Appellant Craig Armstead was convicted of murder, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, and unlawful eavesdropping and surveillance, all of which were crimes he committed in his workplace, including the stabbing death of his coworker Kerri Harris.1 The evidence at trial showed appellant placed a video camera in a women’s restroom at his workplace and commenced a scheme whereby he would record his female co-workers using the restroom, retrieve the tapes and replace them after-hours, and take the tapes home where he watched and stored them. During his employment, appellant attempted to date the victim but she rebuffed him. On the day of her death, the victim and another woman had reported to human resources that they found a camera in the women’s restroom. Although the women did not know who had placed the camera in the ladies’ room, appellant believed he had been discovered. Throughout the day, appellant became increasingly agitated, especially when he noticed police had been called to the workplace. He obtained a knife from a test kitchen in the facility and waited a few hours for the victim to return from a meeting. As soon as she returned to her office, he stabbed her in the back and neck. Another employee, who had heard noises of someone being injured, followed the sounds and saw appellant leaving the victim’s office. Appellant fled the premises, but was arrested soon thereafter. The victim died at the scene.
At trial, it was shown appellant had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the early 1990s in New Jersey for killing an ex-girlfriend by hitting her with a hammer and strangling her to death. Appellant was released from prison in 1999 and relocated to Georgia shortly thereafter. In 2000, appellant was convicted in Georgia and received a one-year sentence for watching a woman in a public restroom. After serving that sentence, he began working at the employer at whose workplace he committed the crimes at issue. Appellant’s defense at trial was that he was not guilty by reason of insanity because he was operating under a delusional compulsion. Specifically, appellant’s expert psychologist Dr. Eugene Emory testified appellant suffered from intermittent psychosis and, at the time he killed the victim, was operating under a delusional compulsion that the victim was a bad person who needed to be eliminated.
