Appellant Douglas Wayne Brown was charged with driving under the influence and other crimes after he was stopped and later arrested at a traffic safety checkpoint, or roadblock, in Cobb County.1 The trial court granted Appellant’s motion to suppress his statements and other evidence resulting from the stop, ruling that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed that ruling in a 4-3 decision. See State v. Brown, 315 Ga. App. 154 726 SE2d 654 2012. We granted Appellant’s petition for certiorari, posing the question: “Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct legal analysis in assessing whether the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than field officers, for a legitimate primary purpose”
As explained below, we reject Appellant’s initial argument that the checkpoint at which he was stopped was unconstitutional because the police sergeant who authorized it was not a “programmatic-level executive.” Appellant draws this argument from Court of Appeals cases that have improperly conflated the “supervisory personnel” requirement for implementing a specific checkpoint, see LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 497 SE2d 367 1998, and the distinct requirement that a law enforcement agency’s checkpoint program have an appropriate primary purpose other than the general interest in crime control, which requires review at the “programmatic level” and may involve evidence relating to agency policy and practice and policy-makers other than the supervisor who decided to implement the particular checkpoint at issue, see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 121 SCt 447, 148 LE2d 333 2000. There is no dispute in this case that the Cobb County Police Department’s traffic safety checkpoint policy satisfies the Edmond requirement, and we adhere to LaFontaine’s holding that the decision to implement a particular checkpoint may be made by any authorized supervisor.