The Supreme Court of Georgia on Monday issued the following attorney discipline opinions:

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 4, 2019

S19Y1156. IN THE MATTER OF MILLARD C. FARMER, JR.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter¹ is before the Court on the report and recommendation of the special master, Patrick H. Head, recommending that the Court disbar Millard C. Farmer, Jr. (State Bar No. 255300) for an extensive pattern of disciplinary infractions committed in the course of his representation of a client in postdivorce child custody and related proceedings. After the State Bar filed its formal complaint in this matter, Farmer filed an answer, which the special master held did not conform to the requirements of applicable Bar Rules. See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rules 4-212 (a) and 4-221.2 (b).² After Farmer failed to file an amended answer as ordered by the special master, the special master entered default against Farmer. Subsequently, the special master issued his report and recommendation, in which he deemed admitted the allegations in the formal complaint. See Bar Rule 4- 212 (a) (upon failure to file proper answer, "facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted"). Farmer has never contested the default, nor did he file exceptions to the special master's report. Upon the record before us, we agree that disbarment is the only appropriate sanction in this case.

The facts as admitted by virtue of Farmer's default are as follows. Farmer, who was admitted to practice in 1967, was retained in 2008 by a client (hereinafter, "Wife") to pursue a malpractice action against the attorney who had handled her 2006 divorce. The crux of the claim was that the divorce attorney's negligence had resulted in a shortfall of approximately $50,000 from the division of marital property. In 2010, after Wife's ex-husband (hereinafter, "Husband") had been joined as a defendant in the litigation, Farmer refused Husband's settlement offer for the full $50,000 and threatened to make the case "expensive and painful" unless he paid $150,000. Husband ultimately acceded to the demand.

In 2011, Husband filed a petition in Coweta Superior Court to modify the parties' child custody arrangement, and Wife again retained Farmer. Throughout his representation in the custody litigation, Farmer employed litigation tactics that he himself referred to as "Conflictineering," the purpose of which was to disrupt the judicial process to the point that either the court or the opposing party would simply capitulate for the sake of restoring order. In furtherance of this strategy, Farmer filed repeated frivolous motions and pursued baseless appeals, ultimately yielding more than 500 filings in the case, and routinely made ad hominem attacks against parties, the trial judge and court staff, and participants who took positions contrary to those of his client. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 328 Ga. App. 767, 773-774 (759 SE2d 909) (2014) (imposing frivolous appeal penalties on Farmer and his client).

In one emblematic episode, Farmer counseled Wife to refuse to participate in the custody evaluation and, in direct violation of an express court order, discussed substantive issues involved in the custody litigation with the parties' children. He then willfully refused to appear at the resulting contempt hearing, after which both he and Wife were held in contempt. See Murphy v. Murphy, 330 Ga. App. 169 (6) (a) (767 SE2d 789) (2014).

Farmer threatened witnesses on at least two occasions, the first in an effort to compel the witness to recant after he had testified adversely to Wife, and the second in a preemptive attempt to influence the witness's testimony. The latter instance involved a psychiatrist and former client of his whom he had retained to evaluate the parties' children, whose professional reputation Farmer threatened to destroy if she offered testimony adverse to Wife. Then, after the witness testified contrary to Farmer's preferences, Farmer filed briefs revealing sensitive information the witness had disclosed in confidence in the course of his representation and accusing her of having been under the influence of drugs at the hearing.

After the trial court awarded temporary physical custody to Husband amidst Wife and Farmer's failure to cooperate in the custody evaluation, Farmer directed Wife to instruct her children to resist Husband's exercise of custody through various means, including encouraging them to run away from Husband's home and orchestrating an elaborate scheme to manufacture evidence of child abuse and neglect by Husband. In addition, purporting to act on Wife's behalf, Farmer filed suit against the trial judge's court reporter—against whom he had also filed a professional grievance—and the Board of Court Reporting, which had rejected said professional grievance. After the trial court dismissed the suit on summary judgment, Farmer appealed and, after submitting filings accusing the trial judge of bias and corruption, was subjected to frivolous appeal sanctions. See Murphy v. Freeman, 337 Ga. App. 221, 227-229 (787 SE2d 755) (2016) (imposing maximum sanction for multiple willful violations of Court of Appeals Rules and noting likely violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct). According to Wife's later testimony, Farmer persisted in litigating the court reporter suit even after she had instructed him to discontinue it, filing at least one brief that she had not authorized.³

