Phillips v. State

The trial court did not clearly err in ruling that the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and there was therefore evidence to support the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during that stop in his DUI trial.

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Following a stipulated bench trial, Arthur Phillips was convicted of DUI per se OCGA § 40 6 391 a 5.1 Phillips appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop that resulted in Phillips’s arrest. Specifically, Phillips argues that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to make the traffic stop. We disagree, and therefore we affirm.

There are three fundamental principles which must be followed when conducting an appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment. These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the State or the defendant.

Phillips v. State

The trial court did not clearly err in ruling that the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and there was therefore evidence to support the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during that stop in his DUI trial.

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