In November 2005, Michael Lejeune pleaded guilty to murder, was convicted upon his plea, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. Years later, Lejeune filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his plea was invalid because, he said, he never was advised that, if he instead had insisted upon a trial, he could not have been compelled at that trial to testify against himself. Following an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court denied his petition. Lejeune appeals,1 and we vacate the decision of the habeas court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. To properly form the basis for a judgment of conviction, a guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 I 90 SCt 1463, 25 LE2d 747 1970. See also Hicks v. State, 281 Ga. 836, 837 642 SE2d 31 2007. For a plea to be knowing and intelligent, the accused must have “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” of his plea. Brady, 397 U. S. at 748 I. The circumstances and consequences of which the accused must be aware include the essential constitutional protections that the accused would enjoy if he instead insisted upon a trial, protections that he waives by pleading guilty and consenting to judgment without a trial. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 II C 93 SCt 2041, 36 LE2d 854 1973 “Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to determine whether the accused knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and that he had intentionally chosen to forego them.” Footnote omitted.. See also Loyd v. State, 288 Ga. 481, 485 2 b 705 SE2d 616 2011. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 89 SCt 1709, 23 LE2d 274 1969, among these essential protections is the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See id. at 243. In this case, Lejeune alleged that his plea was invalid because no one advised him of his privilege against self-incrimination.2