In addition to his above-noted sanctioning on no less than three occasions during the custody and related proceedings, Farmer was also more recently found liable, based on the above-described conduct, in a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") action, see OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq., for multiple acts of racketeering, including attempted theft by extortion, in violation of OCGA § 16-8-16; attempted bribery, in violation of OCGA § 16-10-2; intimidation of a court officer, in violation of OCGA § 16-10-97; influencing witnesses, in violation of OCGA § 16-10-93; and employing interstate travel, in concert with others, to deliberately interfere with Husband's lawful custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 and OCGA § 16-5-45.

Finally, the record from the disciplinary proceedings below reflects that Farmer has failed to comply with several directives of the special master and, since the filing of his unsatisfactory initial answer, has failed to participate in any way in the proceedings.

These facts establish that Farmer violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.6 (a), 1.8 (b), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 (d), 4.4, and 8.4 (a) (1) and (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.6 (a), 1.8 (b), 3.4, and 8.4 (a) (1) and (a) (4) is disbarment, and the maximum sanction for the remaining violations is a public reprimand.

As noted by the special master, multiple aggravating factors are apparent in this case, including Farmer's pattern of misconduct; his multiple violations; his intentional noncompliance in the disciplinary proceedings; his mischaracterizations of the facts; his selfish motive; his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; his substantial experience in the practice of law; and his apparent indifference to restitution, as demonstrated by his failure to satisfy the judgment in the civil RICO case. The sole mitigating factor, on the other hand, is Farmer's lack of any prior disciplinary history.

On this record, we have little difficulty concluding that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. See, e.g., In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 (778 SE2d 218) (2015) (disbarment warranted for attorney with no prior disciplinary history for engaging in pattern of misconduct involving frivolous filings and misrepresentations, acting without client authorization, and obstructing disciplinary proceedings); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 (765 SE2d 361) (2014) (disbarment warranted for attorney with no prior disciplinary history for making false statements, acting without client's authorization, and failing to make restitution); In the Matter of Rolleston, 282 Ga. 513 (651 SE2d 739) (2007) (disbarment warranted for attorney's extensive history of frivolous filings, recalcitrant behavior, and open disrespect for the judiciary). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Millard C. Farmer, Jr. be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Farmer is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).⁴

Disbarred. All the Justices concur, except Boggs, J., disqualified, and Ellington, J., not participating.

¹ On January 12, 2018, this Court entered an order amending Part IV of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia ("Bar Rules"), including Bar Rule 4-102 (d), which contains the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The order provided that, with two exceptions not applicable here, "these amendments shall be effective as of July 1, 2018 and shall apply to disciplinary proceedings commenced on or after that date." The order further specified that "the former rules shall continue to apply to disciplinary proceedings commenced before July 1, 2018."

² Formerly, Bar Rule 4-221 (e) (2).

³ There was also evidence that Farmer had told Wife, with regard to the custody case, that he would not allow her to dismiss or mediate the case unless he was paid the $500,000 in attorney fees she owed him.

⁴ Formerly, Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 4, 2019

S20Y0079. IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM LESLIE KIRBY III.

PER CURIAM.

This is the second appearance of this disciplinary matter before the Court. We rejected the first petition for voluntary discipline filed by William Leslie Kirby III (State Bar No. 220475), despite the Special Master's recommendation that it be accepted and that Kirby receive a State Disciplinary Review Board reprimand for his admitted violations, in four separate State Bar matters, of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (c) and (d), of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). See In the Matter of Kirby, 304 Ga. 628 (820 SE2d 729) (2018). The Special Master has now issued a second report and recommendation, recommending that this Court accept Kirby's second petition for voluntary discipline and impose a 30-day suspension from the practice of law. However, we find that a 30-day suspension is insufficient given the gravity of Kirby's misconduct in these four matters.

In Kirby, this Court recited the facts in the underlying matters as follows:

With regard to State Disciplinary Board Docket ("SDBD") No. 6926, Kirby admits that he was retained in 2014 to represent a client in a child-support modification action and was paid $375. He filed the modification action, albeit later than he promised. When a motion for contempt was filed against his client, Kirby failed to appear at a 2016 hearing on the motion. The client was held in contempt for failing to pay child support and had income deduction orders entered against her. Kirby failed to respond to the client's multiple requests for information and failed to perform necessary work on the matter. Kirby admits that by this behavior he violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).

