Deloris Gaulden experienced cardiac arrest, and she died in the emergency department of Liberty Regional Medical Center. Her daughter sued Bobby L. Herrington, M.D., the medical director of the emergency department, alleging that Gaulden could have been saved, if only her treating physician and nurse had promptly and properly implemented a chest pain protocol that the hospital had adopted.1 The daughter alleged that Dr. Herrington owed a duty to supervise the training of the physician and nursing staff with respect to this protocol, but he negligently failed to ensure that they were adequately trained in that respect. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Dr. Herrington, but the Court of Appeals reversed, at least to the extent that the claim against him sounded in professional negligence.2 Gaulden v. Green, 319 Ga. App. 84, 85 733 SE2d 802 2012. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Dr. Herrington assumed a responsibility as medical director to supervise the training of emergency department physicians and nurses, and as a result, he owed a legal duty to Gaulden to see to it that their training was sufficient “to ensure that the physicians and nurses were adequately informed of and knowledgeable about hospital policies, including the chest pain protocol.” Gaulden, 319 Ga. App. at 90 1. We issued a writ of certiorari to review that decision, and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
To make out a case of medical malpractice, the plaintiff usually must prove that she was, in fact, a patient of the defendant-physician. See Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201 296 SE2d 693 1982 in “classic medical malpractice actions,” “doctor-patient privity is essential because it is this relation which exists between physician and patient which is a result of a consensual transaction that establishes the legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct” Citation and punctuation omitted. See also Rindsberg v. Neacsu, 317 Ga. App. 269, 272 730 SE2d 525 2012; Schrader v. Kohout, 239 Ga. App. 134, 136-137 522 SE2d 19 1999. In this case, of course, it is undisputed that Dr. Herrington did not treat Gaulden. But the usual rule has a few recognized exceptions, and in this case, the Court of Appeals found such an exception, relying upon its own decision in Gray v. Vaughn, 217 Ga. App. 872 460 SE2d 86 1995, as well as Restatement Second of Torts § 324A a. We conclude, however, that neither Gray nor Section 324A a properly applies in this case.
