Douglas L. Quinney and his wife sued Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Inc. and Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. “the hospital”, Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C. , Raymond E. Gutierrez, M.D., Elizabeth Kenja, R.N., and David Stalvey, R.N. collectively referred to as “the defendants” asserting claims for professional negligence and for violations of the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act “EMTALA” under 42 U.S.C § 1395dd, alleging that the defendants failed to provide Mr. Quinney with necessary medical treatment while he was in the emergency department of the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that OCGA § 51-1-29.5 applied to the Quinneys’ negligence claims and that the Quinneys failed to satisfy their evidentiary burden of showing gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that the hospital was entitled to judgment on the Quinneys’ EMTALA claim. The Quinneys appeal, arguing that the trial court erred: 1 in finding that their claims arose out of the provision of “emergency medical care” as defined by OCGA § 51-1-29.5 a 5; or 2 if OCGA § 51-1-29.5 does apply, in finding that they failed to show gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence; and 3 in finding that they failed to show that the hospital violated the federal EMTALA statute. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we construe the evidence most favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and possible inferences. The party opposing summary judgment is not required to produce evidence demanding judgment for it, but is only required to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact.