In July 1998, Jamel Humphrey negotiated a plea agreement with the State, entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill, was convicted of murder upon his plea, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life with the provision that he would be eligible for parole, but only after he served 25 years of his sentence. Almost sixteen years later, Humphrey filed a motion to vacate his sentence, alleging that the sentence is void because murder is punishable only by death, imprisonment for life without any possibility of parole ever, or imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole at the earliest point permitted by law, which would have been, in Humphrey’s case, after fourteen years.1 The trial court denied his motion, and Humphrey appeals. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case with direction.
To begin, we agree with Humphrey that the law only authorized the trial court to sentence him to death, imprisonment for life without any possibility of parole ever, or imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole as soon as permitted by law. See OCGA § 16-5-1 e 1. The applicable law offered the trial court no other sentencing options. It is true that Humphrey consented to his sentence, including the provision that he would be ineligible for parole for the first 25 years of that sentence. But when a court imposes a criminal punishment that the law does not allow, the sentence is not just an error, it is void. See Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611 1 409 SE2d 517 1991 “A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.” Citation omitted.. And as we have indicated in a number of cases, the consent of the parties cannot validate a void sentence. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 705, 706 1 749 SE2d 660 2013 “A defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement and accepts the benefit of that bargain does not waive or ‘bargain away’ the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.” Citations omitted.; Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 8 2 749 SE2d 672 2013 “A defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement does not waive the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.” Citation omitted.; von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 573 2 748 SE2d 446 2013 “A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.” Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.; Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 487 2 c 746 SE2d 109 2013 “Void convictions and illegal sentences have never been subject to general waiver rules.”.
