State v. Johnson

The State charged Holly Johnson by citation in municipal court in May 2010 and then by accusation in State Court in November 2010 with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that she was a less safe driver “DUI less safe” OCGA § 40-6-391 a 1. On February 25, 2013, the trial court granted Johnson’s motion for discharge and acquittal based upon her constitutional right to a speedy trial. The State appeals, contending that the trial court misapplied the principles set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 92 SCt. 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972 and Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647 112 SCt. 2686, 120 LE2d 520 1992, which guide a court in consideration of whether a delay in bringing an accused to trial amounts to a denial of her right to a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record and the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Johnson’s right to a speedy trial was violated.

In Georgia, the application of these principles to the circumstances of a particular case is a task committed principally to the discretion of the trial courts, and it is settled law that our role as a court of review is a limited one. See State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 2 a 705 SE2d 636 2011. Under our precedents, we must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, id., and we must accept the ultimate conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion, even though we might have reached a different conclusion were the issue committed to our discretion. Id. at 533 2 e.