar notes Golub’s substantial experience in the practice of law and his prior receipt of a reprimand. The Bar recommends that this Court accept Golub’s petition and impose his requested discipline, which it states is consistent with the sanctions imposed in other similar cases. See In the Matter of Jordan, 305 Ga. 35 (823 SE2d 257) (2019) (imposing public reprimand for conduct including failure to respond diligently to client requests for information and updates, failure to perform necessary work, failure to provide correct information in filed documents, and an eventual total failure to respond or perform client work); In the Matter of Moncus, 296 Ga. 154 (765 SE2d 358) (2014) (imposing public reprimand for failure to adequately communicate and consult with client); In the Matter of Stewart, 301 Ga. 227 (800 SE2d 279) (2017) (same).

However, this Court has two concerns. The first is that it is not entirely clear from the admitted facts that Golub violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4), which concerns professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.² See In the Matter of Dorer, 304 Ga. 442 (819 SE2d 7) (2018) (not accepting recommended Review Panel reprimand for a putative Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation without a full understanding of the facts); In the Matter of Braziel, 303 Ga. 154 (810 SE2d 476) (2018) (petition for voluntary discipline rejected where there was uncertainty about facts underlying purported rule violation); In the Matter of West, 299 Ga. 731 (791 SE2d 781) (2016) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline where admitted facts did not show that lawyer violated rule he admitted to violating). Second, we are concerned that Golub has failed to fully repay the monies owed to the client’s son. In his petition, Golub states he intends to “pay as much of the money” as he is “able,” but states no intention of making the client’s son whole. See, e.g., In the Matter of Melody Yvonne Cherry, 304 Ga. 836 (822 SE2d 823) (2019) (petition for voluntary discipline rejected where there was lack of information of how a third-party doctor’s claim to unpaid settlement proceeds was resolved). Accordingly, the petition for voluntary discipline is rejected.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

¹  See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) (noting that this Court “look[s] to the American Bar Association’s standards for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction to impose”).

²  In his voluntary petition, Golub states the following conduct violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4):

I admit that I violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) when I failed to correct [the client’s son’s] understanding of the status of the case and my efforts to get the case resolved, specifically the problems with the discovery as it related to [the client’s] health and state of mind and how it affected my efforts to get the case resolved.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 19, 2019

S19Y1192. IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES EDWARD TAYLOR.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report of special master Charles D. Jones, which recommends that Charles Edward Taylor (State Bar No. 699681) be disbarred. Taylor, who has been a member of the Bar since 1997, was personally served with the formal complaint underlying this matter, but he failed to respond to the complaint or to seek an extension of the time for responding. The Bar then moved for Taylor to be held in default, he failed to respond to the Bar’s motion, and the special master found him to be in default, as a result of which he is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the complaint.

The facts, as deemed admitted by Taylor’s default, show that Taylor associated with a non-lawyer who advertised mortgage loan modification services to consumers. In furtherance of this enterprise, Taylor cooperated in setting up a business entity, C. Taylor Law Firm, LLC, and cooperated in setting up an account that would allow the LLC to accept credit card payments, which Taylor did not accept in his regular practice. Taylor’s non-lawyer associate created a website for the LLC; created and disseminated marketing materials on behalf of Taylor and the LLC, some of which contained misrepresentations to the effect that Taylor had offices in Texas and Colorado; created email addresses for the LLC, separate from Taylor’s official email address on file with the Bar; created a phone number for the LLC, separate from Taylor’s official phone number on file with the Bar; wrote and signed letters on behalf of the LLC; and told customers responding to the marketing materials that they were being represented by Taylor, for whom the associate maintained he was an employee.

Taylor permitted funds paid to the LLC to go directly to the non-lawyer associate, rather than to Taylor’s trust account; failed to exercise any oversight as to the payment account for the LLC; accepted referrals from the associate and filed cases without personally vetting the clients or their cases, resulting in the filing of “skeletal” bankruptcy petitions containing only basic information and often only a partial filing fee; and identified himself on bankruptcy petitions and supporting documents as representing the clients referred by the associate, despite his failure to supervise the associate’s conduct or communications about the clients’ mortgages. In the absence of supervision from Taylor, the associate had clients sign forms in which they agreed to pay money to Taylor, to allow the LLC to withdraw funds from their accounts, and to authorize the release of their information not only to the LLC, but also to the associate and other individuals who were not associated with Taylor. These clients stated that they believed that their money and information would be safe because they were being entrusted to a lawyer.

In one of the client matters leading to this disciplinary matter, a client retained the LLC to avoid foreclosure, because she was attempting to sell her home and needed additional time to do so. The client spoke to Taylor and his non-lawyer associate, who assured her that they would help her keep her home long enough to find a buyer. Accordingly, the client made a number of payments to the LLC, apparently totaling $2,850, but the special master noted that the record did not make clear whether any of that money was paid towards the client’s mortgage, as Taylor’s associate had promised the client.

