The Supreme Court of Georgia on Monday issued the following attorney discipline opinions:

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 6, 2020

S19Y1450. IN THE MATTER OF MATTHEW A. DICKASON.

PER CURIAM.

Matthew A. Dickason (State Bar No. 220375), who was admitted to the State Bar of Georgia in 2003, has filed a petition for voluntary surrender of his license,¹ see Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2), stating the Bar has received numerous grievances about his failure to account for fiduciary funds placed in his trust account in connection with various real estate closings. He admits that he has failed to account for such funds and that the failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 1.15 (I) (c) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 1.15 (I) (c) is disbarment. He also acknowledges that the voluntary surrender of his license is tantamount to disbarment. See Bar Rule 1.0 (r). The State Bar has filed a response, noting that there are currently 20 grievances pending against Dickason and asking the Court to accept the petition.

Having reviewed the petition and response, we agree to accept Dickason's petition for voluntary surrender of his license. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Matthew A. Dickason be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Dickason is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and Blackwell, Boggs, Peterson, Warren, Bethel, and Ellington, JJ., concur.

¹ Dickason is currently under interim suspension. See S19Y1450 (March 13, 2020).

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 6, 2020

S20Y0209. IN THE MATTER OF MUHAMMAD ABDUL-WARIT ABDUR-RAHIM.

PER CURIAM.

Lawyer Muhammed Abdul-Warit Abdur-Rahim (State Bar No. 560822) has filed a petition for voluntary discipline, consenting to a State Disciplinary Review Board reprimand for his disrespectful and disruptive behavior in a criminal proceeding in which he represented himself. Abdur-Rahim concedes that his conduct was a violation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5 (d), which forbids lawyers to "engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 3.5 (d) is a public reprimand. The State Bar of Georgia agrees that a Review Board reprimand is appropriate, and for the reasons that follow, we accept the petition for voluntary discipline.

According to his petition, Abdur-Rahim was involved in an altercation with his father in September 2017, and as a result, Abdur-Rahim was charged with family violence battery, thirddegree cruelty to children, and disorderly conduct. At his arraignment in April 2018, Abdur-Rahim was unnecessarily argumentative with prosecutors, used profanity, failed to follow the instructions of the court, and generally engaged in disruptive conduct. In mitigation, Abdur-Rahim says that he was suffering from personal and emotional problems at the time of his arraignment, that he later sought and obtained treatment for these problems, that he apologized to the judge and court staff involved in his arraignment, that he freely and fully disclosed his wrongful conduct to and cooperated with the State Bar and State Disciplinary Board, and that he is remorseful for his misconduct. We note as well that Abdur-Rahim has no prior disciplinary history, and his disrespectful and disruptive conduct on the occasion of his arraignment appears to have been an isolated incident, inasmuch as  the State Bar has come forward with no evidence of Abdur-Rahim disrupting court proceedings on other occasions.

In light of these mitigating circumstances, and considering that the most severe discipline for a violation of Rule 3.5 (d) is a public reprimand, we agree that a Review Board reprimand is appropriate discipline for Abdur-Rahim's conduct at his arraignment.¹ We accept the petition for voluntary discipline and direct that Abdur-Rahim receive a Review Board reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (4) and 4-220 (b).²

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Review Board reprimand. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J. and Blackwell, Boggs, Peterson, Warren, Bethel and Ellington, JJ., concur.

¹ See American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2015), Standards 6.23, 6.24, 9.32. See also In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996).

² We note that the petition for voluntary discipline concerns only the misconduct that occurred at the arraignment, not any misconduct that may have occurred in connection with the altercation that led to the criminal charges on which Abdur-Rahim was arraigned. Our disposition of this petition would not preclude discipline for any such other misconduct. See Rule 8.4 (a) (convictions for certain criminal conduct shall constitute a violation of the Rules).

