This appeal returns to us following our grant in 2010 of appellant Holly Cox’s pro se application for a certificate of probable cause and our remand of the case to the habeas court with direction “to analyze and make appropriate findings and legal conclusions regarding the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel.” See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 1984. On remand, the habeas court concluded that Cox did not satisfy the prejudice prong and denied relief. We again granted Cox’s pro se application for a certificate of probable cause, and examine the habeas court’s rationale for concluding that Cox did not establish the requisite prejudice to authorize relief. Cox entered guilty pleas in 1998 in Mitchell County to charges of aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and incest, for which she was sentenced to serve consecutively terms of 30 years and of 20 years, and to serve concurrently a term of ten years. She entered her guilty pleas after having been informed by trial counsel and the trial court that she would be eligible for parole after serving ten years. In point of fact, the General Assembly had designated aggravated child molestation as a serious violent felony and statutorily required that “any sentence imposed for the first conviction of any serious violent felony . . . shall be served in its entirety as imposed by the sentencing court and shall not be reduced by any form of parole or early release. . . .” Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, §1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 180, §2 former OCGA § 17-10-6.1c3. Because the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of thirty years for the aggravated child molestation conviction, under former OCGA § 17-10-6.1c3, Cox was required to serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
In July 2008, having been imprisoned for ten years, Cox filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by affirmatively misrepresenting her eligibility for parole in discussions with her that preceded her entry of the guilty pleas. The habeas court denied relief and we granted Cox’s application for certificate of probable cause in January 2010, ruling that the habeas court had erred in finding that Cox’s attorney had not performed deficiently when he affirmatively misrepresented to Cox that she would be eligible for parole when she was not. See former OCGA § 17-10-6.1c3 now c4; Crowder v. Smith , 288 Ga. 739 707 SE2d 78 2011; Smith v. Williams , 277 Ga. 778 596 SE2d 112 2004. We remanded Cox’s case to the habeas court for consideration of the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel and, on remand, the habeas court denied relief, finding “there is insufficient evidence to undermine confidence in the outcome and there is not, therefore, a reasonable probability within the meaning of applicable law that Cox would have pleaded differently had she received accurate advice as to her parole eligibility.” It is this ruling we now review. “Deference is given to the habeas court’s factual findings as to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous; the habeas court’s legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo.” Rakestrau v. State , 278 Ga. 872 2 608 SE2d 216 2005.
