Taron Maurice Williams was tried by a Chatham County jury and convicted of the murder of Aljene Flannings and other crimes related to the unlawful possession of a firearm. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Williams appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it limited his cross-examination of a prosecution witness about another case in which the witness had been charged with armed robbery but had been allowed to plead guilty to a lesser included offense. Williams also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the briefs and record, we find no error, and we affirm.1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that on the afternoon of November 27, 2009, Flannings repeatedly contacted Williams about a debt that Williams owed to Flannings, and Flannings asked Marcus Black to drive Flannings to a public housing project. When they arrived, Flannings exited the vehicle, spotted Williams, and walked up to meet him. After a short conversation, Williams handed Flannings some money and then shot him, once in the neck and twice in the head. Flannings died as a result of his wounds. Williams fled, and Black drove away and called 911. Within minutes, Williams called Elton Cheru and told Cheru that he and Flannings had gotten into an altercation. And in another phone call later that evening, Williams told Cheru that he shot Flannings because Flannings “came towards him with aggression.” The police interviewed Black and searched his person and his vehicle but found nothing that incriminated him. When police interviewed Williams, he admitted that he had talked with, and given money to, Flannings just before Flannings was shot, but Williams said that the shooter was an unknown third party. Although Williams does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions, we have independently reviewed the record, and we conclude that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 III B, 99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979. See also Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 892, 894 1 734 SE2d 23 2012; Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 376 1 721 SE2d 843 2012.