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 6, 2020

S20Y0312. IN THE MATTER OF JARED MICHAEL ARRINGTON.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Notice of Discipline seeking the disbarment of Jared Michael Arrington (State Bar No. 000686), who was admitted to the Bar in 2008. The State Bar attempted to serve Arrington personally at his official address as listed with the State Bar, but he could not be found at that address. The State Bar then properly served Arrington by publication pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Arrington failed to file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, Arrington is in default, has waived his right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of Arrington's default, are as follows. In October 2013, in connection with the closing of a residential real estate transaction, Arrington collected $972.50 from the purchasers to obtain a title insurance policy for the benefit of the lender, Branch Banking & Trust ("BB&T"). Arrington, however, never purchased the policy. When contacted by a BB&T loan officer inquiring about the policy, Arrington promised to forward it, but he never did. The loan officer, after being informed by the title insurance company that no policy had ever been purchased, again contacted Arrington, requesting that he remit the $927.50 to BB&T. Arrington failed to respond to this request and several others over a more than two-year period, prompting the loan officer to file a grievance with the State Bar. In response to the grievance, Arrington stated that, due to "personal issues," he had closed his practice the previous year; that he had believed all final title policies "were taken care of by an office assistant" before he closed his office but recently discovered this was not the case; and that he was in the process of closing all his open files and would send the final policy and proof of payment as soon as possible. Arrington, however, did not do so. The State Bar thereafter issued a Notice of Investigation, unsuccessfully attempted personal service, and ultimately effected service by publication. The State Bar then moved for an interim suspension, which the Court granted on May 13, 2019, and which remains in place. See S19Y1152.

Through the above-described conduct, the State Bar contends that Arrington has violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), and 1.15 (II) (a) and (c) (2) (ii) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, found at Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.15 (I), and 1.15 (II) (a) is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for violations of Rules 1.4 and 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. In recommending disbarment, the State Bar notes in aggravation that Arrington acted willfully, dishonestly, and with a selfish motive; engaged in multiple violations of the Rules; intentionally failed to comply with the disciplinary process; took advantage of vulnerable victims; has been indifferent to making restitution; and has experience in the practice of law.

The Court hereby finds that Arrington has violated Rule 1.3, by willfully disregarding his responsibility to acquire the title insurance policy and willfully abandoning the matter and his client; Rule 1.4, by failing to communicate promptly and accurately with his client about his failure to acquire the title policy; and Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II) (a), by failing to keep the $972.50 in a trust account separate from his own funds and by converting the funds and failing to deliver or account for them upon his client's request.¹ Given the nature of the conduct and the aggravating factors noted above, we find that disbarment is appropriate and consistent with discipline imposed in cases involving similar violations. See, e.g., In the Matter of Bennett, __ Ga. __ (837 SE2d 298) (2019) (disbarment warranted for abandoning client matter and retaining settlement funds where attorney acted with dishonest or selfish motive, failed to respond adequately to disciplinary authorities, and had substantial experience in the practice of law); In the Matter of Mays, 303 Ga. 152 (810 SE2d 478) (2018) (disbarment warranted for abandoning client and failing to refund unearned retainer where attorney had substantial experience in the practice of law and failed to respond adequately to disciplinary authorities); In the Matter of Miller, 302 Ga. 366 (806 SE2d 596) (2017) (disbarment warranted for abandoning client where attorney had substantial experience in the practice of law and failed to respond to disciplinary authorities); In the Matter of Ali, 283 Ga. 225 (658 SE2d 115) (2008) (disbarment warranted for abandoning client and failing to respond to disciplinary authorities). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Jared Michael Arrington be removed from the rolls of  persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Arrington is reminded to his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Disbarred. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and Blackwell, Boggs, Peterson, Warren, Bethel, and Ellington, JJ., concur.

¹ Given that no trust account was utilized at all for these client funds, the specific provisions of 1.15 (II) (c) (2) (ii) are inapplicable.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 6, 2020

S20Y0814. IN THE MATTER OF BARRY WAYNE ROREX.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the State Disciplinary Review Board's report and recommendation recommending that the license of Respondent Barry Wayne Rorex (State Bar No. 615160) be suspended for six months based on a similar suspension in Arizona. We agree.

The record shows that disciplinary proceedings were initiated in Arizona against Rorex and that, after he failed to respond, he was found to be in default.¹ The facts, which were deemed to have been admitted, were that in 2014 and 2015, Rorex violated various disciplinary rules by abandoning the legal matters of three separate clients, failing to adequately communicate with those clients, failing to return the clients' files or unearned fees, and failing to respond to the Arizona Bar. On June 21, 2017, the Supreme Court of Arizona ordered that Rorex be suspended for six months and one day (retroactive to February 24, 2017) with conditions on reinstatement.²

In July 2019, the State Bar of Georgia issued a Notice of Reciprocal Discipline pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) (2) and mailed it to Rorex at his official address of record, but he did not acknowledge service or file a response. After an unsuccessful effort at personal service, the State Bar served Rorex by publication in accordance with Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Rorex, who has been a member of the Georgia Bar since 1997, has not responded or filed any objection to this reciprocal proceeding.

