Settendown Public Utility, LLC, Ken Curren, Camella Curren, and Waterscape Services, LLC collectively “Settendown”, and their attorney, George E. Butler, II, have filed separate direct appeals from an order of the trial court disqualifying Butler from representing Settendown in a lawsuit filed against it by Waterscape Utility, LLC “Waterscape”.1 Waterscape filed a motion to dismiss each of these appeals, arguing that an order disqualifying counsel is an interlocutory order and that Settendown and Butler failed to obtain a certificate of immediate review or follow the application procedures required for an interlocutory appeal.2 We denied the motions to dismiss to allow us to consider Settendown’s argument that there is a conflict in Georgia law on the issue of whether a disqualification order is directly appealable. Having read and considered the relevant case law, we find no such conflict. As explained in our previous decision in Lassiter Properties v. Davidson Mineral Properties, 230 Ga. App. 216-217 495 SE2d 663, this issue is controlled by the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Cherry v. Coast House Ltd., 257 Ga. 403, 404 2 359 SE2d 904 1987, rather than by Stevens v. Thomas, 257 Ga. 645 361 SE2d 800 1987. As explained more fully below, Cherry held that an order disqualifying counsel is an interlocutory order. And because neither Butler nor Settendown complied with the requirements for appealing such an order, we are without jurisdiction to consider these appeals. Accordingly, the appeals in both Case No. A13A0830 and Case No. A13A0831 are dismissed.
As an initial matter, the Georgia Code limits our jurisdiction to consider direct appeals to specific categories of judgments set forth in subsections 1 through 12 of OCGA § 5-6-34 a. All other judgments of a trial court are considered interlocutory and are therefore subject to the interlocutory appeal procedure set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 b.