The parties to this will contest are the four children of Evelyn Copelan, who died on November 29, 2009. Two of her children—Uyvonna Copelan and Willie David “Danny” Copelan—are the appellants. The other two—Thomas “Tommy” Copelan and John Copelan—are the appellees. The appellants sought to probate a will in which their mother left almost her entire estate to them, leaving only one dollar each to the appellees. In turn, the appellees opposed the admission of the will to probate, claiming that their mother was without testamentary capacity when she executed the will, and asserting as well that their mother made the will under the undue influence of the appellants. The probate court admitted the will to probate, the appellees sought review in the superior court, and following a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment for the appellees, denying the petition of the appellants to probate the will. The appellants bring this appeal from the judgment of the superior court.
The appellants argue principally that the appellees should not have been heard to assert incapacity and undue influence because the Court of Appeals already had decided the issues adversely to the appellees. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has twice decided cases involving these very parties. In the first case, the appellees filed a lawsuit in 1997 to seek a guardianship of their mother, and the trial court agreed that a guardianship was warranted. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, positing that such a guardianship required “clear and convincing” proof, and finding that the decision of the trial court “was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Copelan, 250 Ga. App. 856, 863 553 SE2d 278 2001 “Copelan I”. As it turned out, the Court of Appeals was wrong in Copelan I to hold the appellees to a “clear and convincing” burden of proof—we later overruled Copelan I in Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 279 Ga. 428, 429 614 SE2d 758 2005—but that nevertheless is what the Court of Appeals actually decided in Copelan I. In the second case, the appellees filed another lawsuit in 2002, this time seeking to set aside certain deeds by which their mother had conveyed real property to the appellants. There, the Court of Appeals relied on Copelan I to conclude that the appellees were “collaterally estopped from alleging their mother was incapacitated or unduly influenced” when she executed the deeds. Copelan v. Copelan, 261 Ga. App. 726, 728 583 SE2d 562 2003 “Copelan II”.
