This case involves a dispute between appellant Shalanda Sanders, ne Riley “Shalanda”, and her purported biological half-brother, appellee Curtis Riley “Curtis”, over the estate of Clifford “Colonel” Riley “Mr. Riley”, who died without leaving a will. Shalanda claims the right to inherit from Mr. Riley as a child born during the marriage of her mother and Mr. Riley and, alternatively, based on the equitable doctrine known as “virtual adoption.” Curtis filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of virtual adoption, arguing that there is insufficient evidence of an agreement by Mr. Riley to adopt Shalanda and the required partial performance of that agreement. The trial court granted Curtis’s motion. In doing so, however, the court did not view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to Shalanda as the party opposing summary judgment, and consequently erred in concluding that Curtis had shown that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding virtual adoption. The court also misinterpreted the requirement of partial performance of the agreement to adopt and erroneously concluded that an established virtual adoption can be undone by showing that the child formed a relationship with her natural father after she learned of his existence when she was a teenager. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment to Curtis.
1. As this appeal is from a ruling on a motion for partial summary judgment, “there have not yet been factual findings by a judge or jury, and Shalanda’s version of events unsurprisingly differs substantially from Curtis’s version.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 127 SCt 1769, 167 LE2d 686 2007. In this posture, courts must view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 567 731 SE2d 731 2012. See also Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624 697 SE2d 779 2010 explaining that “summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 c have been met”. So viewed, the record shows as follows.
