After an Atkinson County grand jury indicted Aram Andrade for rape and burglary, he moved to suppress evidence of statements that he had made to law enforcement officers. Following a Jackson-Denno1 hearing, and before any trial commenced, the trial court granted this motion in part, finding that one of the statements was involuntary. Seventeen days later, the State filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding that the State had attempted to bring its appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 a 5, which requires that a notice of appeal be filed within two days of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken. See State v. Andrade, 330 Ga. App. 549 768 SE2d 525 2015. Contending that it instead had brought its appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 a 4, pursuant to which it had thirty days to file a notice of appeal, the State filed a petition in our Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition, and we now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The State is permitted to take appeals in criminal cases only to the extent expressly authorized by statute. See State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 91 1 a 779 SE2d 603 2015. For more than forty years, our statutory law has authorized the State to appeal from a pretrial order suppressing evidence on the ground that it was obtained unlawfully,2 and as early as 1977, our Court of Appeals recognized that this authorization permits an appeal from an order suppressing evidence of a statement given by the accused to law enforcement on the ground that the statement was involuntary. See State v. Watson, 143 Ga. App. 785, 786-787 2 240 SE2d 194 1977, overruled in part on other grounds, Strickman v. State, 253 Ga. 287, 288 319 SE2d 864 1984. Since then, this Court and the Court of Appeals both have looked repeatedly to this statutory authorization as a proper basis for appeals by the State from orders suppressing such evidence on the ground that it was obtained by unlawful means. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 867-868 1 725 SE2d 320 2012; State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 99 686 SE2d 244 2009; State v. Sammons, 283 Ga. 364, 364 659 SE2d 598 2008; State v. Davison, 280 Ga. 84, 85 1 623 SE2d 500 2005; State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646, 648 1 619 SE2d 684 2005; State v. Austin, 310 Ga. App. 814, 816, n.4 714 SE2d 671 2011; State v. Stone, 304 Ga. App. 695, 696, n.11 697 SE2d 852 2010; State v. Stanfield, 290 Ga. App. 62, 63 1 658 SE2d 837 2008. Today, this statutory authorization is found in OCGA § 5-7-1 a 4, which provides in pertinent part that the State may appeal:
