This case involves Husband Stephen Turner Scott’s challenge to the trial court’s final child support order entered in the divorce action initiated by Wife Amanda Kay Scott. At the time of the final bench trial in the parties’ divorce case, Husband had ceased being a self-employed farmer, as he had been at the time the trial court entered the temporary child support order, and he had commenced working as an employee of his parents’ farming business. He had also moved into a house owned by his parents. The final decree required Husband to pay $1,004.00 per month in child support based upon the trial court’s finding that Husband’s gross monthly income was $5,299.39. This figure consisted of a finding that Husband earned $2,166.67 in monthly wages, along with monthly fringe benefits as follows: $1,177.40 for the use of a 2011 Ford F-250 truck provided by his employer/parents; $100.00 for automobile insurance premiums; $400.00 for gasoline; $30.32 for the monthly average ad valorem tax and registration payments for the truck; $1,000.00 for the use of a house belonging to his parents; $350.00 for the power bill paid by his parents; and $75.00 for a cellular telephone they provided to him. We granted Husband’s discretionary appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in its determination of fringe benefits available to Husband for purposes of calculating his gross monthly income.
Fringe benefits for inclusion as income or ‘in kind’ remuneration received by a parent in the course of employment, or operation of a trade or business, shall be counted as income if the benefits significantly reduce personal living expenses. Such fringe benefits might include, but are not limited to, use of a company car, housing, or room and board. OCGA § 19-6-15 f 1 C. The primary issue with respect to each sum the trial court found to constitute a fringe benefit is whether it was received by Husband in the course of his employment. ‘In the appellate review of a bench trial, this Court will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this Court properly gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.’ Citation omitted. Autrey v. Autrey, 288 Ga. 283, 284-885 702 SE2d 878 2010. See also Walton v. Walton, 285 Ga. 706, 708 2 681 SE2d 165 2009. But we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. See Lawrence v. Lawrence, 286 Ga. 309, 310 1 687 SE2d 421 2009. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
