This is the second appeal stemming from a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by appellant Michael Lejeune. In that petition, appellant contended that his plea of guilty to murder in November 2005 was not knowingly and intelligently entered because he never was adequately advised of his privilege against self-incrimination. See Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291, 292, n.2 766 SE2d 803 2014 Lejeune I.1 The habeas court denied relief, finding that appellant was aware of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and concluding that appellant’s plea was thus constitutionally valid. In the first appeal, we concluded that the habeas court’s findings on which it based its ruling that appellant knew of his right against self-incrimination were not supported by the record. See id. at 292-294. We also ruled, however, that the court had improperly placed the burden of proof on the warden in this habeas proceeding and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing with appellant bearing the burden of proof. See id. at 294-299. On remand, the habeas court concluded that appellant was sufficiently aware of his right against self-incrimination and that his plea was thus entered knowingly and voluntarily. We granted appellant’s application for certificate of probable cause to appeal, see OCGA § 9-14-52, and now reverse the habeas court’s ruling that appellant’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.
This Court has, for many years now, held that for a plea to be constitutionally valid, a pleading defendant must be informed of his three Boykin rights.2 See, e.g., Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 779-780 727 SE2d 90 2011 overruled on other grounds in Lejeune I, 296 Ga. at 294-297; Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 481-482 591 SE2d 802 2004 overruled on other grounds in Lejeune I, 296 Ga. at 294-297; Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893, 894-895 471 SE2d 869 1996. And, in Lejeune I, this Court held that for a plea to be knowingly and voluntarily entered, a pleading defendant was required to know of his essential constitutional protections, including his right against self-incrimination. Lejeune I, 296 Ga. at 291 292. Under this due process test, appellant’s plea was constitutionally invalid.
