Barry and Denise Straus appeal from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Renasant Bank and Anthony Stancil in this case involving their liability as guarantors of a real estate acquisition and development loan obtained by Interstate South, LLC.1 They contend that the trial court erred because 1 the D’Oench Duhme doctrine2 does not preclude their defenses and counterclaim; 2 the D’Oench Duhme doctrine does not preclude their tort claims against Stancil individually; 3 genuine issues of material fact preclude the award of summary judgment on the alternative grounds relied upon by the trial court; and 4 the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final money judgment in Renasant’s favor after the Strauses filed a notice of appeal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
Summary judgment is proper when the record reveals no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. “We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Footnote omitted. Melman v. FIA Card Svcs., 312 Ga. App. 270 718 SE2d 107 2011. So viewed, the record shows that Interstate South, LLC, had six members, including the Strauses. Beginning in 2004, Interstate South borrowed funds from Crescent Bank and Trust Company “Crescent” in order to purchase undeveloped land in Pickens County, Georgia. On February 10, 2009, the loan was renewed in the amount of $1.5 million with a maturity date of June 10, 2009. Members of Interstate South, including the Strauses, were required to sign a personal guaranty of the note at the time of this renewal. On February 25, 2009, Stancil, as the executive vice-president of Crescent, notified Interstate South that the note would not be renewed again unless Interstate South made a principal reduction of ten percent at or before the date of maturity.