With regard to SDBD No. 6977, Kirby admits that a client retained him in 2012 to defend her against criminal charges. After the client was convicted, Kirby advised her to seek appointed counsel for the appeal but failed to file a notice of withdrawal even though he had no plans to represent her. Although Kirby gave a copy of his file to the client's family, he failed to respond to new counsel's request for a copy of his file after counsel was appointed in July 2015. New counsel filed a motion in March 2016 to compel Kirby to produce his file, but Kirby failed to respond. Kirby admits that by his conduct he violated Rules 1.4 and 1.16.

With regard to SDBD No. 6978, Kirby admits that in February 2014 he was retained to represent a client in divorce proceedings. After a March 2015 mediation, the client refused to sign a negotiated agreement and informed Kirby that he wished to retain new counsel. Kirby gave the client a copy of his file and told the client that he was withdrawing. But he failed to file a notice of withdrawal with the court and failed to communicate with the client. As a result of Kirby's failure to withdraw properly, the client was unable to retain another attorney. Kirby admits that by this conduct he violated Rules 1.4 and 1.16.

Finally, with regard to SDBD No. 6979, Kirby admits that in 2011 a client hired him to file an uncontested divorce and paid him a $700 retainer. Although Kirby filed the petition for divorce in January 2012, he stopped communicating with the client and did not perform any additional work on the case until July 2013, when the parties negotiated and signed an agreement. Kirby prepared a final judgment and decree but did not file it with the court because the court required the parties to attend a seminar for divorcing parents. Although Kirby informed the client of this requirement, the client did not attend the seminar. In February 2016, the client notified Kirby that he was terminating Kirby's services. Kirby failed to send the client his file, although he had promised to do so, and he did not properly withdraw from the representation. Kirby failed thereafter to respond to the client's inquiries and requests for a refund. Kirby admits that this conduct amounted to violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16.

304 Ga. at 628-630.

This Court determined that, although the State Bar did not oppose the petition, the requested sanction of a Review Board reprimand was insufficient in light of the pattern of misconduct, the multiple clients harmed, and the lack of any assurance that the issues that led to his misconduct had been resolved. Id. at 628, 632. As to these issues, the Court noted that:

[w]ith his petition for voluntary discipline, Kirby submitted under seal the March 2018 report of a psychologist who performed [an] evaluation and found Kirby to be fit to practice law. Generally speaking, the psychologist's report discusses Kirby's statements regarding particular stress he was under, including the 2012 death of his father, an attorney with whom he shared office space, and the 2016 death of his mother. The psychologist noted various challenges Kirby faced in managing his practice and his stress. The psychologist made specific mental health recommendations but also expressed a concern about whether Kirby would follow through with his stated plans for personal and professional improvement. Kirby's petition for voluntary discipline provides no indication that he is following the psychologist's recommendations.

Id. at 630.

After this Court rejected Kirby's requested sanction, Kirby filed a second petition for voluntary discipline, seeking any range of discipline between a Review Board reprimand and a 30-day suspension. The facts remain largely the same, although Kirby has included greater detail, including highlighting some of the difficulties he faced in representing the clients in these matters. In addition, he filed, under seal, a February 2019 letter from a licensed psychologist, confirming that Kirby "is currently under [his] care," and a personal statement by Kirby, in which he seeks to more fully explain the circumstances that led to these disciplinary matters. Kirby states that he has changed the scope and focus of his practice and that words cannot express the disappointment he has had in himself for his poor decision making, but that he is thankful that this process has led him to seek therapy and to gain some peace with the death of his parents.

In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the Special Master points to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions as instructive, see In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), and notes that ABA Standard 3.0 provides that in imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, a court should consider the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors; and that ABA Standard 4.43 provides that a reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. In mitigation, the Special Master notes, pursuant to ABA Standard 9.32, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; restitution, with Kirby providing a full refund to the client in SDBD No. 6926 and a partial refund of fees to the client in SDBD No. 6979; and remorse. As further mitigation, the Special Master notes that Kirby underwent a psychological evaluation with a licensed psychologist who determined that he was fit to continue practicing law; that he attended counseling sessions through the Lawyer Assistance Program offered by the State Bar; that he continues to undergo treatment with a licensed psychologist; and that, as Kirby stated in mitigation in his second petition, he attended Continuing Legal Education courses and additional seminars on small firm management, running a law firm, and lawyer wellness.

