Ellen Rebecca Wadsworth sued Gregory Howland, PA-C, Paul Paustian, M.D., and their employer, Georgia EM-I Medical Services, P.C. the “defendants”, asserting claims for ordinary negligence and gross negligence, alleging that the defendants failed to provide her with necessary medical treatment while she was in the emergency department of the Houston Medical Center.1 At trial, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, claiming that OCGA § 51-1-29.5 applied to Wadsworth’s claims because her cause of action arose out of the provision of “emergency medical care” in a hospital emergency room and that Wadsworth failed to prove gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence as required by OCGA § 51-1-29.5 c. Wadsworth argued that the statute did not apply because the treatment she received was not “emergency medical care” as defined by OCGA § 51-1-29.5 a 5 and that, therefore, the jury should be allowed to consider ordinary negligence under the preponderance of evidence standard. The trial court denied the motion for directed verdict, finding that the evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue on gross negligence. The court further found that the evidence created a jury issue as to whether the medical care provided to Wadsworth constituted emergency medical care, which would determine which standard of care and burden of proof would apply. Consequently, the trial court charged the jury on both ordinary negligence and gross negligence, along with the respective burdens of proof. The court further charged the jury on the statutory definition of “emergency medical care” and instructed the jury that their determination as to whether Wadsworth’s claims involved the provision of emergency medical care would determine which standard of care and burden of proof to apply. Ultimately, the jury applied the ordinary negligence standard of care and returned a verdict in favor of Wadsworth in the amount of $5,000,000.
The defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred: 1 by allowing the jury to determine, as a question of fact, whether Wadsworth’s claims arose out of the provision of “emergency medical care” as defined by OCGA § 51-1-29.5 a 5; 2 in failing to decide, as a matter of law, that the medical care provided to Wadsworth constituted emergency medical care; 3 in denying their motion for directed verdict based on Wadsworth’s failure to show gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence; and 4 in providing confusing instructions to the jury concerning the applicable standard of care and burden of proof. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
