This case involves an effort by Mortgage Alliance Corporation “MAC” to develop property in Pickens County as a residential subdivision called Silverstone. In August 2008, MAC filed a complaint in superior court against the county and various county officials alleging, among other things, that an August 2006 letter to MAC from the county’s sole commissioner the “August 2006 Letter”, which said that the county’s position was that any proposal to develop MAC’s property as a subdivision would need to comply with a recent amendment to the county’s land use ordinances, resulted in a taking of MAC’s property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that MAC’s complaint was untimely under OCGA § 5-3-20.1 The Court of Appeals affirmed, see Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County, 316 Ga. App. 755 730 SE2d 471 2012, and we granted MAC’s petition for certiorari.
The question that we posed to the parties in granting certiorari focused on whether and when the August 2006 Letter was “entered” and “filed” within the meaning of OCGA § 5-3-20, thereby triggering the 30-day deadline for MAC to file an appeal to the superior court. We have concluded, however, that this case is properly resolved on the ground that the August 2006 Letter was not a “decision” within the meaning of § 5-3-20, and indeed the county never made a final decision on MAC’s Silverstone proposal. Consequently, MAC’s inverse condemnation claim never ripened for judicial review, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants on this ground. Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was an appealable decision, they reached the right result, and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. See WMW, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 291 Ga. 683, 683 733 SE2d 269 2012 affirming the Court of Appeals’ judgment on certiorari under the right-for-any-reason doctrine. Because the August 2006 letter was not a “decision,” there is no need for us to address—and the Court of Appeals did not need to address—whether and when the letter was “entered” or “filed”; the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussing that issue should be treated as dicta.