In aggravation, the Special Master notes, pursuant to ABA Standard 9.22, the multiple offenses involved, a pattern of misconduct, and his prior disciplinary offense, an Investigative Panel reprimand in 2016.

The Special Master states that, although the essential facts have not changed from the prior petition, it appears from Kirby's uncontested personal statement that he has continued to work in good faith with counsel for the State Bar to find a resolution of these disciplinary proceedings, including continuing to engage in psychological evaluation, working more diligently than before on managing his practice, and working closely with Bar counsel on his second petition. The Special Master notes that cooperation between Kirby and the State Bar has resulted in the State Bar recommending acceptance of the second petition within the same range as suggested by Kirby. Given the admissions of misconduct made by Kirby and our prior analysis and rejection of a Review Board reprimand, the Special Master recommends that we accept the second petition for voluntary discipline and impose a 30-day suspension from the practice of law.

However, as in our earlier opinion, "based on the admitted facts, which include neglect of multiple clients over a period of several years, a prior disciplinary history, and questions about the lawyer's ongoing ability to comply with his professional obligations," Kirby, 304 Ga. at 632, we do not believe that a 30-day suspension is a sufficient sanction, particularly in light of the fact that we previously have imposed suspensions of four months or more for similar conduct and rule violations. See In the Matter of Johnson, 303 Ga. 795 (815 SE2d 55) (2018) (six-month suspension for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.16 (d), and 5.5 (a) for neglect of seven client matters); In the Matter of Brantley, 299 Ga. 732 (791 SE2d 783) (2016) (180-day suspension with conditions upon reinstatement for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (c) (1), 1.16 (d), 5.5 (a), 8.1, and 9.3 in five disciplinary matters); In the Matter of Buckley, 291 Ga. 661 (732 SE2d 87) (2012) (four-month suspension for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (d) for neglect of one client matter where lawyer had three prior disciplinary sanctions for similar conduct); In the Matter of Huggins, 291 Ga. 92 (727 SE2d 500) (2012) (six-month suspension with conditions for reinstatement for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), 1.16, and 9.3 in five client matters). Accordingly, we reject Kirby's second petition for voluntary discipline.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 4, 2019

S19Y1553. IN THE MATTER OF NEVADA MICHAEL TUGGLE.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on Nevada Michael Tuggle's (State Bar No. 301224) petition for voluntary discipline, filed before the issuance of a formal complaint pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b), in which he seeks to resolve two pending disciplinary matters. He admits that by his conduct, he violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 is disbarment, while the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4 and 1.16 is a public reprimand. Although the State Bar supports the petition, in which Tuggle seeks a Review Board or public reprimand, we nevertheless reject it.

In his petition, Tuggle makes the following admissions unconditionally. With regard to the first disciplinary matter, a client retained Tuggle to represent her in a Gwinnett County Probate Court proceeding. In that proceeding, the client contested the validity of a 2014 will, which the decedent's son sought to have probated; the decedent's son also sought to have a 2009 will, which listed the client as the executor of the decedent's estate, vacated or set aside. After initially objecting, the parties ultimately agreed that Tuggle's client would not contest the 2014 will and would not oppose the motion to vacate. The probate court then entered an order revoking the letters testamentary issued to Tuggle's client and appointed the decedent's son as executor.

Approximately six months later, the decedent's son filed a lawsuit against Tuggle's client. The client notified Tuggle about the lawsuit; he emailed her a Legal Services Agreement ("LSA") to sign and send back to him; and he told her that he would not require an initial retainer fee and crossed out the "initial retainer" language in the LSA. The LSA provided that the law firm would bill the client $250 per hour; that it would bill upon significant completion of matters concerning the case; that the client was required to provide the law firm with a credit card authorization in exchange for waiving the initial retainer; and that Tuggle would alert the client at least 12 hours prior to charging the credit card. On February 23, 2016, the client emailed Tuggle the executed LSA and credit card authorization. However, Tuggle, although aware of the February 27, 2016 deadline for filing an answer to the complaint, failed to file a timely response. A few days later, the client emailed Tuggle asking for an update in her case; Tuggle did not respond. He did, however, and without notice, charge $1,000 to her credit card without sending an invoice or other billing documentation to show the work that he did to earn the charge. The client then emailed Tuggle and asked him to give her notice next time he charged fees on her credit card as set forth in the LSA.