After considering the record, the Review Board noted that Rorex had not yet been reinstated in Arizona, and that, under Bar Rule 9.4 (b) (3), it was required to recommend substantially similar discipline unless it found from the face of the record that certain elements existed that would give it the discretion to make such other recommendation as it deemed appropriate. The Review Board found that Rorex had been provided with sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard regarding the disciplinary proceedings both here and in Arizona; that the underlying conduct would be a violation of disciplinary rules in Georgia; that the conduct would be subject to similar discipline in this State; and that none of the elements set forth in Bar Rule 9.4 (b) (3) were present. Therefore, the Review Board recommended that Rorex be suspended from the practice of law in Georgia for six months from the date of the Supreme Court's order, with his reinstatement conditioned on his reinstatement to practice law in Arizona after the payment of restitution and costs as described in the Arizona disciplinary order dated June 21, 2017.

Having reviewed the record, we agree with the State Disciplinary Review Board as to the appropriate sanction in this reciprocal discipline matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Barry Wayne Rorex be suspended from the practice of law in this State for a period of six months from the date of this opinion with his reinstatement conditioned on proof of reinstatement in Arizona after the payment of restitution and costs as described in the Arizona disciplinary order dated June 21, 2017. If Rorex wishes to seek reinstatement, he must offer proof to the State Bar's Office of General Counsel that he has been reinstated to the practice of law in Arizona and that he has made restitution and paid costs as ordered by the Arizona Supreme Court. If the State Bar agrees that this condition has been met, the State Bar will submit a notice of compliance to this Court, and this Court will issue an order granting or denying reinstatement. We remind Rorex of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Six-month suspension with conditions on reinstatement. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and Blackwell, Boggs, Peterson, Warren, Bethel, and Ellington, JJ., concur.

¹ Rorex was later allowed to present some evidence in mitigation of discipline, which the Arizona Bar indicated it considered in reaching its decision as to the proper level of discipline.

² The conditions imposed on Rorex's reinstatement were the payment of restitution to his three former clients and payment of costs and expenses associated with the Arizona Bar's prosecution of the disciplinary matter.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 6, 2020

S20Y0815. IN THE MATTER OF ANDREW DAVID TAYLOR.

PER CURIAM.

This reciprocal discipline matter is before the Court on the State Disciplinary Review Board's February 3, 2020 report and recommendation that this Court disbar Andrew David Taylor (State Bar No. 940522) from the practice of law in Georgia. See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 9.4 (b). The reciprocal proceeding arises from Taylor's disbarment from the practice of law in Nevada. The State Bar of Georgia properly served Taylor with a notice of reciprocal discipline, see Bar Rule 4-203.1, but he failed to acknowledge service and did not file any response or objection to the imposition of reciprocal discipline.

Taylor was admitted to practice law in Nevada in 2004 and has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 2009. On July 5,  2019, he was disbarred from the practice of law in Nevada by the Supreme Court of Nevada. The Nevada Court determined that Taylor misappropriated more than one million dollars of clients' funds, commingled personal funds with clients' funds, and opened numerous law firms with different trust and operating accounts to mislead the Nevada Bar and his clients, in violation of multiple disciplinary rules. In addition, the Nevada Court determined that Taylor entered into litigation-advancement loan agreements on behalf of his clients without their knowledge or consent, used the funds for his personal and business expenses, and failed to repay many of the loans. The Nevada Court also determined that in responding to the disciplinary matters, Taylor failed to comply with reasonable requests for information from the Nevada Bar and made false statements of material fact to the Nevada Bar.

Based on a review of the disciplinary procedures and rules in Nevada and the corresponding disciplinary procedures and rules in Georgia, the Review Board concluded that disbarment is an appropriate level of discipline in Georgia for similar misconduct and  found no basis for recommending anything other than substantially similar discipline. See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 9.4 (b) (3) (i) – (vi). Thus, it recommends that Taylor be disbarred from the practice of law in Georgia.

Having reviewed the record, we agree with the Review Board that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this reciprocal discipline matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Andrew David Taylor be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Taylor is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

Disbarred. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and Blackwell, Boggs, Peterson, Warren, Bethel, and Ellington, JJ., concur.