This Court is faced with a unique dilemma. On the one hand, the Georgia Constitution dictates that we decide each case within two terms of being docketed. On the other hand, that same Constitution also requires us to respect our place in this state’s judicial hierarchy and steadfastly avoid encroaching upon the Supreme Court of Georgia’s exclusive jurisdiction or domain. But in order to decide the case before us, we must choose between two conflicting precedents that are currently being reviewed by our Supreme Court as part of its certiorari process. And while our constitutional duty to decide cases within two terms of docketing may well authorize us to make this choice, we think that it is inadvisable to do so. Instead, we choose to exercise our authority under Article VI, Section V, Paragraph IV of the Georgia Constitution and certify the question presented in this case to our Supreme Court for instruction, to which we shall then be bound. We do not take this action lightly. And in doing so, we fully recognize that this Court is treading into murky jurisprudential waters. But faced with the choice of carving out a narrow and perhaps temporary exception to this state’s certification jurisprudence or disrupting our Supreme Court’s certiorari process, we choose the former.
Before fleshing out our reasoning for certifying the question presented in this case to our Supreme Court, we will briefly describe the procedural context of the case, as well as the parties’ respective arguments. Specifically, J. F. appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the State’s case against him with prejudice for failure to comply with OCGA § 15-11-521 b. He argues that because the State failed to file a delinquency petition within 30 days after his release from detention and neglected to seek an extension of time to file same, the trial court was required to dismiss the State’s case with prejudice.