On March 9, 2016, Tuggle filed an entry of appearance and answer and defenses to the complaint, a copy of which he emailed to the client. He did not inform the client that he filed the answer late or that she was at risk for default judgment, but he did state that he planned to file a motion to dismiss the following week and would send her the motion once it was filed. However, he did not file a motion to dismiss, did not perform any additional work on her case, and stopped communicating with the client after the March 9 email, despite the fact that she attempted to contact him several times. He also did not respond to the other party's counsel, who sent him a letter inquiring about overdue discovery responses, or notify his client as to the court's scheduling order or that a motion for default judgment had been filed in the case.

Ultimately, the trial court entered an order on April 12, 2017, granting the other party's motion for default judgment against Tuggle's client in the amount of $815,460.23. On July 12, 2017, the client received an affidavit of garnishment from the other party's attorney. She then sent Tuggle a text message notifying him that she received an affidavit of garnishment from a default judgment in excess of $800,000 and requested that Tuggle return her file. Over the next several weeks, she made repeated attempts to collect her file. Tuggle did not return the file until February 7, 2018, after she filed a grievance against him with the State Bar. The client has since retained other counsel to represent her in an attempt to open the default and have the judgment against her set aside. As of the date of this opinion, the $815,460.23 judgment against the client is still pending. In addition to filing the grievance against Tuggle, the client has sued Tuggle for legal malpractice.

With regard to the second disciplinary matter, Tuggle admits that in September 2017, a married couple retained him to file an application with the United States Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA") for the husband's benefits and to provide estate planning services. Although they did not execute a formal retainer agreement, the couple paid Tuggle $2,500 to prepare the estate planning documents, which he completed and the couple duly executed. He then agreed to file an application for VA benefits for the husband and to draft a revocable living trust, a warranty deed transferring a home to the trust, a pour-over will, a financial power of attorney, and a healthcare directive. Over the course of the next few months, Tuggle failed to provide any status updates to the couple despite such requests. Tuggle ultimately did file informal claim paperwork with the VA, but he used the wrong social security number ("SSN") for the husband in the application, despite being provided with the correct number. The couple's daughter-in-law contacted the VA to obtain an update on the application and was told that the application had not been filed (due to the incorrect SSN), and the couple then terminated Tuggle's representation and requested he return their file. Tuggle told the couple he knew a representative at the VA who might be able to assist in correcting the SSN, but they refused to authorize him to contact the VA representative. The husband subsequently passed away and his file with the VA was closed before his application for VA benefits was approved.

In mitigation, Tuggle states that he has fully cooperated with disciplinary authorities by initiating this petition prior to the filing of a formal complaint; that he has no prior disciplinary record; that he is sincerely embarrassed and remorseful for having violated the disciplinary rules; and that he had unspecified substance abuse issues during the time period giving rise to this matter. As to his substance abuse issues, Tuggle states that he is currently, and voluntarily, undergoing outpatient individual and group counseling and treatment for professionals with substance abuse issues, which includes regular drug testing for a period of 12 weeks administered by appropriately licensed medical care providers. He attached to his petition a copy of a letter from a physician at the center where he underwent treatment, confirming treatment compliance and that he has had significant improvement in his cognitive testing and is able to safely practice law. Tuggle submits that the appropriate discipline to be imposed is either a Review Panel or public reprimand.

The State Bar has filed a response and recommends that this Court accept the petition. Relying on the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions as instructive, see In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), the Bar notes that this Court should consider the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See ABA Standard 3.0. In addition, the Bar states that ABA Standard 4.43 provides that a reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client. In mitigation, the Bar notes the absence of a prior disciplinary record. See ABA Standard 9.32 (a). In aggravation, the Bar contends that the applicable factors include the presence of multiple offenses; a pattern of misconduct; vulnerability of the victim; and substantial experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22. Finally, the State Bar notes that multiple, previous disciplinary cases addressing violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 have resulted in a reprimand. See, e.g., In the Matter of Jordan, 305 Ga. 35 (823 SE2d 257) (2019); In the Matter of Smart, 303 Ga. 156 (810 SE2d 475) (2018).