Taylor informed the client that he would file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy on her behalf and obtained from her a check for $310, the filing fee for such a proceeding. However, Taylor used only $75 of the $310 to make a partial payment of the filing fee, keeping $200 as his fee for undertaking the filing and failing to account for the remaining $35. Taylor filed a skeletal bankruptcy petition on the client’s behalf, but falsely declared to the bankruptcy court that he had to that date received no compensation and that his entire fee remained due. Although the filing of the skeletal petition did result in the postponement of the foreclosure sale of the client’s home, the petition was shortly thereafter dismissed because the balance of the filing fee had not been paid. The client contacted Taylor about the dismissal via text message, and he responded, but he did not know with whom he was communicating and did not know that the client’s case had been dismissed. The bankruptcy court then sent the client a notice seeking payment of the balance of the filing fee for the dismissed case, lest additional collection proceedings ensue.

The client’s home was again scheduled for a foreclosure sale, and Taylor filed a second skeletal petition, this one filed under the name of his regular firm rather than the LLC. Taylor again paid only $75 of the $310 filing fee the client provided, again keeping the balance for himself and again declaring to the bankruptcy court that he had not yet received any compensation. Taylor filed a motion for the client to be allowed to pay the filing fee for the second case in installments, but the court denied the motion because the client had defaulted on the fees owed in the prior case. Despite the filing of the second bankruptcy case, the client’s home was sold in foreclosure, and she returned to her home two days later to find a dispossessory notice posted on the door. When contacted by the client, Taylor directed her to speak with his non-lawyer associate, who responded to an initial text message from the client but then failed to respond to additional attempts at communication. The client then contacted Taylor again, but he attempted to avoid responsibility for the client’s situation and told her he would look into the matter. A few days later, the client contacted Taylor to discuss why the filing fee for the first case had not been paid in full, but Taylor failed to respond to that message or her subsequent attempts at communication. The client’s second case was then dismissed, and she was again served with a bill for the unpaid filing fee.

In the other client matter at issue here, the client had received a mailed advertisement from the LLC and contacted Taylor’s nonlawyer associate, who provided the client with a contract with the LLC. The client, whose home was scheduled to be sold at a foreclosure sale, signed the contract and made payments totaling $2,250 to the LLC. The client then paid a further $475 to Taylor, but Taylor again paid only $75 toward the filing fee for the client’s bankruptcy petition, retaining the balance for himself and failing to account for it; Taylor also again falsely declared to the bankruptcy court that he had to that point received no compensation and that his entire fee remained due. Taylor filed a skeletal bankruptcy petition on the client’s behalf, resulting in the postponement of the foreclosure sale, and an application seeking to pay the filing fee in installments. The bankruptcy court entered an order directing that the balance of the filing fee would have to be paid in installments or else the case would be dismissed and further ordered that the skeletal petition be supplemented.

Taylor then failed to appear at a scheduled meeting of creditors, without giving notice to the court or his client that he would not appear. The court subsequently dismissed the client’s case for non-payment of the full balance of the filing fee and sent the client a bill for the remaining fee. The client retained new counsel, who filed a new, complete bankruptcy plan. The client’s matter was brought before the fee arbitration panel, which concluded that the client paid Taylor $2,725 for services that were not provided, that payments were made through the LLC’s account, that Taylor failed to appear at a scheduled hearing or to provide notice that he would not appear, and that Taylor’s non-lawyer associate acted illegally in ways known to Taylor. The special master concluded that the fee award granted to the client was supported by clear and convincing evidence and that Taylor had failed to pay the amount awarded to the client.

Based on this conduct, the special master concluded that Taylor had committed violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.1, 3.3, 5.3, 8.4 (a) (1), and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 3.3, 5.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment; the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4 and 3.1 is a public reprimand; and the maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated.¹ In aggravation of discipline, the special master found that Taylor displayed a dishonest or selfish motive, that the facts demonstrated a pattern of misconduct and multiple violations of the Rules, that he failed to comply with the Bar’s rules and directions, that he refused to acknowledge his misconduct, that he has substantial experience in the practice of law, and that he has shown indifference to making restitution; the sole factor found in mitigation was Taylor’s lack of a prior disciplinary history. Accordingly, the special master concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction and was consonant with the sanction imposed by this Court in prior disciplinary matters involving serious misconduct and the failure to participate in the disciplinary process. See, e.g., In the Matter of Barton, 303 Ga. 818, 819 (813 SE2d 590) (2018) (noting that, under Standard 4.41 (b) and (c) of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, “disbarment is generally appropriate where serious or potentially serious injury is caused to a client by, respectively, the lawyer’s knowing failure to perform services for the client and the lawyer’s having engaged in a pattern of neglect of client matters”).

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Charles Edward Taylor be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Taylor is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

¹ Rule 8.4 (a) (1) makes it a violation for a lawyer to “violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.” The special master concluded that Taylor violated this rule by assisting his non-lawyer associate in setting up the LLC and its account, which gave the associate “the capacity to defraud clients in [Taylor’s] name.” However, neither the formal complaint initiating this matter nor the special master’s report identified the specific rule or rules that this conduct violated. Although that omission does not affect our conclusion in this matter, given the clear evidence of other rule violations supporting the recommended sanction of disbarment, we remind the Bar and special masters that it is necessary to specify the predicate rule violations on which a Rule 8.4 (a) (1) violation is based, particularly because the maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is “the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated.”