Winnie Anderson, a former employee of the Atlanta Public Schools formally known as the Atlanta Independent School District “the district”, brought this breach of contract action against the district in the Superior Court of Fulton County. Days before a trial was scheduled to commence, the parties’ counsel of record reached a settlement in principle, and so advised the trial court. Over the next two weeks, the parties exchanged drafts of a Release Agreement; the district accepted Anderson’s final proposed changes on or about November 11, 2009. Months later, the trial court entered the following order: “The Court, having been advised by Counsel that Anderson’s action has been settled in principle, hereby order that this action shall stand dismissed within 30 days of this date unless either party, with good cause, moves that this action should not be dismissed, but should be allowed to proceed upon such basis as is shown in said motion if so ordered by this Court.”
Within 30 days of that order,1 Anderson moved that her action should not be dismissed, asserting that her attorneys lacked her authority to settle her claims, and she sought to proceed to a resolution of the merits of her suit. In response, the district moved to enforce the settlement. Finally, the trial court entered the appealed order, which granted the district’s motion to enforce the settlement, based on the absence of any evidence that Anderson limited her counsel’s apparent authority to settle her claims or that her counsel communicated to the district’s counsel any such limitation of their authority.2 The trial court did not recite the terms of the settlement agreement in the final order, but attached the draft Release Agreement first proposed by Anderson’s counsel.3 It is undisputed that, as finally accepted by the district, the settlement agreement had been revised, inter alia, to exclude, from the parties whom Anderson released from her claims, the Teachers Retirement System of Georgia and to omit any release by the district. See Torres v. Elkin, 317 Ga. App. 135, 140-141 2 730 SE2d 518 2012 “Settlement agreements must meet the same requirements of formation and enforceability as other contracts. Thus, an answer to an offer will not amount to an acceptance, so as to result in a contract, unless it is unconditional and identical with the terms of the offer. The offer must be accepted unequivocally and without variance of any sort. When a purported acceptance of a settlement offer imposes any new conditions, it constitutes a counteroffer rather than an acceptance.” punctuation and footnotes omitted.
