Lynn Eshleman is employed with the DeKalb County Police Department as a law enforcement officer and dog handler, and in connection with her employment, she is responsible for the care and maintenance of Andor, a police dog trained to assist in the apprehension of persons suspected of criminal activity. When Eshleman is not working, she keeps Andor at her Walton County home, just down the street from the home of Benjamin Key. On November 6, 2011, Eshleman put Andor into a portable kennel outside her home, but she evidently failed to secure the kennel door. As a result, Andor escaped into the neighborhood, where the dog encountered Key’s son, then eleven years of age. According to Key, the dog attacked his son, causing the child to sustain serious injuries to his arm. Key sued Eshleman, alleging that she failed to restrain Andor, and Eshleman moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion, Eshleman appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment. See Eshleman v. Key, 326 Ga. App. 883 755 SE2d 926 2014. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and we now reverse.
1. As a general rule, a county law enforcement officer enjoys official immunity from a lawsuit alleging that she is personally liable in tort for her performance of official functions.1 See Roper v. Greenway, 294 Ga. 112, 113 751 SE2d 351 2013. See also Phillips v. Hanse, 281 Ga. 133, 133 1 637 SE2d 11 2006; Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 124 2 549 SE2d 341 2001; Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752-753 6 452 SE2d 476 1994. There are, however, two important exceptions to this rule. First, an officer has no immunity to the extent that she acted with malice or an intent to injure. See Cameron, 274 Ga. at 124 2. Second, an officer has no immunity for negligence in the performance of a ministerial function. See Roper, 294 Ga. at 113.