House Hasson Hardware Company, Inc. “House Hasson” sued Lawson’s Home Center, Inc. “LHC” and its principals, Richard Lawson and Scott Lawson, alleging that LHC defaulted on a promissory note and that the Lawsons were personally liable for that note based on a written guaranty. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted House Hasson’s motion on its claim that LHC was liable for the debt but denied it as to the Lawsons, and granted the Lawsons’ motion on the ground that the personal guaranty did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. House Hasson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the personal guaranty was unenforceable.
In an unpublished opinion issued on February 26, 2014, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that our prior precedents in this area of law—including Thompson v. LaFarge Building Materials, Inc.1 —”dictated the result in this case”—i.e., our conclusion that the personal guaranty did not identify the principal debtor with sufficient specificity to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.2 But on October 20, 2014, the Supreme Court of Georgia granted House Hasson’s petition for certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration3 in light of its recent decision in LaFarge Building Materials, Inc. v. Thompson.4 In that decision, the Supreme Court held that a personal guaranty, which incorporated the subject credit application and described the party whose debt was guaranteed as the “applicant,” sufficiently identified the principal debtor to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.5 And given this decision, we conclude that the personal guaranty at issue here likewise sufficiently identified the principal debtor. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lawsons as to the enforceability of the personal guaranty and its denial of summary judgment to House Hasson as to this same issue.