While the State Bar supports Tuggle's request for a reprimand, having reviewed the record, we conclude that Tuggle's petition for voluntary discipline should be rejected. Of particular concern is the fact that Tuggle has failed to accept any sort of financial responsibility for the losses caused by his conduct or to provide concrete information as to what amount of restitution is due. See, e.g., In the Matter of Johnson, 301 Ga. 264, 266 (800 SE2d 570) (2017) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline and noting that attorney failed to make full and proper restitution); In the Matter of Henderson, 289 Ga. 135, 135-136 (710 SE2d 124) (2011) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline where attorney failed to demonstrate that he made the final disbursements owing). In particular, while Tuggle states in his petition that the first client has sued him for legal malpractice related to a default judgment of $815,460.23, it is not clear how that case has been or will be resolved. Of additional concern is the lack of specificity provided, under seal or otherwise, by Tuggle as to the substance abuse issues that led to his misconduct in these disciplinary matters. Accordingly, we reject Tuggle's petition for voluntary discipline.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 4, 2019

S19Y1329. IN THE MATTER OF JOEL S. WADSWORTH.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before us on the State Bar's notice of discipline, which seeks the disbarment of Joel S. Wadsworth (State Bar No. 730000), who has been a member of the Bar since 1972. The State Bar attempted to serve Wadsworth by mail at the address listed with the State Bar, and subsequently at the same address personally, but a staff investigator filed a return of service non est inventus. The State Bar then properly served Wadsworth by publication, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Wadsworth failed to file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, he is in default, has waived his right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).

The facts, as deemed admitted by Wadsworth's default, show that he represented several plaintiffs in a civil suit, but, during that representation, he failed on multiple occasions to respond to client requests for information or documents related to the case. Furthermore, Wadsworth became ineligible to practice law on September 1, 2017, because of his failure to pay his Bar dues, but thereafter nevertheless continued his representation of the civil plaintiffs and failed to withdraw from that representation or take any other action to protect the clients' interests. Based on these facts, the State Bar asserts that Wadsworth violated Rules 1.4 (a) (3) and (4), 1.16 (d), and 5.5 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4 or 1.16 is a public reprimand, while the maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 5.5 is disbarment. In mitigation as to the appropriate level of discipline, the State Bar notes Wadsworth's absence of prior discipline in his 45 years of practicing law; in aggravation, the Bar notes Wadsworth's failure to respond to the disciplinary proceedings against him, his multiple violations showing a pattern of misconduct, his "evident" dishonest and selfish motive, and his substantial experience in the practice of law.

Although Wadsworth is in default and subject to some sanction, we are not convinced that the recommended sanction of disbarment is appropriate under the circumstances presented here. The only violation of which Wadsworth is accused that would warrant disbarment is the violation of Rule 5.5 (a) involving his unauthorized practice of law after September 1, 2017 (based on his failure to pay his Bar dues). However, no information is provided regarding the extent to which Wadsworth continued the representation of his clients after becoming ineligible to practice. Absent some more serious supporting allegations, disbarment would not necessarily be warranted for such a violation. See, e.g., In the Matter of Iwu, 303 Ga. 539, 541 (813 SE2d 336) (2018) (three-year suspension for violations of Rules 5.5 (a), 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4); noting that "Iwu's initial violation of Rule 5.5 (a) for having filed an answer and counterclaim on behalf of a client while ineligible to practice law may have subjected him to the much less serious sanction of a public reprimand rather than a suspension or disbarment. But, through Iwu's choice to lie to the Bar during the disciplinary proceedings in an effort to avoid taking responsibility for his actions, he only exacerbated his own problems by subjecting himself to more serious sanctions"). Furthermore, although the Bar cited in aggravation Wadsworth's "evident" dishonesty and selfishness, none of the conduct alleged in the notice of discipline supports such an assertion.

Accordingly, despite Wadsworth's default, we reject the Bar's notice of discipline, as the sanction suggested therein is not appropriate in light of the alleged conduct. Although we have the authority to determine the appropriate level of discipline in this matter, see Rule 4-208.1 (b) ("The Supreme Court of Georgia is not bound by the State Disciplinary Board's recommendation and may impose any level of discipline it deems appropriate"), we decline here to exercise our discretion to do so, in the hope that any future filing by the Bar as to this disciplinary matter either will contain additional allegations more properly supporting the sanction the Bar now seeks or will propose that some lesser sanction is sufficient to address the misconduct at issue.

Notice of Discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.